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  • HE 'L-OGKED FORWARO lff)iLY 10 SEEING TSE "!Pl~SI.'ll!NT IN ·-- ··: -;:; .-:-r:~ , .)IASH}ltGTON, f,1£ FE'ELS HE PROBASL Y MUST RETURN -HOME' AS HIS PEOPLE .. _ ~WDlllD NDT UNDERSTAND HIS TRAVELING IN .PARIS A.liD ._. .V.lSl.t'IJJG. THE -¥AIR
  • difficult the flow of armed mea and aupplles comillg from the Nortb. It was necessary, finally,, and after flve long years o.f reatra.lnt, to bring home to the men ln Hanol. some ol the punlshme-nt that they had long been hullctlng on tielr fellow
  • the Nortb. It was necessary, finally,, and after flve long years o.f reatra.lnt, to bring home to the men ln Hanol. some ol the punlshme-nt that they had long been hullctlng on tielr fellow Vietnamese la the South. The bombing of North Vietnam began
  • December December 9, that Dzu was still at home (though under.house arrest), and that it appeared unlikely he would be arrested, as Dzu stated to the American journalists. Although we feel that Dzu has largely shot his bolt and is not highly regarded
  • -4'l 4 p 04/13/65 A #57a letter to Sir Robert Gordon Menzies from the P~esident Possible classified information 1 p n.d. A #120a lette to the president Possible classified information 4/2/65 A 4/17/65 A ~ Pos~isle tl129 memo resident
  • program. Since that time we have been developing this in detail. In the meantime, with the Kennedy Round behind us and the prospect for five years of periodic tarif~ reduction and with the increasing pressure of protectionism on the home front which could
  • program. Since that time we have been developing this in detail. In the meantime, with the Kennedy Round behind us and the prospect for five years of periodic tarif~ reduction and with the increasing pressure of protectionism on the home front which could
  • £ PRESIDENT FROM MR. PRESIDENT I TR!? AND ij!LL BE WALL·NER GOLDSTEIN HAVE DECIDED TO CANCEL MY BRUSSELS COMING HOME THURSDAY NIGHT. FEBRUARY 22. BT NNNN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE • ' INFORMATION SEcii.ET Mr. Pre ■ ldeat: · The order• ba•• Nea
  • a schedule to move out of South Vietnam, to come home, to leave no troops in that area, to give up our bases--provided they will lay on the table their schedule for withdrawal, and their schedule to get their people to quit the killing and the murdering
  • :. ~AYDEN THOMA. N, W& ■STCIII DCNNla II, aoHI.CMMIIII OCOIIOC C, OUU.WUOIII. October.18, DID NOll'TH CHUIICM DTMCT T-Ma•­ AMA-DII 1967 'I'.he President Washington, D. C. Sir: Any responsible, thinking person must approve of your stand JI on Viet
  • for this kind of constructive movement. This will convey, both ab::oad and at home, ·the impression of an administration which responds imaginatively, not defensively, to external challenge. II. 3. Vietnam The Vietnamese war offers a chance to create a s
  • on top of the Vietnamese situation, and the fact that we already had a lessened or smaller Strategic Reserve force at home, don't you think this is a very small force to be calling. in for the home_ front fprces? MORE 5 SECRETARY CLIFFORD: No, because
  • THAT F'CJREIGMMINISTER GROMYKOWAS COMSIDERIN8 SIGNING FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMEIJTIF' THE SIGNATURES WERE AFFIXED IN GEtJEVA• IF DESIRED I CAN READILY ASCERTAIN FROM HIM PRECISELY ~HAT HE HAD IN MIND SINCE THE MATTER HAS BEEN LEFT THAT THE SIR!IIWi WILL TAKE PLACE
  • for ammunition and food supplies. This draft is very unpopular as the porters must work far from home, supply their own food and risk attacks . . Meanwhile guerrillas and local force soldiers are told to prepare for duty with main forces mainly in the Highlands
  • -t/~ (VL.J91-#0(, I.LO .ff #13a Letter President Johnson to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa lp possible classified information 06/30/65 A #59a Letter President Johnson to Eisaku Sato possible classified information 06/18/65 A #63a Letter Juan
