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  • the actions we must take in the next few months, and b. Study the alternatives which face us in the next year or two with recommendations as to the course of action we should adopt. t:PA Rostow Attached are two unanswered quest j ons which I suggest you
  • . The mos~ . seriou~ situation apnears to be at C..iJ./tU u()
  • forces to be available at all times. 2. Make available troops for an amphibious landing north of the DMZ if that action is decided upon. The 82nd Airborne and the Sixth-Ninth of Marine division can only be deployed if we eliminate the restrictions
  • ..riits up to strength. President Eise:i.::.ower said we should press for C.iplor.1atic action in t.l-i.e United Nations, and intensify the bombing in North Korea. I want to ask Secretary McNamara to review exactly what happened. We will ask Secretary
  • should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly
  • , and artillery bombardment k:Z-_' ~~ '~ of North Vietna:::i:::,ta ~ Ih~v~::::::t:::ii~:~cision on the ~~ . . basis of developments in the Paris talks, - - and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peacefu~ settlement of the war. I
  • prepared). III. Under Secretary Katzenbach will ask Bill Bundy to amplify and define major action problems now before us. IV. You may then wish to go round the table and get comments from: Gaud on the development picture and prospects in Indonesia; Freeman
  • on military actions and it is probably good that it doesn't. --- The President has strong convictions about our responsibilities in the Middle East, especially toward the people of Israel. --- There is a growing sentiment in this country to " come home
  • on impending action. The President pointed out that he was very dis-appointed by the handling of the discussions with Congress, especially Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell, on the question of sending U. S. transports to the Congo. I .1 i Secretary Rusk
  • ,, . . ... .. _5i:CRE~ - 2 - Secretary Fowler proposed: "The U.S. regrets the failure of the Govern.tnent of Israel to make clear that its actions ·in recent weeks is only provisional." Bundy objected because of the reaction to this. Clark Clifford said do not be too
  • move. DeGaulle will smile at us, but will not change his attitudes on monetary affairs and in relation to Great Britain. Secretary Fowler: The Chinese have been heavy takers of gold. Speculation. There is a possibility of independent actions between
  • - : I'm not giving up the possibility for a pause. But we ought to talk to the Hungarians and Russians. ·· I don't see where it leads us. Bundy Go for one day at Christmas. Defer further action until we talk to the Hungarians and Russians. Rusk
  • , March 15, 1968 -- 4:20 o . m .J lv1Z:.:V10R~:U'JDUiv1 51 e... -=----­ ACTION ~OTES.. FOR THE PRESIDENT SuBJECT: 3:00 p .m. Meeting, March 15, 1968 1. Ask Sec. Clifford to present his recommendations. 2. Questions, if not answered: What level
  • flow for purposes of attacking airfields; tie infiltration to their military actions. GENERAL WHEELER: It would be fatal for us to be forced into de facto cease fire. SECRETARY RUSK: What's going on in Ashau? GENERAL WHEELER: Finding caches
  • States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement. The President nodded agreement and said
  • that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions the Assembly might take concerning Cz echoslovakia, there are at least three perti­ nent consid erations for the U.S.: what 't\lOuld b·e he lpful to the Czechs, what
  • . A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach. 3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler. 4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation. S
  • arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the .Ain.erican people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward
  • an additional $100 million in military assistance, because of North Korean aggressive actions. Details on the ~quipment involved both for the troop package and for the $100 million supplement are attact"wnent A. In short, we have done everything up to this time
  • The Postmaster General said that each Cabinet member had before him a list of target dates for legislation. He stressed that action is desired on these pieces of legislation by Labor Day. He said, "This is our little bible among us. 11 The Postmaster General
  • are in any way weakening. We should send only support troops. General Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The inte rprctation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position
  • - - and do more risky bombing than we have before. You could sell that the other night. Are we getting closer to danger paints by resuming our bombing -- and shoving it -- or by not resuming it? :McN-".."n~ By resuming, '\Ve increase milit:i.ry action
  • . US Action Consic2rations Efforts to achieve a peaceful transiticn thrcu0h creation of a broadly··lxi.sed gov-2rrn:'-'?nt are in our ir.tercst. i:·;e should do what \·:e Cili1 to foster these efforts, :rnakin9 clear to South Arabicm radicals
  • no operating railroads, today 53% are. The North Vietnam army lost about 7, 000 killed in action to about 800 Americans killed in the last two years. The South Korean division has contributed magnificently. In Phu Yen Province, Vietcong controlled 75
  • troops. Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position. General Taylor: I am dismayed. The picture I get is a very
  • no action that would impede South. military actions in the Secretary Rusk: If they ask for a cease-fire, our response should be mutual withdrawal of forces, amnesty, application of Manila formula. Secretary Katzenbach: It is unlikely they'll propose
  • it into an Americal Division such as was organized during World War II. General Westinoreland said this would be handled by picking up bits and pieces of units which. are currently in action. ~IEl 11 46 146 I Ea COPYltleHT!D r rbf.i&atic11 Reqolf'is tecrRaisaleA ef
  • COPYRIGHTED Publication Aequie es V" f!,or.fftiHiun of Copyr1~ht . ,tiolder. W. Thomas lo nson TOP: SECRET EYES_ONLY - - -: :..5..: It was agreed this was the best course of action. The President asked about putting former Ambassador Lodge in charge
  • no part in support of our actions. I propose we hold his feet to the fire on this. THE PRESIDENT: Walt, get in touch with Abe Feinberg on this. Tell them we can only support Israel if we do provide some help to the moderate Arabs. The President ended
  • Vietnamese military force. In 1966, pacification was no more than a plan. Today it is an action. Pacification is beginning to move. 10. The people feel a new sense of dignity. 11. On my last trip to Vietnam I came back "impressed." Today, I returned
  • forces. Out of 40 battles recently, they have had 35 successes. They are fighting in night actions now too. "The press does not believe our head counts and KIA." The President asked Director Helms to get what information the U.S. government has on head
  • revanchism", Viet-Nam, and the Middle East) and generally will try to place Czech events in a cold war context in hopes of silencing the non­ aligned countries that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions
  • appropriate action. I would like to say there 11 1 is a 1clear understanding. General Wheeler: We know they understand if they violate cities and the DMZ we are required to respond. Secretary Rusk: The message does not give ''green light." FM called
  • ·' .... - 2 ­ No action again~t any reconnaissance planes -- drones or manned reconnaissance planes. Apparently they have passed the word. General Taylor: I agree we should play it loose. to protect urban population centers. CIA Director Helms: We are trying
  • your brother who i• in need (cf. Jamee 1, 27) you also give honor to God. It is a great •ource of joy for Us to know that tho Epbcopate, the clergy and the members of Catholic Action and of the "Cursilloa de Criatianda.d" are studying ways
  • of North Vietnam in the South. No real shortage of supplies (Red China has plenty for them); More involvement by the Chinese; More involvement by the Soviets. (It is inconceivable that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction
  • out our reconciliation approach now. The President observed that we do not, in fact, hold to a rigid course of action. We are keeping our options open. Professor Eckstein said he thought it encouraging that we had offered an exchange of agricultural
  • the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ. ;:. . Secretary Rusk said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would reciprocate
  • with a site and wishes to talk. To create a situation, if Hanoi would not move, which would convince our people that we had done all that was possible. In the latter case we could resume full- scale military action with public support. Mr. Rostow cited