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  • is immediate military threats. As far as Africa and South America are concerned, I remember George Ball, I guess it was, said, "Their problems are impossible, but not serious." And you say that there's a good bit of truth in that. They're not serious from
  • doing something on New Year's Eve, Friday, December 31--I think it was a Friday--that they thought they could get away with. And it was like surreptitious action, number one. Number two, there was a strong feeling that they were, in fact, taking
  • Republic. In your judgment was our action and the size of our commitment justified with the information that was available at that time? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories
  • started recommendations to resume consideration of this course of action, which had been considered and rejected in the past. It was only after three terrorist attacks on American installations--one, the Bien Hoa Air Base just before the election; one
  • , if they wanted to create an atmosphere where negotiation could take place, [was that] there should be some action taken to call the strike off. We couldn't possibly do anything more in the immediate hours than to get down to some agreement extending the current
  • remember. 1 don't know how it came about. 1 think maybe what we did was perhaps to get draft memos on ideas; someone would come up with saying, "Well, here's an idea for a community action program," for instance. the statute." They'd say, "Well, stick
  • Services Committee. Senator [Richard] Russell was chairman. Styles Bridges was the senior Republican. Lyndon was number three on the committee on the Democratic side, Russell being the chairman and Harry Byrd, Sr. of Virginia, now deceased, the next in rank
  • representative of the United States. The difference would lie in the power behind the United States as against the power behind, say Sweden, in this case. The United States Simply cannot take irresponsible action without it having great repercussions throughout
  • this time. I might complete the actions that happened here, although they are not chronologically all together, by stating that the final resolution between Mr. Zwick and myself came about in the Presidentrs office on a final occasion when the President had
  • a general concept in Latin America that the U.S. should not intervene. F: How much notice did you have of our action? B: None. F: You mean that you found out from what you learned in the papers It had already happened when I found out. to a certain
  • Foreign service career assignments: 1936 in the Pacific and later in Latin America; effect of Alliance for Progress in Ecuador; effect of Kennedy assassination on the Alliance; assignment as Ambassador to Venezuela; fishing agreement (12 mile limit
  • of legislation which tends to make it easier for handicapped people, especially those in wheel chairs, to move around, by eliminating these so-called "Architectural barriers." So this has been a part of the program. So actually our program is one of action
  • language, but always this overriding consideration was there. Well, we have to make it work somehow. And we have to take action that we think is agreeable to, and in the interest of, the country. And out of that broad principle we always manage somehow
  • . Mulhollan PLACE: Mr. Bundy's office, New York City Tape 1 of 1 M: This time the subjects I want to talk about--and for your time benefit I hope we can wind it up--are Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East, particularly. Suppose we begin with Latin
  • and his failure to explain his decisions to the press and public; Bundy's work in Santo Domingo; Ellsworth Bunker's negotiating success in the Dominican Republic; LBJ's relations with Latin America; LBJ's support of Multilateral Force (MLF); opposition
  • in the defensive capabilities of the country. Now the parts of our program that receive major criticism at the present time involve military aid to such countries as Ethiopia and to countries in Latin America. I think I've explained earlier that our military
  • their competence, and so it was a good match. Just to show you how the thing ran, I was on a program one evening at the Mayflower Hotel--it was a conference on day care--and the head of the Child Welfare League of America, Joe Reid, and I were on that program
  • Biographical information; Head Start; developmental action; Sargent Shriver; grant application process; Syracuse project; parental involvement; Even Start program; Title II and Community Action Program; Child Development Group of Mississippi; Head
  • document which he, I think, never published. But he and Secretary [Stewart] Udall considered it a very important document. Actually as a result of this, we put it in book form, A More Beautiful America -- Lyndon B. Johnson, you see. This was done I think
  • Burke Marshall was confirmed, and this delayed somewhat any initiative action in the civil rights field. In fact, delayed it until the freedom-rider episodes during the summer of 1961, when on several occasions we had people including the Deputy Attorney
  • want to start in 1937. F: And you were a freshman American. L: In 1937 I had never seen America. I met, in the summer of 1937 in the vicinity of Salzburg, a man by the name of Charles E. Marsh, who was a newspaper owner or publisher from Texas (ed
  • Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Goldfarb -- I -- 7 I was reading stuff there and educating myself while I was serving. I read [Michael] Harrington's book [The Other America] the first day I arrived, because I hadn't
  • to see me; they knew what Wirtz was arguing for, and that's what they wanted, and that we faced action in the House very soon. And I suggested that LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library
