Discover Our Collections


  • Type > Text (remove)
  • Series > Memos to the President (remove)
  • Collection > National Security Files (remove)

149 results

  • . / 7. AI1C:H ICAN S IN CUBA THi~ CUBA N GOVER i~I1lENT COi~TINUES TO BLOCK THE DEPARTURE OF ABOUT 1,000 AMERICAN CIT !ZENS WHO HAVE REQUESfED PERMISSION TO L£hVE. SINCE MANY ARE DEST IT UTE, STATE HAS AUTHORIZED THE S>JISS T O PROVIDE THEM
  • and repeated scourings--that· is "comb-out" by police-type methods, precinct by precinct, block by block, house by house and farm by farm, much ·as was done by General Massu in Algiers and which is set forth in David Galula's book "Counter Insurgency Warfare
  • him a 11 party hack" ). He is politically important because he represents the largest single voting block, the 11 Untouchables. " He does not have S ubramaniam •s imagination or quick decisiveness, but is an experienced administrator, and a much more
  • study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and certain third countries, but also offers many advantages. Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking
  • ammunition, 500 pounds of TNT, and 25 pounds of medical supplies. The slide area blocking Route 9 has been bypassed. Twelve bridges and five culverts have been repaired and leading engineer elements are now moving west. It is estimated that Route 9
  • /NVAu I rs· AS SOON AS TH~ ENEMY 8EGINS WITHDRAWING THE REMNANTS or HIS HAIN fORCES TO BASE c~ BORDERAREASTO REGROUP ANDRESUPPLY, INDIVIDUAL5PcRATlONS WILL BE U, DE:RTAKEN TO INTERCEPT, BLOCK AND•DESTROYTHESt: ,ORC:S· ALONG THE R ROUTESOF' WITHDRAWAL
  • conscious of the need to block the Soviet thrust, our hands seem freer, especially in Jordan. What more can we do? Should we, for example, seek a more meaningful US military presence in the Arabian Sea area? SECREI - .. ~iCRiT 3 --The question of how
  • , measures were taken to block access by Israel to the Gulf of Aqaba, despite the international agree­ ments and the existing de facto situationo Everyone knew perfectly well that the enemy ~ould nqt fail to react; the Arab ·press itself ·intimated
  • of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong. 2. Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos. 3. Incre a se sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin
  • CONFLICTRESOLVED. WEBELIEVETHATTHE TIME HASCOMEFOR SOVIETGOVTTO WEIGH IN HEAVILYTO MAKEORVREALIZETHATTHEYARETAKINGA WHOLLY UNREASONABLE ANDUNREALISTIC POSITIONWHICHIS BLOCKING THE WAYTO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WEBELEIVEWEARE NOWAT A CRITICALJUNCTURE,ANDWEFEEL
  • of the dependence on Communist China that would result; but this judgment . . I. should be periodically reexamined in the light of all the circumstances • t l •' ! '; I 'j l In the meanwhile, ways of blocking access between ~aiphong and Hanoi should
  • A DETENTE. WHY DO YOU THINK THEY 'BLOCKED OUR PROPOS AL FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, AND ALSO THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION, AND WHAT ~OLE ARE THEY PLAYING NOW? 1 S.M. CLEVELAND BT . ' - -- ----,,---.--'---:..........--'--~-.------,.....-,---...- I
  • 1.4) is not a high performa.nee air... craft and would coat considerably less. It represents a more log1.. cal progression on the part -o f Latin Americ4 into supersonics. the assumption that we must block Mirage purchases and ·o ffer instead r-s•s, I
  • Operations 1. I have revlow~d Co:i. Cuah:n.m' a plaa fer the riex.t six-eight. weeks in Northern I Corp=. Priority will be given to cestroyi:lg . enemy !orcos in coaotal aroaa of Tbua Th1en &nd Quang Tri; blocking enemy u:.e o: ltouto 5~7 aad mterdicting bis