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  • . Personally I would mine Haiphaig at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating, and that it will continue to go down. Some in Congress are disgusted about the Buddhist uprising
  • &l-Yc j)c ft , NARS, Date 4 =4-~ :.t\uthonty By; Meeting in President's Office Date: January 29, 1966 Time: 12:45 (a. m. or p. m. not specified) Present: President, Vice President, Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti (From notes
  • '.Vier. - 3 ­ The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us. Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations
  • , that they are expecting us to hit the air field any time we go into that area. Secretary Rusk said that we should not keep referring to targets being shifted from one list to another. Everytime we hit a new target, there is a notion around the world
  • and verse.) Presid-ent: When you go to Sharp, Bob, tell him we are thinking along t...""lese possibilities -- and get their views:. Rusk: Tragedy about -situation is that Fulbright statement urging extending the pau..se and recognizing the Viet Cong. Times
  • ) wants to wait. I asked him if he c".uld deliver VC if I ga.ve him more time . He couldn't answer. Rusk: But the central policy issue is err.barrassment over some thin issue -­ r11cNa.r~a.~a : to D~2..:: Ne can:t start before F riday their time
  • of National Secui-ity Council Date: (Not specified but believe it was January 30, 1966 Time: 12:15p.m. to2:25p.m. check) Present: President, Vice President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Fowler, Mac Bun::ly, Bill Bundy, Goldberg, Marks
  • Room Date: March 11, 1966 Time: 12:35 to 1:30 p.m. Present: President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Komer, Gardner, Marks, Helms, Raborn, Bell, Ball, Bromley Smith, General Goodpaster, J. Valenti (Fro:n notes by J. Valenti) Goodpaster: March 4
  • -a./ , - -- NAlC'.', Date_!L_l J.2 SECRET ­ -2­ Arthur Dean and General Bradley spent a good deal of their time on the domestic situation and how to present the story of the war in ways which would encourage our people to unify and stay the course. Dean cited
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • to say but when Podgorny was here he told me that Russia would never abandon the cause of North 5. Vietnam. I tried to convince him that this was the proper time to collaborate with the U.S. in peace moves but I received negative results. Is there some
  • : Walt and Bus will explain what is happening. GENERAL WHEELER: Starting at midnight their time, we had a number of attacks, mostly airfields, also city of Kontum. Information we have is that the attack in Danang area was light. But Chu Lai
  • offshore. (Tab A} The Vietnamese have, at various times, advanced the claim that the entire Gulf of Tonkin was a closed area, i.e., territorial waters. No major maritime state has acknowledged this claim. The map showing the precise track of the first
  • concerrsabout early political moves to obtain a negotiated settlement (paragraphs 4c and 9) were recorded in footnotes. Ambassador Lodge emphasized that his concern with respect to political moves was basically on the matter of timing. He also felt that channels
  • days after Peking 1 s broadcast castigating Thant as a U.S~ errand boy. He emphasized too the sharp divisions in the leadership in Hanoi, .::s reported particularly by Dier, Canadian ICC member. The Secretary Gener~l noted that for the first time Hanoi
  • made it clear that he and General Westmoreland were in agreement on this question of timing. The President indicated that he had gained the impression in an earlier talk with Ambassador Taylor that the Government now might in fact be somewhat
  • - l August 5, 1967 NOTES OF MEETING OF PRESIDENT WITH MEL ELFIN, NEWSWEEK: JOHN STEELE OF TIME: JACK SUTHERLAND OF U.S. NEWS, JULY 28, 1967 The President had a general discussion with these three magazine writers on the Detroit riot and civil
  • I MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON NOTES ON INFORMAL COFFEE IN THE FAMILY DINING ROOM - JANUARY 31, 1968 Present: The President George Christian ~ Hugh Sidey - Time Carroll Kilpatrick - Washington Post Merriman Smith - UPI Frank
  • give considera­ tion to Taylor's recommendation but for the time being, we should approve a strike by the South Vietnamese only. Bomb damage assessment flights by U.S. planes should be flown. Secretary McNamara, turning to the question of withdrawing
  • unable to get the Hanoi people to even consider negogiations at this time. Thus, we were forced to keep our pressure up until talks could begin. He promised that he would personally transmit this view and the memo to the Holy Father along with his
  • Rusk: Do we want to warn Hanoi on the consequences of an attack on Saigon? 'l'he President: Yes, we ought to tell them to give these talks a chance to succeed. After we've stopped the bombing all this time and they hit Saigon, what kind
