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  • Contributor > Bundy, McGeorge, 1919-1996 (remove)

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  • was unceremoniously overthrown by Dominican military elements who promptly installed a three-man, "anti-Communist" civilian junta under Dr. Emilio de los Santos. President Bosch, with more sincerity than political sense, had offended many in­ fluential
  • hle•ttued blac arad. whlt• ._.at\lo bitoadcaete f•om 3. lat .tlfle · • botap operatlea• iD · 011tll Vletnaan · v Yi•taamese pereoanel • .abotage .· · pi-o.pa and.a apnaUona la North Vietnam ta th la. t ye it and a half have"• lnOst . I •woinU• • 'T h
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. November 2009 LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Page 1 of 2 Doc# DocType Doc Info Classification Pages memo TS 1 3/29/64 A TS 2 3/29/64 A s 3 3/27/64 A s 2 undated
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. DATE LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Doc# DocType Doc Info 012 memo Page 1 of 2 Classification Pages Bundy to the President re Martin cable from Bangkok Date Restriction s
  • -t:J9Al'-r~f -:J..' Secret ~ S-1'1..SY /JL.J 8 ~-1J>/ 2 p #72 agenda m:a;-,nemo---f--:l;;.o.._:the~~.i-0£~--ftonr R. W. Kem.er ~ Secret ~ Nt..J -r.r-~ #7l+e DA TE CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE /96fo I 08/10/65 A 08/10/65 A lo r -p- 08/09/65 ~ 08
  • power plants (thermal, hydro-electric and atomic energy) and construction projects in Chattanooga~ ~t~ Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, and Washington. The group will also visit projects in and near New York City prior to their departure
  • is doing a good job with the Florida people 1 but the Governor and the Mayor are protecting their flanks. The Miami Herald is not helping either. Panama. Arnulfo Arias continues to press his attack against President Robles on the canal negotiations. He has
  • govoromental acttvitles la tho fleld of counterinsurgency (l.o• • tbe reelatance to ••wa,.• of Ubcr atloniv) and make appropriate recommendt.t.lone to assure our r eadin•usa to cope with lQtura altuatious almilu to that lo South Vietnam. In the dlecbarge
  • difficulties there than in the petroleum field .. He insisted that we carefully examine the question of where we wished to maintain pressure and where we would like to rolax. His interpretation of Secretary Rusk 1 s view was that it was 11 goodn to assist
  • their subversion and aggression and live peacefully with their neighbors, we are prepared to re-examine co-existing peacefully with them. It is not we who are isolating Red China, but Red China which is isolating itself. If we 're going to be forced to adjust our
  • confidential 1 p 02/16/66 A fflCffl~ fHCfflO ~,;,..-,1-4 Nt.-l ,,...-~ ~ - -- t@,,-2-f~ the Preoiden L fi·om R. W. Komer s-ecret ~ " vjJ,'f;:#LJ o/1--ICg i;o #56 RESTRICTION fHOl+lO ~ I/LT ff-/t,f .J:-p- ~~Eft1e-:Pres±tlFn:c"firorii- K.Y. Komer
  • undertaken a new examination of the German problem and of the prospects for resuming discussions on this subject with the Government of the Soviet Union. The three governments have done this by virtue of the obligations a_n d responsibilities concerning
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. November 2009 LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Page 1 of 1 Doc# DocType Doc Info Classification Pages memo TS- 1 2/21/64 A s 1 undated A TS 1 1/3/[64] A TS 7
  • of the people of South Viet-Nam. DE.CLASSIFIED l"Sc.. {e#-Q r I - lo - I q By Oc.,t'f= NARS, Date t b-~7_,. ~ '"POP SECRE'f • MEMORANDUM TAB A THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON J:o.P SEGRB!f -2Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks
  • , and a time schedule for this fall's review of the foreign aid program. In summary, I suggest: a rapid but thorough re-examination of the program, which will put before the President, by November 1st, sharply focused statements of the alternatives
  • Coordination Meeting we examined the limitations facing both the U.S. and North Vietnam in prosecuting the Vietnam war. As far as the U.S. is concerned, we defined our limitations as those imposed by: A. The current mobilization base; B. Current
