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- Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941- (86)
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Folder, "November 26, 1968 1:45-2:25 p.m. Foreign Policy Meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- of the first questions of substantive matter will be a more formal agreement on the DMZ, cities and reconnaissance. They will press for a political settlement. of political settlement they can agree to. We cannot agree to type I would lean toward
Folder, "[December 21, 1965 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
(Item)
- position. I think the cables miss the point- .as a committment to do nothing for a month. We can stop bombing, not say anything, and resume · when we choose. Would pressure mount to tell the press? President Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas
- to President Jahr.son's letter which rr..ay indicate tC.e Greeks are prepared to give way , thus per::nitting conti.-1..uation of bargaining. The UN Secretary General 1 s press conference was not helpful i.n t hat he said that the Cyprus Gover:iment had
- suppliers should be press ed to make pa r ts available. There was a short discussion of the Congo situation . The Pr e sident adj ou rn ed the meeting . (;} ~ .Cj,~ William J . Uo{:)en -&E GRE T 3, L IST OF ATT EN DEES, NSC MEETING, AUGUST 9 , 1967
- show it to gov·ernmenta and not put it out to the .A.meric3.n press. Presid~'.1~: McNamu"': That's good. Let's do it tha.t way. When sho•ild we have this s .. evidence~ -r-~ . . - - rt ... \,_ _ ... .a.... LJ.J COPY Lvndon B. John
- : General Walt got on well with him. keep eye on him. But a conniver. Hard to President: How do we get Lodge and Westmoreland to stop giving out Top Secret information? The press is saying they have to go to Saigon (for) Top Secret information and it's
- the President gave to the Pope and to Cardinal Cicognani copies of a proposed press release dealing with thei conference. The Pope objected to a line near the end of the release which said "We will never surrender South Vietnam to aggression or attack." R
Folder, "May 4, 1968 - 4:30 p.m. Cabinet Room Meeting on Vietnam," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3
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- - 100, 000 last 4 months April record month. I will talk to Ball about "Meet the Press". TOP SECRET . . ··., . i - ~ i '. ... - - - - - - - - :-; ,. "' =·-· ; I l - .d•-1/ ~ ~vt~) ~1~ vr/,, ;ti,_,:_ k ~. j j ~ ' j ! l
- MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHlNGTON January 20, 1968 NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH WOLFGANG WEYNEN AND WOLFGANG NOLTER OF DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTEUR OF GERMANY ON NOVEMBER 14, 1967 The President asked Weynen how things were going
- which they originated; and to provide press guidance that put a positive cast on prospects. Mr. Martin had done much the same in calls to his Dutch and Swiss counte rpar ts. Deming had called his counte rpart in the UK Treasury who had had mixed
- and quarreling of the. type that haa gone on in South Vietnam. I ' I I I The meeting waa followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the e!!ect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President
- . Senator Dirksen asked what use could be made of the information which he had h eard during the meeting. The President replied that he had instructed McGeorge Bundy to talk to the press, telling them as much as he possibly could without affecting
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 6 January 1964 - 1 April 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- to ascertain through President Chiari's Press Secretary that President Chiarj_ would receive the telephone call. t I r I B) Mr. Mann wonlct head a delegation representing President JohnGon to leave for Panama immediately, include Messrs. Vance, Martin
- was being boarded. At 2354 (11:54 EST) the first SOS came. We ceased t6 hear from the Pueblo 31 minutes later. The President: Were there no planes available which were prepared to come to the aid of this vessel? Every press s~ory I have seen this morning
- Reserve Board made detailed presentations about the pressing need for a tax increase and expenditure reductions. In executive session before the Ways and Means Committee on September 20th, the Budget Director specifically emphasized that each appropriation
- . Secretary McNamara: We would plan this on the basis that it would be brought to the attention of the North Vietnamese and not to the American public. CIA Director Helms: hands of the press. It is a great thing if you can keep it out of the Secretary
- : If the press asks us why no bombing, we answer we are increasing our effort in Laos and the South. Ball: Only 40 per cent of the missions are going on now. in the South. Concentrate President: Shouldn't we have someone moving throughout the world trying
- Economic Issues: Mr. Robert Komer .,·· · 6. Guidance on Further Discussions and Press Handling of Ambassador Lodge's Visit I I_ .. t. I~ I '' ) I I: i•II f f1 ,. BECl'tS'i' ( r t ~·~~·~~~~~~~~~!'. .. . _... •1• i ,.-. 1,4 , i tJllili
Folder, "[June 17, 1966 - 6:05 p.m. National Security Council Meeting]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
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- . Everyone present can be trusted but we must be careful about talking to the press or even to staff members who might talk to the press. The highest security must be maintained. Secretary Rusk: We have an elementary obligation to support our combat troops