  • -- XXVII -- 2 we were faced with was liberals and liberal editorial writers saying, "Not enough," the Congress saying, "Too much, 2.3 billion is too much," and the southern Democrats also saying, "We're not going to give another tool to desegregate
  • that encouraged congressional actions way beyond this budget. [He] mentioned the defense problem and not knowing where Vietnam was going. And Les Arends said, "Putting it bluntly Congress is the problem." Ford said we ought to differentiate between authorizations
  • , the Brinks incident occurred--a clear case of terrorist action against an American officers' billet. was very fortunate that the damage was light. It But I recommended retaliation again despite the nearness of Christmas. I was much less sympathetic
  • HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Dale -- I -- 2 D: After while it became clear it was Latin America. He didn't appear until
  • Comparison of service as Executive Director for the U.S., International Monetary Fund in JFK and LBJ administrations; LBJ policy to draw eastern bloc states of communist countries into IMF; duties of IMF position; role and actions of "Deming Group
  • independently reached agreement that the program they were presenting to us made no political sense. You couldn't hang the whole poverty program on community action and you'd have to put together a much more diverse package with elements, something for everybody
  • =z~ r~o, ~~d a~d Kennedy a~d Johnson, I select them, you understand why I skipped then to suddenly be restricted in their actions and so forth, LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson
  • there'd be speedy action on the LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh
  • , as a moral issue. I think he knew, if not exactly, he had a good sense of what it would do to the Democratic Party over time. But he thought these rights were more important than the Democratic Party basically. Crudely put. He never said that, but I always
  • do not themselves have the force of law, but under many statutes they are prerequisite to certain other actions that he may take, such as the issuance of an executive order. To be precise about one example, before the president can order federal
  • assassination; the occasional need to make sure the president understands the situation about which he is making a decision; the president's authority in lawmaking; interagency action; the 1967 New Town in Town program at Fort Lincoln in Washington, D.C
  • Leader. F: Right. Let I s talk very briefly about the period when you T,qe re the leading Democrat in the Senate, and Mr. Johnson served as junior senator but was definitely on his way. One of the things that came up T,-las the confirmation of Leland
  • of the chairman of the committee, Senator Russell, and so the questioning was designed to support the action of President Truman. I was convinced in reading the record that this was so, anyhow. G: At the same time it was a very touchy political issue, and a lot
  • the Congress. I don't think this is an illegal activity. The only illegal activity that I know of was one young ill-advised staff member at one point sent a wire to a mayor asking him to make some sort of intercession, and this was an improper action
  • or three months before any action was taken, and that was taken only after Dr . Travell was informed that if she did not call Dr . Kraus, he would be called without her consent . This period following Dr . Kraus' arrival was a very productive one as far
  • a policy but to explore various alternative courses of action that could be undertaken. I think the general conclusion was that at least for the time being we ought to do more of the same, which was basically putting Americans in an advisory role
  • my first memory is his campaigning in the area, and we would always go, and Tom was helping hold elections here, and we were pretty active Democrats, which wasn't an easy thing to be in this county. (Laughter) G: This is Gillespie County. BW: Yes
  • How the Weinheimer and Johnson families knew each other; meeting LBJ and Lady Bird; LBJ’s 1954 campaign; the Weinheimers being Democrats; the history of party allegiances in Gillespie County, Texas; the impression LBJ made on local citizens
  • that we're beginning, and international education. "Expand trade . . . program to [re]build on a scale never before attempted, entire central and slum areas in several of our cities in America."--Model Cities. "I recommend that you attack the wasteful
  • into a regular course of conduct; retaliation is not an attractive premise to base major action on, and you're comparing apples and oranges in the most classic sense if you're trying to judge whether to strike X target because of a barracks' dynamiting
  • administration recommended adjustments in salary to the Congress that followed that particular pattern. The President was particularly vigorous in seeing to it that this commitment was validated by congressional action and that the executive machinery
  • approach of some kind, how do you get it into the action channel? 0: Send it as a memo to the secretary . M: Is there anyway you can then lobby it forward? 0 : Oh sure . I can go and talk to him about it, or I can ask for a meeting in which other
  • conception. the Manpower Training Act was passed in 1962. As I recall It probably took some time to get this going. R: It did. M: And you came in about the time that it was in action. R: Well, the first programs were really started in early 1963
  • Biographical information; Manpower Development and Traveling Act; Office of Manpower Automation and Training; Community Action agencies; business in ghetto areas; Social Security Office; Chamber of Commerce; employment programs; NAB; labor union