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  • . McCone to give us his estimate of enemy action--what their responses would be. RUSSELL: Mr. Mc Cone, I notice you did not mention the submarine. Does anybody know what kind of anti-submarine warfare there is in that area? MC CONE: We discussed that today
  • and the Viet Cong. General Wheeler: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North VietnCl.mese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the thr e e targets are not necessary from a mi litary point of view. Howe v er , a South Vietn
  • action. It is important that we make no public move until Saturday. The President: What is the military situation? Secretary Clifford: There is more activity, but we don't know whether this is the third offensive. The attacks are not coming off v ery
  • action to minimize adverse impact or (b) restrict deployments and-;:;-ilitary construction and run the risk of a growing communist military advantage? Recommendation: Option a. Subject: Military Situation - I Corps and 1st Division {Tab D) Problem
  • concerned the question of whether Taft-Hartley should be invoked, the legal problems that would be presented by that action, and a general discussion of the dire economic situation created by the strike. When the President joined the group, he welcomed
  • -~¥ SJ GI~'-./SENSITIVE "-· _·__:~;_;_~~-'-~~~~~- FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SUM:MARY NOTES OF 559th NSC MEETING June 17, 1966; 6:05 to 8:00 P. M. Vietnam - - POL The President summarized the actions required and the judgments which will have to be made
  • AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557 STATE GRNC BT -S E e ft E T AMM.AN 3270 NOD IS FEB 3, 1968 8 :14 ;p .M. , FOR YOUR INFORMATION . SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES TOWARD SOVIETS \ t. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE
  • with the President from 2:30 until 5:30. A list of those present is attached at annex. Preparatory Meeting - 10:30 Secretary McNamara noted that the only Section of his report which contained specific action recommendations and the only one fully co­ ordinated
  • hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of action, Africans didn't want mutual because of our bombing. That is now out. Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did. Presidens Rusk: Let Goldberg find
  • and especially pressure from the farmers. But he said that the one deterrent to Soviet action against Germany is the "presence of U. S. forces in Europe" not the nuclear weapons, but the forces. Kie singer was a bit of a 11 Secretary Clifford observed
  • of the Secret Service Advisory Commission. The President went over the lists of legislation on which action is needed and emphasized particularly Foreign Aid and Housing. I provided the Leadership with copies of these lists. The meeting broke up about
  • , the President said he is asking each Department to prepare a history of the Johnson years -- its accomplislunents, its personnel actions, its failures -- and what still needs to be done in the major programs. He said he is planning to have each Cabinet officer
  • -10 ground operations (briefed group on latest military action). President: action)? What accounts for substantial difference in KIA (killed in Wheeler: 1. Heavier fire pow'e r -- fighter bombers and artillery. 2. Mobility -- choppers. 3. Good
  • pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgement. Goldberg said I don't agree. Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara
  • \JTHORTTIIES IN Jt".NOI, lltffORTUNATP.l.Y, HA~OI HAS RESPON!:lED WITH THE OPPOSITE OF RESTRAINT AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EFFORTS ' TO TflXE OVER THE SOUTH DY FORCE. S\JCH' ACTIONS CREf\·n: s~:RIOUS DOUBTS IN OUR MIND TH/\T COMPL~TEL.Y STOPPING THe: BO~:s H"G
  • of military actions aga inst them. VC unhappy that Hanoi {unreadable) worldwide - - frightens them. Goldbe~ I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public statement was not good but could have been much worse. He said
  • of many delegates and figure heavily in the general debate . . The Soviets and other Conununist delegations are likely to attack our policy and actions, and we think it probable that some non-aligned nations will display concern, ·if not out­ right
  • this will be ~necessary to take monetary action, even to devalue currency. Not now because o:fxv1dc:KfXyRk volatile situation. Meantime, series of actions suggested -- putting some money through black market in Hong Kong. VN wanted to sell gold but told them it was out
