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- Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941- (102)
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- . The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam. The meeting in the President's office included, in addition
- are fewer , smaller, of s h orte r durat ion and less frequent than in the early mo n t hs of the year. I at tribute this f all -off inlarge and moder ate scale combat actions by VC/NVA units to the attrition of supplies b y our air campaign against North
- of military actions aga inst them. VC unhappy that Hanoi {unreadable) worldwide - - frightens them. Goldbe~ I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public statement was not good but could have been much worse. He said
- of many delegates and figure heavily in the general debate . . The Soviets and other Conununist delegations are likely to attack our policy and actions, and we think it probable that some non-aligned nations will display concern, ·if not out right
- not constitute a new commit ment for the United States but rather gave promise of action by reaffirming our existing commitments under the UN Charter. He reported that the ENDC had now submitted to the UN its repoi-t forwarding the draft text of the trreaty
- will adjourn without action and throw the matter back into the Security Council. There are two questions raised by the resolutions - whether there should be withdrawal back to the situation of June 4 or simply a statement eliminating the state of belligerence
- , and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease aa al ---- , Washington time. President Thieu and I have reached this decision on the basis of developments in the Paris talks, -- and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful
- this will be ~necessary to take monetary action, even to devalue currency. Not now because o:fxv1dc:KfXyRk volatile situation. Meantime, series of actions suggested -- putting some money through black market in Hong Kong. VN wanted to sell gold but told them it was out
- the actions we must take in the next few months, and b. Study the alternatives which face us in the next year or two with recommendations as to the course of action we should adopt. t:PA Rostow Attached are two unanswered quest j ons which I suggest you
- would be to follow a different course of action than we were now following. As regards the sale of petro - chemical plants, this is a different issue because such plants verge on being strategic by definition. Ambassador Thompson said our only hope
- . M . Vietnam -- POL The P r esident summa ri zed the actions r equired and the j udgments wh ich wi ll have to be made in the next several weeks , emphasiz ing the decision to strike POL targets . In genera l, we should seek J with min imum loss
Folder, "[January 31, 1968 - Meeting with Congressional Leaders]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2
(Item)
- . The mos~ . seriou~ situation apnears to be at C..iJ./tU u()
- forces to be available at all times. 2. Make available troops for an amphibious landing north of the DMZ if that action is decided upon. The 82nd Airborne and the Sixth-Ninth of Marine division can only be deployed if we eliminate the restrictions
- ..riits up to strength. President Eise:i.::.ower said we should press for C.iplor.1atic action in t.l-i.e United Nations, and intensify the bombing in North Korea. I want to ask Secretary McNamara to review exactly what happened. We will ask Secretary
- ics in Arab Africa, our ·political actions in t he Mediterranean and the Near Eas t will be of primar y import ance, but economic support will remain an essential element in restoring political stability and American influence. It is t herefor e
- should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly
- to apply to this problem may be less than indicated in the State Department's paper. Essentially, he added, continental countries have confidence in London and have welcomed British actions reflected in the last UK budget . However, the London
- , and artillery bombardment k:Z-_' ~~ '~ of North Vietna:::i:::,ta ~ Ih~v~::::::t:::ii~:~cision on the ~~ . . basis of developments in the Paris talks, - - and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peacefu~ settlement of the war. I
- and that the Japanese Gove rn ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever sion. He thought that action
- prepared). III. Under Secretary Katzenbach will ask Bill Bundy to amplify and define major action problems now before us. IV. You may then wish to go round the table and get comments from: Gaud on the development picture and prospects in Indonesia; Freeman
- on military actions and it is probably good that it doesn't. --- The President has strong convictions about our responsibilities in the Middle East, especially toward the people of Israel. --- There is a growing sentiment in this country to " come home
- the occasion offers. The Secretary want ed the President t o have t his repor t of staff work in progress . The President asked the Secretary to spend a couple of minutes discussing action in the UN tre day before. The Secretary misunderstood briefly
- are dismayed and outline what should be antici pated. Secretary Clifford: They had first meeting. It seemed to go well. They had a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. I am not clear as to the reason the Soviets took this action . The President: We have been
- on impending action. The President pointed out that he was very dis-appointed by the handling of the discussions with Congress, especially Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell, on the question of sending U. S. transports to the Congo. I .1 i Secretary Rusk
- ,, . . ... .. _5i:CRE~ - 2 - Secretary Fowler proposed: "The U.S. regrets the failure of the Govern.tnent of Israel to make clear that its actions ·in recent weeks is only provisional." Bundy objected because of the reaction to this. Clark Clifford said do not be too
- move. DeGaulle will smile at us, but will not change his attitudes on monetary affairs and in relation to Great Britain. Secretary Fowler: The Chinese have been heavy takers of gold. Speculation. There is a possibility of independent actions between
Folder, "[December 21, 1965 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
(Item)
- - : I'm not giving up the possibility for a pause. But we ought to talk to the Hungarians and Russians. ·· I don't see where it leads us. Bundy Go for one day at Christmas. Defer further action until we talk to the Hungarians and Russians. Rusk
- military force s . He said the Army was U .S. - oriented; the Navy and Air Force were S oviet - oriented. The military is capable of maintaining inte rnal security. He saw no need for "fancy" military equipment. The main n eed was for civic action support
Folder, "[February 13, 1967 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
(Item)
- "1 t ; I ./-_-,_
- , March 15, 1968 -- 4:20 o . m .J lv1Z:.:V10R~:U'JDUiv1 51 e... -=---- ACTION ~OTES.. FOR THE PRESIDENT SuBJECT: 3:00 p .m. Meeting, March 15, 1968 1. Ask Sec. Clifford to present his recommendations. 2. Questions, if not answered: What level
Folder, "May 4, 1968 - 4:30 p.m. Cabinet Room Meeting on Vietnam," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3
(Item)
- flow for purposes of attacking airfields; tie infiltration to their military actions. GENERAL WHEELER: It would be fatal for us to be forced into de facto cease fire. SECRETARY RUSK: What's going on in Ashau? GENERAL WHEELER: Finding caches
- States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement. The President nodded agreement and said
- that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions the Assembly might take concerning Cz echoslovakia, there are at least three perti nent consid erations for the U.S.: what 't\lOuld b·e he lpful to the Czechs, what
- what the end result of such an iniciative would be. Amendments could be attached to our resolution which would be difficult to handle. They fear beginning a course of action when they can:1ot estimai:e where it will end up . Ii our friends stood with us
- . But the declaration may provide a platform for talks with the Russians on this issue, and progress is possible in the longer term. ~editerranean - We anticipate some low key actions . The Soviet threat there is primarily political and secondarily r.-lilitary
- President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension. The President: Asked each per son in turn whether he had any doubts as to the ac t ion proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action. a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement
- . A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach. 3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler. 4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation. S
- arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the .Ain.erican people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward
- an additional $100 million in military assistance, because of North Korean aggressive actions. Details on the ~quipment involved both for the troop package and for the $100 million supplement are attact"wnent A. In short, we have done everything up to this time
- -- if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons --therefor it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we