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Oral history transcript, William J. Jorden, interview 3 (III), 8/13/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

work I respect, and I think that very often in their reporting one got an insight into a situation or a mood or an action that one didn't get in the action reports that were coming through official channels, often through eight filters and so on and so

Oral history transcript, William McChesney Martin, interview 1 (I), 5/8/1987, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

that I would be accused of having brought the government down by this action. I felt this was just really silly, but I accepted it and I'm not going to try to insult the president of the United States. He just got the story all wrong. Later he as much

Oral history transcript, Henry H. Fowler, interview 3 (III), 7/31/1969, by David G. McComb (Item)

had to take the positions and information that came to me from those sources as the benchmark for my own actions. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781

Oral history transcript, Phillip Tocker, interview 1 (I), 7/3/1984, by Lewis Gould (Item)

attorney in the state of Texas principally and have been since my graduation in 1933. In addition to being an attorney and representing for many years the Outdoor Advertising Association of America, which is the association of members who
Biographical information; how Tocker came to know LBJ; the billboard bonus law of 1958; Tocker’s work for the Outdoor Advertising Association of America; passing an amendment to the billboard bonus law; LBJ’s stance in regard to the billboard bonus

Oral history transcript, W. DeVier Pierson, interview 1 (I), 3/19/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)

been horrified if he knew how little I knew when I started. Mc: Did you continue in this area? P: Yes--and all the way through, although we did a good deal more in 1967 in thinking through farm programs, programs for rural America up

Oral history transcript, James H. Rowe, Jr., interview 3 (III), 12/16/1969, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

, but when he goes to Turkey or South America. He seems to have some particular genius at organization and handling people. attractive man. A very Valenti had met him somewhere, I don't know where, maybe when he was there. Valenti called Monsignor

Oral history transcript, R. Sargent Shriver, interview 3 (III), 7/1/1982, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

on the CCC experience. G: Did you see the Job Corps as the component that would yield the fastest results in the War on Poverty, say as opposed to Community Action or VISTA? S: That may well have been true, I'm not sure. I am sure, however
Corps; Jeanne Noble and Bennetta Washington's involvement in women's Job Corps centers; Bill Kelly taking over for Ted Berry as director of Community Action and Kelly's later work in Job Corps; talking to LBJ in December 1964 to get the Job Corps budget

Oral history transcript, Lewis Mayhew, interview 1 (I), 5/1/1985, by Janet Kerr-Tener (Item)

: Okay. Well, I ask because the 1955 White House Conference on Education, sponsored by the Eisenhower administration, did make a fairly specific set of recommendations for federal action, for state action, and local action in education, and I

Oral history transcript, Frank M. Wozencraft, interview 11 (XI), 2/27/1969, by T.H. Baker (Item)

some way to jar you into action, so that your delay must be constructive and using the time to get into the forefront issues that you feel need to be there, postponing to another day the ultimate decision which you would have a sharp conflict. 2 LBJ
The importance of maintaining a high moral standard; proposed revision of the Administrative Procedure Act; Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) strategies to delay or expedite action to accomplish their intended goals; how to get a viewpoint heard

Oral history transcript, Ramsey Clark, interview 5 (V), 6/3/1969, by T.H. Baker (Item)

for repressive legislation would be even greater without affirmative action by the administration. We had been building up toward this for a couple of years anyway. So we went forward. B: May I ask here because it's a part of the bill: Am I correct in assuming

Oral history transcript, Lawrence E. (Larry) Levinson, interview 1 (I), 11/19/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

period between the proposal and the action. Things sort of hatch and get warm and ripen, but the seeds have been planted through this by this very thorough study of the operations of the federal government which call for some very fundamental reforms

Oral history transcript, Bromley Smith, interview 2 (II), 9/25/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

your expectations are against you, don't get yourself in a position where you haven't any course of action open to you. Suppose you get a tragic over-run of our forces in the DMZ. The reaction in the United States will be tremendous, but I doubt very

Oral history transcript, Courtney A. Evans, interview 1 (I), 3/27/1969, by T.H. Baker (Item)

to enlarge the initial program, these didn't meet with favorable action from the Congress insofar as appropriations were concerned. B: Did you conceive of the purpose of this office to be primarily planning as opposed to operational in the sense of grants

