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  • ML REF: EMBTEL983. FOLLOWING IS A StORY BY JOHNBIRD DATELINED OTTAWA APPEARING IN BUSINESSANDFINANCESECTIONOF TODAY'SMONTREAL GAZETTE: ~FRENCHSEEKURANIUM HERE, STAKESASKATCHEWAN CLAIMS. FRANCE'ISSHOPPINGIN CANADA FOR HUGEQUANTITIESOF URANIUM FOR ITS
  • conventional war stock­ pile objectives. (2) The assumptions, techniques, and goals used in the establishment of post-nuclear attack supply re­ quireme'n ts. · ECI.AS.SIFIED "'CONFIDENTIAL N5< nt.Uuf 11.ff' 8p 'ff NARA, Date I J. -~'11 - I
  • that the Soviets have proceeded with testing very vigorously. The meeting adjourned with no decision being reached. # # # [4 of 4] SW:RV!CE SET THE V{ASl-iI?'JGTON POST Octcoer 25, 1967 SECRET PROTES':' ON A-BLAST TOLD by Chalmers IvI. Roberts 1
  • of the people that are trying to make sure that we take a good 'hard look at what we commit ourselves to post-MC 26/4. If you feel that this exceeds the scope of the President 1 s approval, we can either drop it entirely, in which case you can sign at the bottom
  • Objectives established at your direction by NSAM No.321 on December 1, 1964, to review strategic stockpile objectives and post-nuclear attack planning. The Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and consisting
  • was a member, first, of the President's Air Policy Commission, and then served as a special assistant to Secretary Forrestal before the National Defense Act of 1947 provided for a Deputy Secretary of Defense. I occupied that post as Secretary Forrestal's
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • "too primitive to threaten us," ~hile the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) thought it represented 'scarcely more than an enormously expensive propaganda gesture." Mainichi 's (Japan) analysis noted that "it may take 20-30 years for China to reach
  • operate or park a ■otor vehicle in the pukiac areas of or oa the roads adjaceat to the Pentas,:,n coeltary to these recalatioes 01 to tile directioas of police omcer& on dllty or to the directioos of posted sips. 2. The provisions of aubparagraphs a. to d
  • . MEMO - . REPORT cc, OTHER: 11/19/64 OTHER NO• .. ' ]894 J, X OST cy no 1 CLASS, Secret DESCRIPTION, I REC'D, (Mu POST REG. OFFICE NO. b• Unclas,lfudl DATE REPI...Y NECESSARY, NO REPt... Y NECESSARY: BY: ANSWERED, Fl1LE CODE
  • -thirds of them will either roll up their sleeves and correct themselves, or if they can't or don't want to, they begin looking for another post. Because very few people really want to stay on in a situation in which they are not doing their job
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • immediately assumed that somebody had duplicated the key. Now in the case of Vietnam, I've always had the feeling that we reasoned from the analogy of our experience in post-World War II Europe. We looked at Communist China as though it were Russia; we looked
  • on the Hill? A: No, we did very little of that. We testified, you know, fairly .1 frequently for the Joint Economic Committee, and occasionally before Ways and Means on major tax legislation. I testified a few times on post-war reconversion--we were
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • research . In 1949 I went to the Johns Hopkins University and spent one year in post-graduate training in pathology. � � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781
  • ,,.. '. Qf deterrent of its even though such a guarantee ment to use its attack and which can, theref
  • be able to find someone better qualified than I for this post." difference. He said, ''Well, that doesn't make any Anybody with any intelligence can pick up the pieces, and maybe it's better not to have a Manpower expert, per se." Well, I still LBJ
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • Relations December 16, 1965 The honorable Dean Rusk Secretary Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520 Dear Mr. Secretary: It was reported in a dispatch by Anatole Shub in this morning's Washington Post under the headline "Accord Seen on 5-Nation
  • for leading discussion at post-game critiques with the object of further illuminating areas of major interest. Issues, problems and questions cited in the advance material provided to participants, represent typical subject matter for discussion at the review
  • be so nice Que~: Is there anything worth watching or promoting in East-est relations which might transform that post-Sep ­ tember prospect? Of course,. all the foregoing is without benefit of reading cables for two weeks - .... or knowledge of what
  • participants, a tran­ script of the video-film summary and commentary of BETA I & II-67, post-Critique comments of the Game Director and several game participants, transcripts of the Senior Critique and extracts from the Action-level Critique. The object
  • _ _. ~. INB/WQl - D&yid la Mark Clldr Satt.rwait• IIIO!ll"F ="'DS-322 ..... REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITEDUNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" February MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: 19, 1963 FOR THE RECORD .Alsop Column in Washington the French Mirage Bomber Post
  • in Indian political circles in designing and testing a nuclear explosive device with a stated "peaceful" objective, such as digging a canal or harbor. Then, ori May 19 Prime Minister Gandhi was reported by the Washington Post to have said that exploding
  • POST -,o lZ/22/64 id for Compute~s Puts •LBJ on §pc: apeclally deslped ·computer weapons by using a variety U.S. weapons designers used from Control Data Corp. nf mathematical formulas. a c o mp u t e r c a 11e d 71 ..-.nwy,,, Tbe John110n Adml