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  • " wanted France out of the Alliance. really b. Both the"United States" and "France" wanted the US troop presence continued in West Germany. (The 'French" proposed a Four Power US-UK-FRG and French command over national forces in Germany). c. Neither
  • these alternatives it i _s . important to get away from the false and troublesome dichotomy between alliance consultation and hardware control as alternative and competing routes to increased allied participation in nuclear affairs. 1. Alliance consultation should
  • the Alliance. with the reaction or and said that this was a very 1hL the PALSystem had now been installed ta.ry is satisfied seemed quite capability Mr. Holifield for weapons now seems much improved, and summarized by saying that the problems noted
  • is changed General French participation to see NATOreplaced alliance. if the·alliance re-elected, some NATO at some after to pull in major respects 1969 out before then. In this be three One: situation there S€em, broadly speaking
  • 2. Suspicion pendable ally. will gro tI~a the United States is an tmde­ 3. This general notion will have specific adverse effect on our alliances such as NATO, CENTOand SEATO. Some of the members of these alliances have felt that their tri
  • supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance. Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest. not to con.t ribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead
  • HOUSE (/ INFORMATION WASHINGTON SECRET June 18, 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on NATO, Wednesday, June 19, noon The purpose of the NSC meeting on NATO is to discuss our policy on several Alliance issues which will come up
  • on that occasion. I agree with you entirely on the importance of a strong North Atlantic Alliance. We have just witnessed an example of unprovoked aggression against a small nation very close to your country. The existence of NATO can provide the people
  • consultation with our NATO allies and in accordance 'with agreed Alliance procedures, have been achieved without undermining the •. ' II 1. I /~----~-----~U--____,,,__-~\L .. I I • -2­ cohesiveness e.nd strength of NATO and with the U.S. adhering
  • at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance. Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest. not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French
  • . On the other hand, NATO recently had been debated in Norway and the Norwegians strongly voted for continued supp ort of the Alliance . Assistant Secretary Leddy By way of introduction, Leddy said that NATO is in a better state of health than the pessimists
  • judgment of this plan not only \J\ terms of its immediate political attraction, but also in terms of its durable v~ue as an instrument for strengthening the alliance. I want your judgment on the preferred means of command and control -­ and in particular
  • . organization countries' Unclassified s. States role in alliance upon release under is needed delivery bilateral of NATO atomic NATO member under which we can exchange of information use of nuclear creation has hitherto itself of information
  • a lliance itself is "mo r e important than the buildup." He said that Khrushchev's major objective in Berlin had been t o smash the alliance but this had not been achieved. The European allies, he said, "now think the United States has leadership
  • he dissolution of the alliance means the loss of our diplomatic cards in dealing with the Russians . We must t a l k t o Congress every chance we get about the continuing b ut changed NA TO structure. SE CRET/SENSITIV E ­ ser.vmESE' .r~ /Cl
  • ,but there have been several adverse BAC·and SYGreactions to recent quadripartite steps. Steps now in process to bring the whole Alliance much more~ into Berlin contingency planning will, it is hoped, improve the atmosphere and elicit NATO-widesupport