Oral history transcript, William Dayton Maclay, interview 1 (I), 11/19/1968, by T.H. Baker (Item)

sure it makes a difference from the overall standpoint. so-called "action" programs. The It probably has lesser effect on the research, which is I think not as closely politically oriented as the department's action programs. But the general

Oral history transcript, Warren Christopher, interview 3 (III), 12/2/1968, by T.H. Baker (Item)

://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 11 federal troops in Chicago were extremely restrained in their action and in my

Oral history transcript, C. Robert Perrin, interview 2 (II), 3/17/1969, by Stephen Goodell (Item)

was the National Advisory Council? P: The National Advisory Council also was created by the act to bring together, at a high level, citizens simply to serve as an advisory group for the director of OEO. It subsequently, through Congressional action

Oral history transcript, George Ball, interview 2 (II), 7/9/1971, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

, as I saw it even in those days, a rearguard action. I was trying to slow down or prevent the escalation of the war. I was trying to persuade the President and my other colleagues that we should systematically seek to cut our losses and disengage from

Oral history transcript, Henry H. Fowler, interview 1 (I), 1/10/1969, by David G. McComb (Item)

as But in my judgment the USSR completely reversed the spirit and thrust of the Yalta agreement at Potsdam in August, 1945. M: The history textbooks indicate that the realization that America was in a Cold War came but slowly in the few years following

Oral history transcript, S. Douglass Cater, interview 3 (III), 5/26/1974, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

. Then the rather traditional thing followed. I always made it the business in areas that I was working in that each thing would trigger a succeeding action. And he, I think, in that speech, although you would have to check, indicated that he was going to set up

Oral history transcript, Adrian S. Fisher, interview 2 (II), 11/7/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

weapons conference were held earlier, it would be the non-nuclear powers getting together and having an advance caucus for making a rather high price with going along with the non-proliferation treaty. So the timing of these two actions was fairly critical

Oral history transcript, Joseph A. Califano, interview 38 (XXXVIII), 11/15/1988, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

, financial supporter, of the Democratic Party, or at least the Lyndon Johnson Democratic Party. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral

Oral history transcript, Thomas H. (Admiral) Moorer, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

is probably too strong a word, but a program of actions designed to warn the North Vietnamese that something forceful might be in store for them if they didn't lay off supporting operations in the South? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org

Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 1 (I), 3/4/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

mosquito netting and soap and blankets and stuff like that, that people needed, because this--I'm trying to recall when this was--this was about October, I guess, in 1954. He also introduced me to a guy named Hanh [?], who ran the Ministry of Social Action

Oral history transcript, Anthony Solomon, interview 1 (I), 11/18/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

advice and recommendation and if the U.S. firm does not wish to accept it, then we have no alternative. M: What has been the experience, particularly in cases where your advice might be based on the judgment or the action of an international organization

Oral history transcript, Lewis W. Walt, interview 1 (I), 1/24/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

a look at that. So you're getting a tele- vision picture, probably, of bits and pieces of about twenty per cent of the war--maybe fifteen per cent of the war. action out of that. And they only pick the dramatic So that's what you're getting on your

Oral history transcript, Gene Latimer, interview 1 (I), 8/17/1971, by David G. McComb (Item)

seemed harsh at the moment, and they sometimes did, his actions always later proved to be in my best interests. But I continued to have trouble with my finances, and once when the pain had been severe for some time I summoned up the considerable courage

Oral history transcript, Edwin O. Reischauer, interview 1 (I), 4/8/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

not established contacts with the outside world or been interested in that aspect of America's national interest as much as maybe Mr. Kennedy had. In any case, certainly in a country like Japan and most others he did not have a great image the way Mr. Kennedy
reaction to crucial U.S. decisions; exchanging his role as Asian scholar for that of ambassador; importance of early action to avoid later crisis; SEATO; attempts to minimize the bad Japanese-American relations; the Vietnam War and why U.S. methods didn’t

Oral history transcript, Leslie H. Gelb, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