  • in uninhabited area of Cambodia used for North Vietnam retreat.) Secretary Rusk: I need time to think about it -- especially B-52s. General Wheeler: I don't need a decision for several days. to have it Monday or Tuesday. I would like Secretary Clifford: I see
  • bombing, to see if the talks in fact become serious. If they attack across the DMZ or attack the cities, then we could resume at any time according to the conditions we have put to them. On the other hand, Secretary Rusk pointed out there would be costs
  • CARROLL, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES October 5, 1967 Mr. Carroll: I have been here eight days, and the thing that has struck me is the popularity charts showing the trends in public support of the President and his policies. At what point do you decide
  • DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES
  • should go to Vietnam. Lucey also paid tribute to the "fine type of military men." He said they were just magnificent and it is just terrible that these men are called murderers. "This isn't the time to lie about the United States." - 3 ­ Rabbi P. Rudin
  • African sen­ sitivities over outside intervention in the Nigerian civil war. This will not be a historic General Assembly. The time is clearly not right for major ne\v proposals for international cooperation. In the fields of international economic
  • to a non-mandatory apportion..~ent for peacekeeping costs above the one-third limit governing. our mandatory assessment; (b) keeping adequate • . air trans­ port units available at all times for U"N airlift; and (c) proposing a U.S. program to train units
  • and that country were being ta.ken to people's hearts. Moreover, he took !lrm position• on the great is&uee of hls time. Be in no doubt whatsoever: the new governr,"lent wlll carry forward the pollclea that Harold Hold had lnltlated. through to the end
  • to up-value, otherwise the pound is in trouble . The questions is whether I should tell Kiesinger this is the most serious situation in some time. Walt Rostow: Right now this is premature. The President: What is our offensive strategy? recommend
  • of these deliberations and t.1.e successive steps ·;j::ic:-, are to follow until t.here is installed in Saigon some time next y .~a;c a qov~!' :-r:!r:r~. of the people fashioned according to the framework of tlle constirutior, ':'DW :: e::.:--.; drafted.. 4
  • kept one word of it. under no illusions. So I'm They're arriving in Paris with a force of 43, They have asked for a villa. This indicates they are ready for phase I and phase II. They seem to be dug in for a period of time. Secretary Rusk: Move
  • to a series the first time. We should not have an adversary approach to the report like on "Meet the Press" •. " At this point Jones departed the meeting again to get a letter the President was to send to Congressman Joe Karth. -· The President read from
  • sa)d it might have some effect on doves and some effect in Europe, bu.t would not succeed and would cause them problems. Secretary Rusk said a critical time for a peace offensive is later after the winter fighting has subsided. He said that if we do
  • planned for some time. I may have an occasion to talk to Mai Van Bo. If not tomorrow, maybe Saturday. The President said, I have enjoyed all you say and agree with it. Your evaluation and as se sment is reasonable. I appreciate the constructive attitude
  • of 100-250, 000 tons .. b. We plan to deal with this problem in November, when we have better estimates of the size of the US harvest, PL-480 availabilities, Vietnam's rice needs and the GVN foreign exchange position. At that time we will propose to you
  • • AN INSURNOUt\'TAUl.E ' 'l 0 .us, AND \:JI! ARE PR\!PARED, IN FACT' TO CEAi)i!' . r;o:':'\f\RDMt:lvT AT THE APPROPRIAT~: TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE. /\CCORDlNGl..Y, l HOPE THAT·Wl-: MAY.PROC~f:D F'ORTH~JITH TO DISCUSS R~Ltl TED MATTERS''. . • · · Hr,i\f\ I
  • · • Goldberg and Sisco are hoping for holding off. more comfortable with some more time. President: Bundy: peace. Harriman would "be What is the logic of Goldberg's position of three weeks more? H-e says no da.mage militarily. Makes no claim that we would
  • . At some appropriate time, we should resume carefully controlled bombing. Wheeler: We should resume. Reasons about the same as McNamara -­ although I would place greater \veight on the part bombing would reduce supplies. Campaign against North should
  • BY ARAB LEADERS WITH RIGHT MOTIVES AND SYMPATHETH IC.. I • POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST. USG IS JUDGED TO BE BOTH UNWILLING AND UNABLE TO CONTROL ISRAEL. THUS, MODERATE JORDANIA~S AGREE WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT TIME HAS COME TO "STAY A STEP AHEAD OF SITUATION