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  • ;as instructed to (1 ) press for an acceptance of United States criteria for a n u c l e ar free zone, (2 ) insist on respect of established nuclear- free zones by "other nuclear povjers/' (3 ) "avoid discussing p a r t i c u l a r US concerns regarding any
  • II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS C. OUTER-SPACE TREATY D. LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE E. FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES F. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION CUTOFF AND TRANSFER
  • that he felt the issue was clear, although he was not completely informed on the latter project. A general discussion was held on the treatment at the President's June 27th press conference of the implications of the Chinese Communist build-up
  • ­ Helms interrupted to say the 100-Day program "is set to go and could be implemented immediately. Walt Rostow said he received a cable toaay with Bunker's recommendation of the main items that they will press on ·the government of Vietnam. Walt Rostow
  • Press relations
  • ..................................... 4 Hot L i n e ....................................... 4 Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .......... 5 Fissionable Materials Production Cutoff and T r a n s f e r ................................... 5 Nuclear-free Zones
  • was thought of our going to the U. N. and getting defeated. Goldberg said I don't think ·this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff. The President asked can we close off.... Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have
  • Committee that the U.S. would feel free to interpret the treaty more liberally if the Soviets were to. To drop Cabriolet would be to drop "Plowshare". Brazil and India want" a nuclear explosion system of their own. In order to prevent this, we have offered
  • has no source legal this to Produce Nuclear Japan could 1970, without potential as 1966 if those of uranium free Japan's the capability force, potential change. capacity, treated * NIE 4-2-64, Japan will actually ultimate decision
  • in discouraging specific countries and areas from acquiring nuclear weapons, including: (a) (b) (c) (d) India Japan Israel Latin America, Afric~, and the Middle East where nuclear free zones may be feasible. 888KEI -4­ J. Test Ban Three alternative
  • the guards at the Pentagon.. You can 1t imagine how they are faced with provocations. They do anything which would further aggravate the situation .. If we are asked, I think we should tell the press that we are prepared to maintain order. It is important
  • •: • . i~ not. subject by claim of sovereignty or·by any other means. to national by means of use or There shall be free access of the d~ep o6ean floor. -n~· Di.:..,1-r
  • for a neutral Europe and nuclear-free zones in Europe. c. Have East Germany announce their of any development of nukes. renunciation d. Hold out vague promises of detente and de-escalation of the arms race if West Germany desists (even though we proceed
  • *GPO: IHI O • 202-217 (204) AN ARMSRACE--ON THESEABED? I'/w Missiles stored in silos drilled into the ocean floor ... Permanent manned stations under the sea ... Free-swimming aquanauts at depths of 1,500 feet-Current research indicates that all
  • collateral measures.^ c While any d e l e ­ gation was free to speak on any subject at any time, the questions discussed usually expressed the Interests of the Co-Chairmen or resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The ENDC reported to the General
  • Security Information. The Office maintains a daily liaison with the press in Washington and also at Geneva when the ENDC is in session and at New York when the General Assembly is in session. It also prepares press guidance and materials related to arms
  • States to •1t a terrible price to pay for a pack o! Mr. HOS:\!ER. l\ir. Speakrr, today we ·selectively proliferate purely defensive words v.·hich could be quite meaningless re-~~!\·ed a message from the t>-residc:nt nuclear armaments to hard-pressed U.S
  • Government can and does offer the fullest assurances that it will nev!!r use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive i..Ttter;t., But the United States, like other free nations, must be fully prepared to exercise effe(:tively the inherent right
  • us, and we should not start down this road unless the Soviets proved ready to go the route with uso How­ ever pressure alone -- unaccompanied by any effort to meet security problems the Indians regarded as both real and pressing -- might still failo
  • to be an atomic bomb. United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bishop Oxnam anc. John Foster Dulles ask suspension of atomic bomb use. Soviet press urges atomic knowledge pooling and hints at international rac:e to better US bomb. Major General
  • . If we would not take the theoretical risk of one or two clandestine tests, this meant to them that we did not want a test ban.^ The Soviets showed no interest in pressing the threshold at Geneva and did not take a position on the Swedish "verification
  • to this problem. We must keep the British in front on this question, but we should also restate as our mm policy our firm commitment to majority rule. The Africans will press for an early decision on revocation of South Africa's mandate for South West Africa
  • stop putting out announcements. Put more sorties into a mission. GENERAL WHEELER: There was a press policy of being completely open on everything. THE PRESIDENT: Let 1 s explore this. Also let's explore the whole area of press relations. Perhaps some
  • by the White House Press Secretary, unless he directs otherwise. The Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council will be responsible for coordinating requests for approval action and announcements of such launches. kiJ~ 4.J McGeorge
  • me to a situation. I don't know what I might do. Rusk and Clifford are in disagreement. Secretary Rusk: What are we in disagreement about? I notice - 3 ­ The President: About the basic Vietnam policy, so the press says. It's imaginary
  • Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, With the Spec­ ial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as an adviser), consulting w1th the Press Sec­ retary to the President and the Director, USIA
  • offered "several weeks. 11 We pressed them back towards a period of about three days, because the South Vietnamese government had steadily insisted that the time interval should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them
  • treated the It received wide dissemination and considerable press comment. T he report's chief conclusion was referred to in the President's announcement at the time the report was made public as follows: "What I find most encouraging of all
  • . This will be a tough one to handle because the Department of Defense is pressing for this weapon even though the technical studies make it of more doubtful value than previously thought. I . New weapons in the other major categories of increase are the deployment of lv
  • have not succeeded and in fact have been undercut by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future. . The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly
  • by Rhodesian and South African moves which make a peaceful solution of these problems all but impossible in the foreseeable future. The Africans can be expected to press to have the General Assembly call for adoption by the Security Council of punitive economic
  • on. In early 1970, incontrovertible US intelligence that the Soviet Union was committed to achieving uclear su eriorit. It also had been confirmed In the Middle being pressed indicated strategic that the with outside-help. Although~ _ _.increased trade