  • decision may also be influenced by our willingness to purchase some British-produced military items which we agreed to examine as part of the F-111 contracto This guid pro quo appears important as a matter of domestic British politicso 4. Africa -- Zambia
  • the sheets ·in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. November 2009 LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Doc# DocType Doc Info 30a memo Page 1 of 1 Classification Pages Mann to Rusk re Chilean election Restriction s 3 5/1/64 A S
  • . The Department of .State examined this proposal; the Bureau of Inter­ American Affairs {ARA) supported the CIA reasoning. They felt that of all possible methods, paramilitary activities have the best chance of creating within Cuba the political, economic
  • ~ ------ ·------ -- - ~--· - - - - - - - - .. - --------·------------------- - - ---------------- ... ~-----------·- ~S~TP > -4tv~ U.S. tion l. In . the cas0 of a. genora.1 upriRlng, we should star1d by Lo hc;J p responsiblo military and polfoe elements by providing equipment and. suppli0s as necessary to maintain order and to prevent an increas
  • , ~J'/.V/9,i, nt....;-,?9-o? "Lo the President from R. W. Komer Conndentlai ~ "..,,~-9r NW-,¥-.,,,.&/-, #104 memo from Rilliam G. BJ w~,,.,~ 1 1·«J.r· 1 p #105 memo #107 memo #108 memo -#10 9 ffiC HO to the PRESIDENT from R. W. Komer
  • , General Eisenhower asked whether any steps are being taken with respect to organization and procedures for security matters that would permit questions of this kind to be examined more deeply and on a more coordinated basis. He said he believed that basic
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. November 2009 LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Page 1 of 1 Doc# DocType Doc Info Classification Pages memo TS- 1 undated A s 1 4/1/64 A s 5 undated A 22 Bundy
  • . to _____·- ·- - ·- ·- -·----- -- - - - - -----·------- -·-·--·- ···- -- .. -- - .... IQ? SECJ:E'P - ----- -·------------ --------Cl{/ s s ;:fi ca t i o >~ -1 expelled rather ih8!\ having to vait f9r a mobilization programo S im:llarly > with. re spect to Cambodia) i.t wo-µld be lo gi cal for l(har1h to · reQ.ct i-f .Silumoull
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. DATE LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Doc# DocType Doc Info 014 memo Page 1 of 2 Classification Pages Bundy to the President re Ball and MLF Date Restriction S 1 12/17/64
  • by the Ka~sma.as and the S-1"8 ·o f the world lo a cl'ltlcal way. Oa the c.ther haad. we· ab 1ett1a1· aoccntld•m. tor- Ute &t.tuadoa we have • • mm om.' poeitl01'.l if aaything. etroager than the ~eapOllelble military 'Pl'••• i•. o«tce~• themaelve:ff
  • to uae our mWtary power lo. the Far Eaat aAd to force a chance of Commuzdat policy. The second t• to deploy all our reeourcea along a track of negotiation. atm.ed at aalvaglng what Uule ca.a be pre•erved with no major addltlon to our preaent military rlab
  • the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. DATE LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Classification Pages Doc# DocType Doc Info 020 memo Page 1 of 1 Bundy re Chinese weapons Date Restriction s 1 9/15/64 A s 1 9/15
  • -uce b .J:.-c~odsb.edp I c:li.~e a 11e.got:latS.cm in wl:d.
  • :• tlotlil agala ~ t J-.panoee 1~•• aad about B•r Am&lltrlean. Oa broader le ~ue1, ••pectally Sout\uuust A·e lan ditY~lopment,, tbc talks havo been l3annontou.s a•4 ehof.114 belp Sato ~ep t,o a lo•tlleotalng poahloJa OQ Q~ata Black'• catei'J)l'lsc
  • to use on specific projects, -~~~~E?.LO?.. ~~~12ro~te 32..QQ ,JmJ"lJ;.911 a_y_~--o~erincipal pa~ts_Q.®, and IMF support, pemaps only as a contingent standby to cover the initial rush of orders when :inp:>rts · are liberalized; - Consider SECRET· r .,.,I
  • :/28/62 A 1 p 01/18/63 A ! p 04/22/63 A 04/-09/-63 A 03/28/63 A from Bundy - ~r-et lOS No. conf. -#7 Hemu MSC Herno Mo. 230 ~ 3-q-D'i NSC .J/.9Action Secret 5lJ.t.A NS-C Mee~in-g -r}H RESTRICTION Conf. NSC NS£· Control DATE
  • , recommendations which translate this state­ ment of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to sub­ stance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possi­ bilities of multilaterallzing