- service. but the Australians were pleased he finally decided against it. Siha nouk is pressing Australia for a declaration on his boundaries, which would be difficult to grant. Hasluck then asked President Johnson as to whetBilrB!e prospects were
- has said it is willing to talk about de-escalation in South Victnara rather than rr..:iintc:.ining this was a matter only for discussion with the NLF. He pressed the U.S. to take the first step of stopping the bombing, a step of limited risk in his
- like a leader. The Vietnamese forces did better than the press indicated. None of the things the enemy expected to happen happened. President Thieu has moved ahead on a great many fronts - - mobilization, upped it from 65, 000 ; civil side, 14 new
Folder, "July 13, 1967 - 1:25 p.m. McNamara, Wheeler, Westmoreland," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
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- . · The Secretary pointed out there may be some press speculation on this figure, particularly after testimony he has made on the Hill to the Congressional committees. The Secretary said that the field commanders would be supplied with the men required. I
- "stalemate.'' The Secretary said that the press corps in Viet Nam are more antagonistic now than they ever have been. He said there is no evidence of a stalemate. He said that military commanders in Viet Nam told him that they believe they have made
Folder, "November 8, 1967 - 10:03 a.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
(Item)
- of the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese Army does not receive good attention. The press does not like to travel with the South Vietnamese troops because their accommodations are not nearly as good as with U. S. troops. 17. Most of the senior reporters with whom
- to press for a conference agreement this week. (Sent to Conference) 4. Pay Raise - Postal Rates. Among points at issue are third class mail and the Pay Raise Commission. Can the Leadership help to get a conference report agreed to this week? (Expect
- press tone because of General Sidle 1 s approach General Abrams ;doesn 1t "sell" it. Facts are on our side. Secretary Rusk: Bunker would try to go along with anything, but he puts priority on GVN presence at table. Secretary Rusk: To replace Ball
- need to get this thing ironed out before all of them a re called together. The President: I agree. The Press would have a field day otherwise. What is our situation in Paris? Secretarv Rusk: There is not much they can say until Thieu
- Press relations
- into the Southeast Asia a rea for political reasons. He ~p SERVIC SECREJ:f-- ,, ·. ,. TOP SEC.BET suggested that r ather than announce the moven'1ent of these fo r ces into the area we c o uld informally gi v e the press the list of U .S. forces which
- . The President: Would General Taylor give me his views. General Taylor: I am optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts -- economic, political, military and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way. We should be escalating
- the guards at the Pentagon.. You can 1t imagine how they are faced with provocations. They do anything which would further aggravate the situation .. If we are asked, I think we should tell the press that we are prepared to maintain order. It is important
- Kaplan in to help on press problems. Also, Bill Sullivan has a personal knowledge of NVN's chief negotiator. Do you have any objections. The President: No objections. Secretary Clifford: staff. No objections. It is better to start with a small
- : Making the bombing order not ·effective for 24 hours is okay. We cannot delay announcement. The President signed "Futherance" papers at 1 :37 p. m. Walt Ros tow: The worst thing is for Ky to learn of this from a press leak or from one of troop
- offered "several weeks. 11 We pressed them back towards a period of about three days, because the South Vietnamese government had steadily insisted that the time interval should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them
- be en exaggerated. The security situation is much better th;-in as reported in the press. In the n1ost i·ecent large engagc1nent; the Vietnamese stood and fought very well. General Wheeler said he agreed. He called.·attention to a page one story
- was thought of our going to the U. N. and getting defeated. Goldberg said I don't think ·this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff. The President asked can we close off.... Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have
- could talk to Thieu arid get the corruption cleaned up. The President also said we are mishandling our information from Vietnam. He said Sigard Larmon has just come back from Vietnam and he is violently upset with the way the press is handling
- of Cubans - no mention of Guantanamo Pres.• - says no one in govt. see anyone until we settle Cuba Rusk says low level no high level on account weather. U Thant knows. we are going to survey - cancelling Press Conference - bui Ids up pressure quarantine
- disposit ion of Soviet troops in Cen tral Europe. '/ • ·' Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction t o the c risis. The press has already p rinted that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances
- the presence SECRETARY RUSK: North Vietnam is not clearly on board in this. The acceptance of North Vietnam of South Vietnam at the conference table is a recognition that the Viet Cong are not sole government in the South. We must press for flat commitments