? LG: Oh, there's a trade-off, but I think that a president is able to explain these things and justify them satisfactorily when the cause is justified. For example, take Central America. I think there would be no difficulty whatsoever getting

Oral history transcript, Arthur M. Okun, interview 1 (I), 3/20/1969, by David G. McComb (Item)

on . on fiscal policy . But I think some of the basic ideas of the task The task force emphasized the need for prompt action We've had lots of examples of that in recent years, have urged strongly the proposal for giving the President some discretionary

Oral history transcript, Lyman Lemnitzer, interview 1 (I), 3/3/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Department--the third member was the Finance Minister--and they urgently sought from Dean Acheson and General Marshall support for the French forces fighting in Vietnam in the action leading up to Dien Bien Phu. They urged that we have our light bombers

Oral history transcript, William C. Westmoreland, interview 2 (II), 7/25/1985, by Charles B. MacDonald (Item)

deteriorated at lower levels during the latter years of the war and became a weak point. Operations put such a load on small-unit action that leadership at that level became strained. tour exacerbated it. The one-year I consider that the marines were used

Oral history transcript, McGeorge Bundy, interview 2 (II), 2/17/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

of assurances without much action, and those due bills fell in. As soon as the election was over, when it became apparent, as indeed it had been right through the year that we were living on borrowed time, the President hadn't wanted to make and the government
after he left the LBJ administration; Bundy's view of U.S. action in Vietnam 1966-1968; events leading up to LBJ's 3/31/1968 speech announcing he would not seek re-election; Bundy's DePauw University speech and response to it; Bundy's surprise

Oral history transcript, Robert M. Montague, interview 1 (I), 9/27/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

to see the Vietnamese want to mount a positive program even if it was not terribly well thought out, planned and executed. G: Were there after-action appreciations of Hop Tac? Was there an effort to draw lessons from it? M: Well, we had a pretty

Oral history transcript, Stewart L. Udall, interview 4 (IV), 10/31/1969, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

apparently nervous about decisions that I might or might not make with the oil program. There began to be inquiries about actions that were pending or that people thought might be taken and this came into view. Then it later on, along in January, that the two

Oral history transcript, Lee C. White, interview 4 (IV), 3/3/1971, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

development. You can't set the d2:!lned thing up so that only the large privately owned utilities can benefit from this. We ought to have some way of getting a slice of the action. 11 The big utilities say, "Well, now, just a second. We've got some stuff
FPC concerns: pollution, future energy requirements, nuclear power generation; cooperation between the FPC and the AEC; the changing role of the NEA; the 1965 NYC power failure ("brown-out"); LBJ summons the FPC to action, the beginning

Oral history transcript, David G. Nes, interview 2 (II), 3/25/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Nes Congress on the other. ~- II -- 5 And it listed ten or fifteen recommended courses of action, which I

Oral history transcript, Ray S. Cline, interview 2 (II), 5/31/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

that leading eventually to Che Guevara's death was a side of our operational program in Central America and the Caribbean. But Mongoose, as I understood it, was aimed at Cuba proper and it was to prevent the economy from being successful. I know

Oral history transcript, Clark M. Clifford, interview 5 (V), 12/15/1969, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

was a fascinating one. Mr. Forrestal at that stage was very clear on what was needed, and he chose a course of action that is rarely selected by men. He was completely forthright with President Truman and in effect said, "I've come over to tell you I have been wrong
by Defense Department; Middle East tension; U.S.-limited partner in regional associations of nations; balance of power in South America; beginning of arms limitation talks; U.S.-U.S.S.R summit meeting; invasion of Czechoslovakia; role of National Security

Oral history transcript, Paul C. Warnke, interview 1 (I), 1/8/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)

of Defense to take action to insure that no discriminatory practices existed. We were able to point to this pro- vision in the Maryland law as sort of the opening wedge, so that initially we evolved the policy of requiring that any housing near bases

Oral history transcript, E. Ernest Goldstein, interview 5 (V), 5/3/1990, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)

some suggestion that toward the end of his life his thinking on civil rights evolved more to affirmative action than he had previously embraced. Did he talk about that at all or do you think that was part of it? EG: No, I don't remember the words

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