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  • to become independent while retaining strong links Yith France. Until General de Gaulle formlly recognized and approved this desire in December 1959 there 'W&S strong behind-the-scenes opposi­ tion to this rapid evolution ot the Canmunity. In Africa
  • be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the d.a.maie that may be done to our policy • and to the alliance SECRET by General de Gaulle's --5E'CREI - 3 - commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your
  • and Saragat of Italy when they are here next week. eANITIZED . E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5 NLJ D
  • rning access to notional se,curily info.-mation. ( B) Closed by statute or by the age ncy which ori ginated the doc ument. (C) C losed in a c c ordance with restric tions contained in the d onor's de ed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GS A DC
  • and generally favorable. Secretary McNamara replied affirmative, as did Director Bell and Directo r McCone. Secretary Rusk said the only exception was the proposal which Ambassador Lodge had made with respect to bow to handle de Gaulle's snpport
  • not recall any ot .r.,,_,"'.'., , ~,,.\. .'.'"'"'': ,,i bis and therefore I dropped the matter. · ··--··~-- ·-· - · · -~. :.. . b. I told Pre~ident Johnson that E isenhower .felt the de Gaulle problem. must be solved, and if it is not solved NATO
  • , [,..,Le ~ _1 Following is text o.i: personal message f rom the P-.1.·er;ident to de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan. Paris a.ncl Bonn chou.ld deli ver depc1r tel soonest and discuss drawing on/~ 939 as necessary. For info London message has been
  • , with an adequate civilian back-up. The President reported that he and De Gaulle discussed Khrushchev's belief that nuclear weapons preclude a general war, and they agreed that a conventional war is more likely. Since there remains the possibility of a nuclear war
  • thin g s which I would r ather not say in ~ublic, or b y ke epin g silent give an e ntir e ly f a l s e impression of t he United States position. Now , I t hink we may ba appro a chin~ the moment whe n ~ de finition of our position in p ublic could