Discover Our Collections


  • Type > Text (remove)
  • Collection > National Security Files (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

656 results

  • V.irs. Gan hie ane if t e 22 o wan ed he aide o me tion to get explore The S cretary ma da e. FORM • l S- again behind the PreBident the importance nteersn. 4 of this point "None. He par icularly an energe including In a free ary
  • . 3. SUGGESTED SCHEDULEIS AS FOLLOWS~ WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8 WEDNESDAYARRIVE ENTEBBE LATE AFTERNOON, PAGE2 RUDTCRll43U SECRET CALL ON PRESIDENTOBOTEAT STATEHOUSEENTEBBECMRS. KATZENBACH CALLON MRS. OBOTE81 SAMETIME>. VISIT AID AGRICULTURAL INFO
  • there we.re two quhftions mor;t difficult in this situa.tio1.1, and one was thot7the Suez Canal and the other that of Jerusalem. He s aid tha t one of the difficulties was that the Arabs constantly sup.ported each othar in everything; for exatnple, assuming
  • . His judgment is firmly that it is ·the lesser of two evils: if we do not have such an explol'atory visit. p~easure.s ue likely to grow promptly to expand Israeli military aid in. the wake of Soviet military delivery to the Arabs. He argues further
  • with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developmento From 1958 to 1961 he was again in Washington, that time as Indian Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, a post especially created to deal on a global basis with questions of foreign aid for India. 0 0
  • offered whole wheat flour (35,000 tons) and more dry m1lk for the balance of about $3 million. In addition, it has offered to allow India to use a substantial sum, from the remaining unallocated portion of its regular aid pledge, for the purchase
  • Food aid
  • Sovi et and E gyptian aid . He no\v appears trying to get Enosis with demilitarization of t h e is land. 5. b. the Con go, the re are s ome signs of improvement but milit arily, the situation i s still critical. o. Tanganyika and anzibar
  • . McGeor ge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia D evelopment Association. Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr . Rusk both indicated their -- ~,,,,..¥ _, :,"... '1
  • to reissue this NSAM? State says it is a protiemo BUNDY BKS MEMORANDUM FOR MR . McGEORGE TiiE WHITE HOUS Subj ct: 7 Reissuance of NSAM 217: Visits to South Vietna Official On January 25, 1 63 you issued to the Secretaries ·Of Stat and Def ens nd th AID
  • on this is sue should go no !unhe r than the lVlay 10 Defense Ministers' statement. Greece - We should r esume military aid to Greece . The importance of our military position there has increased as a r esult of the Soviet iHese:1ce i:i the Mediterranean
  • that their own interests would best be served by joint or parallel actiono Alternative 1: To exert maximum pressure to avert the decisiono We might, for example, threaten to termi­ nate economic and technical aid and serve notice that we would not back India up
  • in pacification activities. Senior staff sections working exclusively on Vietnam and targetted on pacification are now operational where none existed eighteen months ago: -z- - AID has organized a special Vietnam Bureau; is better focused in its Revolutionary
  • . 10:15 pm ..... i 9 66 I ' MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ...- .... ,. .,... ~ ................. -...Y .... . ... -.. George Woods -is eager to -start working over the Indians on a selfhelp and aid package as soon as ha knows whe:re we stand
  • . There are admittedly some tough issues to be resolved. both in Our aid review has given us a good go-round on policy and in tactics. some of them. but now we need to follow that up with some good solid projects. There's also the political qucstion--whether pushing hard
  • work· .._ out a ·Kashmir settlement the United States will not give aid to , . either country .. This in effect would give Pakistan a veto on U.S. •• ..: .• aid to India. In effect this would permit one party to sabotage the •..•·· Tashkent Agreement
  • and implemented. 4'0P SECftE'f "• ! .... - 'fOP SEGRE~ - 3 ­ 3. Provide financial support to ensure the stability of the South Vietnamese economy. More foreign aid in 1965 will be needed, as well as additional military equipment. 4. Train Vietnamese
  • friends have two main subjects on their minds these days: 1. Our military aid freeze. As you know, the Israelis are deeply -suspicious that we are trying to use milita~y shipments as leverage to force them to terms with the Arabs. Geller xnay be especially
  • --.... ·~- .. ,............ ;:_:._ .- SUBJECT: Letter from Ambasaador Brown in Rlcaragua Ambatusado.r Aa.,ro1t Brown ha• &~ you the attached letter deSi­ crtbiq: an AID project: bl Nleara.gu. which bt a snlaU,, but meaa­ lBgful.1i fashioa ns tJreqht a better· way oi lli'.e to hGmble p~ple ln