  • the actions we must take in the next few months, and b. Study the alternatives which face us in the next year or two with recommendations as to the course of action we should adopt. t:PA Rostow Attached are two unanswered quest j ons which I suggest you
  • . The mos~ . seriou~ situation apnears to be at C..iJ./tU u()
  • should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly
  • prepared). III. Under Secretary Katzenbach will ask Bill Bundy to amplify and define major action problems now before us. IV. You may then wish to go round the table and get comments from: Gaud on the development picture and prospects in Indonesia; Freeman
  • on military actions and it is probably good that it doesn't. --- The President has strong convictions about our responsibilities in the Middle East, especially toward the people of Israel. --- There is a growing sentiment in this country to " come home
  • - : I'm not giving up the possibility for a pause. But we ought to talk to the Hungarians and Russians. ·· I don't see where it leads us. Bundy Go for one day at Christmas. Defer further action until we talk to the Hungarians and Russians. Rusk
  • , March 15, 1968 -- 4:20 o . m .J lv1Z:.:V10R~:U'JDUiv1 51 e... -=----­ ACTION ~OTES.. FOR THE PRESIDENT SuBJECT: 3:00 p .m. Meeting, March 15, 1968 1. Ask Sec. Clifford to present his recommendations. 2. Questions, if not answered: What level
  • flow for purposes of attacking airfields; tie infiltration to their military actions. GENERAL WHEELER: It would be fatal for us to be forced into de facto cease fire. SECRETARY RUSK: What's going on in Ashau? GENERAL WHEELER: Finding caches
  • States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement. The President nodded agreement and said
  • that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions the Assembly might take concerning Cz echoslovakia, there are at least three perti­ nent consid erations for the U.S.: what 't\lOuld b·e he lpful to the Czechs, what
  • - - and do more risky bombing than we have before. You could sell that the other night. Are we getting closer to danger paints by resuming our bombing -- and shoving it -- or by not resuming it? :McN-".."n~ By resuming, '\Ve increase milit:i.ry action
  • . US Action Consic2rations Efforts to achieve a peaceful transiticn thrcu0h creation of a broadly··lxi.sed gov-2rrn:'-'?nt are in our ir.tercst. i:·;e should do what \·:e Cili1 to foster these efforts, :rnakin9 clear to South Arabicm radicals
  • no operating railroads, today 53% are. The North Vietnam army lost about 7, 000 killed in action to about 800 Americans killed in the last two years. The South Korean division has contributed magnificently. In Phu Yen Province, Vietcong controlled 75
  • troops. Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position. General Taylor: I am dismayed. The picture I get is a very
  • no action that would impede South. military actions in the Secretary Rusk: If they ask for a cease-fire, our response should be mutual withdrawal of forces, amnesty, application of Manila formula. Secretary Katzenbach: It is unlikely they'll propose
  • your brother who i• in need (cf. Jamee 1, 27) you also give honor to God. It is a great •ource of joy for Us to know that tho Epbcopate, the clergy and the members of Catholic Action and of the "Cursilloa de Criatianda.d" are studying ways
  • of North Vietnam in the South. No real shortage of supplies (Red China has plenty for them); More involvement by the Chinese; More involvement by the Soviets. (It is inconceivable that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction
  • out our reconciliation approach now. The President observed that we do not, in fact, hold to a rigid course of action. We are keeping our options open. Professor Eckstein said he thought it encouraging that we had offered an exchange of agricultural
  • the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ. ;:. . Secretary Rusk said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would reciprocate
  • with a site and wishes to talk. To create a situation, if Hanoi would not move, which would convince our people that we had done all that was possible. In the latter case we could resume full- scale military action with public support. Mr. Rostow cited
  • and the bombing . They have a good understanding of what the Corn.ffiunists are up to. They seem to be relaxed about things. (General Wheeler discussed the offensive action planned to disrupt enemy threat to Ben Het. It would involve some bombing and artillery