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- believed,
however, that because we had sent a note on overflights to the Cubans
via the Czechs, we were taking a new initiative and launching a new
move against Cas tro. They felt we had concluded that we had interpreted
the climate of improving U . S
- of forming
new governments .
D . A difficult and uncertain situation exi sts in Greece .
2 . At the NATO meet ing sch e duled later this month in Ice land,
our objective will be to pr event disarray in NATO .
3 . The uncertainty in Europe has
- interest in the copper stockpile. Several persons,
including As sis tant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Tony Solomon,
responded. The copper stockpile is or soon will be in balance. The shortage
will be met by production from a new Arizona mine whi
-
Secr etary McNamara, speaking from the attached
that Viet Cong actions had reached a new high in July, including
the highest number of weapons lost by the South Vietnamese to the
Viet Cong. It has been a difficult month, but the increased Viet Cong
- of a coalition government before negotiations could be under
taken.
e . Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initia tiv e as IC C co
chairman. He asked that the peace offensive be prolon ged long enough
for the Soviets to react on the basis
- are running out of gas. New
forces a re needed. U.S. troops are outside H ue. The weather is down on
the deck, meaning that there is no fogistic resupply by air. A new attack on
Danang is possible. The North Vietnamese Second Division is in the area. More
U.S
- .1 consideration was given to
pene~tiori
of an ICBM defense.
A "new" or "secom generation"
of var.heads i s now being develo.Ped with the prt:nary objective
of enhancing our penetration capability.
Duril:lg mLICK, de
s1gn features which
-
terms .
2 . The milita r y case for a ttack on POL:
Sec r eta r y McNamara; and then poll the Chiefs one by one .
3. Anticipatory messages to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.
FYI. I personally do not believe it is necessar y to info r C'l
- and that the Japanese Gove rn
ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided
were:
(1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and
(2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever
sion.
He thought that action
- and launched int o a
discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action
on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the devel opment s on the
Middle Eas t in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that
the non-permanent
- information and information given by
Ambassador Dobrynin.
The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter,
The S ecreta ry could say:
(a) Astonished at this news.
(b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow.
Tell allies we
- is to keep our contacts
open with the other side in the event that they have a new position
to g i ve us .
d . The U. S . actions we are taking should be presented publicly
in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are
d etermined
- the new equipment making possible the relighting of the
engines w : thout the descent. He said we are on the very far
frontier of knowledge and there are many problems remaining.
Those who had operated the pl anes were unanimous in agreeing
that it would
- be engaged in
fighting under the new progra m . He also asked whether U . S. planes
were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had ex
pressed their concern to him on this p oint.
Secretary McNarnal'a r eplied that U . S . soldiers
- ious crops . Country per.:'or:r.;.nce in developin5 food resources will be a
priority self-help condition for AID assistance .
invest~ent
In concert ¥ith these efforts , the President has proposed a
new Fooci. for Freedom program, which will be closely
- the enemy militarily; we must make
demons trable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new
ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position
by gett ing ourselves into a military posture that we credibly
- zed
but have no interes t in the control of conventional a r ms .
Our immediat e p r obl em is to gi ve King Hassan a sense of stability.
Therefore , we have r ecommended a $14 million a rms sale and a new
food ag reement.
In this p r ocess , however
- . reaction and he felt that we should respond today
prior to the TV news broadcasts•
Secretary Rusk asked again why, if Commander Bucher were an honest
man, he made the statement. H e suggested the possibility that he was
trading this statement
- to the Soviet bloc without attaching 1peclal
new conditioue.
Su::h action would acc:or1 with President Kennedy's decision in r#iay
1963 on an a!moet identical case (forage ba.rvetters) in which the
sarn e argument for quid pro quo conditions waa advanced
- abotJt the "technologica l
gap" hus led to various s tc:te:-.1ents and suggestions for
corrective i:ct.ion .
Jl.znong these is the "Itali2n 11 proposal ,
on '.·rhich the President cor;t.rnented favorably in the Erharc5.
communique and in his New Yor