  • House of Representatives Washington, D. C. t,3b PHIL M. LANDRUM HOME ADDRESS 9TH DISTl'IIC'r• GEORGIA JASPER, GEORGIA COMMITTEE: WAYS AND MEANS OFFICE ADDRESS: Congress of tbc ~nftcb ~tatcs 2308 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, 0.C
  • THAT IF THEY RETALIATE AGAIN , IN RE SPO SE TO ANYT Hir SiORT · OF A MAJ OR ATl ACK, OUR ABIL I TY TO .STABILIZE THE AREA MAY BE CRIPPLED. . 2. · -BRINGING HOME TO THEi4 THAT THEY• VE· UNDERCUIT YOUR POL I CI £S WILL ST RZ NGTHEN ·YOUR HAND '"FOR WHATEVER WE MAY HAVE
  • .:.:lS!.!J..8 SEC!tE'l' INFOR.MA TION Monday, December 16, 1968 Mr. Pre.tdent: Walt R.o ■tow la at home runnln1 a fever . .Attached l• the a1uda for the luncheon ■ cheduled tomorrow. In the event that Mr. R.o ■tow com•• ln ln the momlna, we can
  • received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize
  • . Santiago Toast at Frei dinner: . Themes Strength of Chilean democratic ins ti tut ions. Fo:r;ward-looking policies of President Frei: "Revolution in Freedom" at home and leadership abroad in econ­ omic integration, arms limitation, port enclave
  • -Communist world. The government in Moscow is even now b~ginning slowly to accept the fact that its people want private automobiles and decent homes and privacy and travel. Let us be clear. There is nothing that has happened over these three years which
  • .__ la pllltllc thl• tecllalcal fact Ila• pla,.. or pr•n••· ... er ■ tuMllac of eltller n1n••lea WWRo•tow:rba ACUOJ! Sir >-....,.,.., •-••c••• tile lonae• Prime Mlalalu el 1... 1a, baa ,-r,msl _.. ,,,,. .... u .. ,-1ea .. amc. •1•• ,- • CT•~ B
  • threat to _its stability. At home, we have to contend both with the national impatience of · our people and with the repercussions on the Presidential campaign which will arise from a stalemate. As long as we continue at least the present limited bombing
  • REFERREDTO " • THE DOMESTIC ANDSOCIAL PROBLEMS AT HOME,THE MASSIVEDEFICIT IN·. OURBUDGET,THE 10 PER CENTSURCHARGE, THE-IMPAIRINGIMPACTOF THIS WAR ON OUR ABILITY TO COPEWITH PROBLEMS IN NATOAND THE MIDDLE -· POLICY BY • .·EAST, AND THE SIGNIFICANTLACKOF
  • " • THE DOMESTIC ANDSOCIAL PROBLEMS AT HOME,THE MASSIVEDEFICIT IN·. OURBUDGET,THE 10 PER CENTSURCHARGE, THE-IMPAIRINGIMPACTOF THIS WAR ON OUR ABILITY TO COPEWITH PROBLEMS IN NATOAND THE MIDDLE -· POLICY BY • .·EAST, AND THE SIGNIFICANTLACKOF SUPPORT FOR OURVIETNAM
  • .. .... o,,T-;-"'T("'I H(\i°'I } ',..,p ·-;--, - '\ --~ · 'D ,... ,.., ,,t'.:J .. 1 V ' .Jr . ,\ >' SIR r-iI ,..-., / I ··1'1)1". ·1t . i.J ! '~: .LL 0 ~ 1--,L; -ft._; i!!..), ,:)-:'rt t-,-;_) fl ....; Li l!-! i ~ . t_;t ~ { ,r,. t. 1 ~ ,:·1 .L; i:... ~ 1 1
  • sorties would be requi~ed. Casualties would probably number in the hundreds, ~nd homes in the village areas wo~ld be destroyed. Loss of the domestic rice would force Hanoi to import between 175,000-750,000 tons (depending on the success of the flooding
  • supplies quickly into the ha.nds of the refugees, placed a ba.n on luxury !ECRET /NO DIS ~C ,Zf."t I NO DIS -3- construction, and started the rebuilding of homes. 2. Resumption of aggressive offensive operations. It is essential that this should
  • Chancellor Klaua. &Ad talkiaa poblt ■ Om- relatima■ with A1Utl'ia are 1ood. problema. There are no major bilateral Klau i• in political difficulty at home. Hi ■ People'• Party which took office in 1966 followtaa twenty year ■ of coalition acw•rameat
  • be ml•-interpreted •• •apportin1 Bahamian hldepeadwe. I •uu••t we take care of thi• problem by imtiq U. K. Ambaa•ador, Sir Patrick Dean. to accompany Pilldliq here. Thi• would alao be in keepiDa with normal practice and UK wi•he•. W. W. R.o•tow
  • soldier ~ who was on board. I wanted these servicemen who had behaved themselves veey well to be able to celebrate In response to your appeal, Christmas at_ home. I have also ordered the release wounded soldier who had jumped from a helicopter
  • know at home; the determination to vote may well be a further sympton of a des1re to go ahead toward orderly government and generally away from terror and violence. These local elections, therefore, if successfully carried out, can be a sharp blow