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- purposes. Nor will we forget that balance-of-payments policies should serve the Nation's basic goals abroad and at home-not the reverse. Yet this recognition makes it no less neces.5aryto deal firmly and decisively with our balance-of-payments prob lem
- : All right, sir. Is it accurate to say that your first involvement in intelligence regarding Vietnam was when you were at USARPAC? D: Yes. That's true. You don't watch it with the single focus that the J-2 MACV watches it, because that's the whole
- Wheeler: Yes sir, they remain under the operational control of their government. Secretary Mc:,Jamara: I am under the very clear impression that they have been told by their home governments to do everything possible to hold down their own casualties. Our
- it with these reserves (referring to the 200, 000 requested.) General Wheeler: Yes, I believe so unless the enemy ups the ante. The President: Are we adeguately prepared for Khesanh? General Wheeler: Yes, sir. The President: Do you think that it will be there (Khesanh
- . M: And how long have you been in that pOSition, sir? W: I've been here since the first of January 1968. M: For the last year of the Johnson Administration, then. At the beginning of the Johnson Administration, you were commanding in the I
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
(Item)
- - Would we send the 82nd Airborne and extend enlistments? I guess if we did that we would have to call more reserves to build up our strategic forces here at home. Secretary McNamara: I agree that we should look at this situation and prepare for any
- thing. G: All right, sir. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh DePuy
Oral history transcript, Thomas H. (Admiral) Moorer, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger
(Item)
- . But it was routine in the sense, as I just told you, that at the same time there were many, many ships at sea worldwide doing the same thing. G: Yes, sir. Is it fair, as has been done, to characterize the patrol of the Maddox as part of a program of--pressures
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- ; that it was not really parochial interservice bickering as sometimes it was described. But it was a question of two contending strategies of great national importance. To air the issue in this way would be a profitable and useful exercise. P: And did you air it, sir
- become a political football in which we've been unjustly criticized. Although I must say that many times the criticism of the foreigners has simply echoed the criticism of our own press here at home. M: The phrase "credibility gap" has so much centered
- hundred forty thousand, is that correct, General?" And General DePuy said yes. He said, "You've killed eighty thousand of them according to your statistics, is that correct?" "Yes, sir, that's correct." "Now, General, you have been in combat," which
- Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 21 was to say, ·'Yes, sir!" I didn't give it a second thought. I did point out that all my experience was in the Middle East, and I
- INTERVIEWEE: BARRY ZORTHIAN INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: The Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C. Tape 1 of 1 G: All right, sir. When we left off, I believe we were talking about the Tet Offensive, the impact of the Tet Offensive on public opinion and so
- ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh May 28, 1969 M: Let's begin by just identifying you, sir. You're Joseph Alsop, a syndicated columnist at the present time and author of numerous books, and you've been doing this same type work for long enough to watch
- , if they moved back into Laos or Cambodia, we still carried them; we didn't drop them. G: Once you put them on the OB [order of battle], they were there? 0: That's right. And to the best of my memory, nobody, none of the North Vietnamese ever went home
Oral history transcript, Earle Wheeler, interview 2 (II), 5/7/1970, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- to their homes on leave for the Tet holidays. The propaganda put out by the enemy, the captured PWs, defectors, and captured documents made very clear what the enemy objectives were. believed they could achieve these objectives. And they apparently had First
- . Well, I was just telling you that I went in to see him, and one of the things that he poignantly asked me was, "Are the mil itary planning a COUp?" And I looked at him and I said, "Yes, sir, I think they are." G: What did you base that on? P: Just
- George Christian Cyrus Vance Douglas Dillon General Omar Bradley Averill Harriman Dean Acheson Henry Cabot Lodge The President The Vice President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford Ambassador Goldberg Justice Fortas General Earle Wheeler General Maxwell
- there's so much background noise in the intelligence . You have to pick out what's important and what's not and put it together . Douglas Pike at all at this Were you talking to time, or was he still around? the LBJ Presidential Library http
- by the home that General Harkins lived in. pondent saying, "There it is. And that corres- There's where that son of a bitch lives," and waving his clenched fist at him. It was that kind of LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
- . But we were looking for signs of hostility Of course, there was the Dallas Morning News of that morning, with a very unfriendly ad. IIYankee. Go Home" and so forth. mostly friendly. We saw signs like, But the crowd at the airport was Kennedy
Folder, "The President's file for Korea, Vietnam (Briefings)," Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 10
(Item)
- in Viet Nam and Korea; position. last night to our position and, also, to the enemy's in the face of view of our 2. In general, it appears to be his judgment that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military
- , IV CTZ crises crises J K ----------------------- Westmoreland's memo, memo, ------------------------ answers at home to President - L M ------------------- in Viet Nam and Korea----------- N February: ..,r 1 Statement 1
- INTERVIEWEE: DOUGLAS PIKE INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: Mr. Pike's office, Washington, D.C. Tape 1 of 1 G: Would you recount how you came to enter government service? P: I worked for the United Nations in Korea during the Korean War and then came
- See all online interviews with Douglas Pike
- Pike, Douglas
- Oral history transcript, Douglas Pike, interview 1 (I), 6/4/1981, by Ted Gittinger
- Douglas Pike
- ;.i RG-qPires PHr."tb3ioil of Cep)
- to prevent the US from significantly situation. of Hanoi would probably rege..rd this It is unlikely the dispatch of 2-3 more divisions unacceptable risks * estimate improving that Hanoi would reeard to South Vietnam as involving to home defense
- clearly it has added to divisiveness at home; it has added to divisiveness in the other portions of our alliance structure; we've paid heavily psychologically, politically, and materially, and in casualties in connection with the defense of South Vietnam
- ,abroad or at home. ·- our stand. He shall do all to -- and all that may be required. of Americans will never be found You know -- no men know better of war are tasks that all Americans abhor. freedom are tests from which Americans will that the tasks
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
(Item)
Oral history transcript, Earle Wheeler, interview 1 (I), 8/21/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- that they should be and at the same time keep a one-year rotation pol icy, \'/hich has proved to be a very great morale factor among the troops. In other words, they know they are going to go there for one year, and then they come home. I say, we are over
- HIS PLACEOF.DUTYI~ PROV!:JCEHEADQUARTERS IN BIEN TRE CITY. HIS FAMILY WAS AT F.!\MIL Y HOME IN SAIG0:1. AT 0230 HOURS, \JC ENTERED H..1ME ANDMURDERED HIS FAMILY. ALTHOUGH LTC DU WAS ADVISED OF THIS TRAGEDY, HE CARRIEDON DURL~G TH£ HEAVY ATTACKS ON HIS
- failed, that must for people-rallying, direction. programs rallied the people? Why have the normal at home and abroad? public Why affairs Are vital be supplied? are missing an_d we believe that the skeleton . . achieved and almost
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- •rent. £low of 1·e£ugccs into di strict and provincial capitals would seem to be furthe1· cvidcmce of this; the refugees could be rleein.g their homes for fear or allied air attacks 011 the Co1nmun.ist forces occupying theil· hamlets. Seve1·a.l docume1