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Folder, "September 25, 1968 - 12:17 p.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future. The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly call for adoption by the Security Council of punitive economic

Folder, "Memo on Security Guarantees and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ACDA)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

of the United States drawn than wa• the CUban For example, with respect Kennedy made the following in bis press confe~ence of May 8, 1963: "We support the security of both Israel and her neighborso We seek to limit the Near --COHF IDENTIJ.L can

Folder, "NSAM # 355: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further to NSAM 351, 8/1/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 9 (Item)

us, and we should not start down this road unless the Soviets proved ready to go the route with uso How ever pressure alone -- unaccompanied by any effort to meet security problems the Indians regarded as both real and pressing -- might still failo

Folder, "Arms Control on the Seabed," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 19 (Item)

Folder, "JCS -- BETA War Games‑SM Keeny, 1967 [2 of 2]," Agency Files, NSF, Box 32 (Item)

to be an atomic bomb. United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bishop Oxnam anc. John Foster Dulles ask suspension of atomic bomb use. Soviet press urges atomic knowledge pooling and hints at international rac:e to better US bomb. Major General

Folder, "JCS -- BETA I & II‑67, Final Report, 4/67," Agency Files, NSF, Box 32 (Item)

on. In early 1970, incontrovertible US intelligence that the Soviet Union was committed to achieving uclear su eriorit. It also had been confirmed In the Middle being pressed indicated strategic that the with outside-help. Although~ _ _.increased trade

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 2G - 2L," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

. If we would not take the theoretical risk of one or two clandestine tests, this meant to them that we did not want a test ban.^ The Soviets showed no interest in pressing the threshold at Geneva and did not take a position on the Swedish "verification