  • the aid bill through. ,.~, unduly p-eesim.istic Pr till w• can re-validate here. our Neitheir Kom r nor but we must aak you to. gr.ant tho td nt'if own unpa.,rall~led sense· of the rocky i-o d th &id bill i having and his s t:r-ong desire
  • to the Congress an economic aid pr ogram for FY 196 7 in which we stated that: - we definitely planned to make Development Loans to 10 countries (Afghanistan., India., Jordan., Pakistan., Turkey., Korea., Ethiopia., Morocco., Nigeria., Tunisia); - . we
  • we do we won 1t know exactly what the Soviets are planning to do. They ap:i;e ar to have left themselves the options of playing this as technical aid or actually becoming involved in producing oil outside the USSR for sale outside the USSR. In any
  • • work to Geer&• ooda an die PJ,eaWeat'• t.ellalf. 2. that tile ~daa/ Jarael plaae tleal la Mttletl, tlwre remalaa tbe matter of telllaa larael uout till• y.ar'• eccaom.lc aid and Pl._. le-Ml. Tlae PreaWeat: •PPl'O-' a certala level laat Jaaary mo la file
  • Food aid
  • of debate about concessional sales of food to UAR, Poland and Yugoslavia. The Hickenloo_per Amendment, for example, specifically exempts our food relief from its mandatory aid shut- off provisions. Attached is a breakdown of programming, approved
  • Food aid
  • mmu an po,la ~lied law. Thla m:ltaliol c:onta~~~~~~n . aace. m and 10t, ~n • CIA/NMC:C: OER AIR) CITE ONE ,AID r.a.., -ft-: 'INTELLIG5:NCE.-- __, DIST ·26 JI..NE 1968. ......... ···-· ·•·••·•·........-- - COUNTRY .CHINA DOI :'1ID- MARCH
  • not want us to discuss MAP levels yet with eithe r country. 11 - 2. ­ We were to 11 make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long - term military aid. " You singled out for India holding down defense expenditures
  • additional concessions out of the U. s. Government durlng tho Park visltJ £or this reason we should avoid epeclfic dl&c.usslone at this moment. ) 3. u. s. Aid to Korea: Park will want all tho roa.seurance we can glve him on our continued econo1nlc eupport
  • assistance. It countered the ChiCom threat by deploy­ ing US air defense, fighter aircraft and air transport units to India and a nuclear capable naval task force into the Bay of Bengal. The Kremlin continued military and economic aid at current levels
  • Following is letter b '- part of Sept8Dlber6 19631;during consultations in Minister Lightbourne over Ambassador's stgnatui-e. p USIA\ Dear Mr. Minister: RMR a 6 09 PM'6.3 to. BEnINVERBATIM TEXT: COM . , I it possible, STR AID INR AGR
  • (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State and including as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Ad­ ministrator, AID, Chairman, JCS, Director, USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The SIG
  • to communicate to the Jordanians, but we will be outting this material in as our.·own assessm EHlt, since Eshkol' s credability at this stage is slight. · 4. The speed-up of the mil tary aid package. which a es sage is being prepared teday. Within seven days, we
  • OF DOCUMENT DATE CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE Agency: RESTRICTION White House, for AID concurrence. FILE LOCATION NSF McGeorge Bundy, Memos for the President, Vol. 4, 5/1-27/64 RESTRICTION CODES (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access
  • ~--;_-f--· , 1 1" AMEMASSY KAIUL ~ Adaon DE Jt UQVVI INR Info NEA cu &·o USIA MAY 5 DOD AID PC SIL AGR COM HEW LAB TB.SY ,'11NT:':-VEEKA··-NO. ] 1965 MAY5. AM 8 1-3 , N t·'J~b t·N TI AL NSC CIA NSA 03897 TO SECSf'AtE·:~ASHDc@ GIINC • ·sr
  • October Dear Dr. 21, 1965 Graham: The wheels of government grind slowly - - obviously. I have had the question of aid for the Ludhiana Christian Medical College of North India in the mill since the day I received your letter. The recommendations
  • ;~·':.,· AID ~ ' RSR '"CINCPAC I BENT . _,.,. I A-1. AUGUST 13 :, f USIA . :: . INR t ·· CIA - NF , t ' ,, ' •. ·.1 '4 FOR POLAD :l f1. ROK,' POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: DRP CAUCUS DECIDED MORNING 'AUGUST 13 TO HAVE ASSEMBLY APPROVE DISPATCH
  • ~ rV INFO PARIS VIENNA BRUSSELS LONDON •• L P ■O .AID AG" co"' "'"" FROM U.S. Embassy OTTAWA INT LAIi TA" SUBJECT: Proposed Sale of Canadian Uranium to France T" ARMY 010 INOICATO" a XM ■ Al" CIA NAVY DATE: )0 June 1965 REF r
  • , a substantial increase in the amount of US economic aid. For the purpose of this section it is assumed that US aid during the period FY 1964-1968 would be based upon a phased reduction of about one-third in present Republic of Korea (ROK) armed force strength
  • commitment in South Korea, will provide additional aid whenever the regime faces economic difficulties. While the regime has agreed to adopt a stabilization program, it has done so only in a nominal sense. DECLASSIFIED Authority fJ 6 00 .-O'f --1--3 By~, NARA