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  • ,Sec. 3.5 NU/~ ll·t.6. NARA, Date C9-ll-l'J. ·gglJii'lPENTIOI BETA I ANDII-67 ISSUES The United States should deploy an ABMsystem. NO YES The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABMsystem in the defense of metropolitan Moscow. In addition
  • ~t poll for negotiations with the Chinese. At an -appropriate time and manner, therefore,· t-1e should vigor­ ously pursue negotiations on this subject with China. But if we must ultimately have · the cooperation of China, and the Soviet Union
  • ............................. 58 Amendments..................................... 58 Entry Into Force............................. .. 59 Tabling of the Partial Draft Treaty .......... 60 The ABM Problem and the Effort for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks With the Soviet Union
  • SECRE'f' The Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting of NATO A. Background The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of Foreign Ministers will meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25. This will be the first time that Iceland, a small but strategically
  • , and less that would weaken them. our fortunes inconsistent Union. place area they the Chinese strengthens public At some time we might wish to the Indians no objection with would desire which they would find with nonalignment. Our actions
  • tentatively assigned to these alternatives. Some disagreement does exist concerning the specific circumstances in which given actions might be taken, and it is generally agreed that these uncertainties cannot be resolved at this time. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958
  • with the Soviet Union a desire to convey the feeling that the present draft was the te.>...-1: of the NPT and not simply a proposal sub ject to general amend.n1ents. At the same time, however, we did not wish to join the Soviet Union in an attempt to railroad
  • resolution, was preferable at that time. In addition, the President wanted to a v oid any too formal or binding arrangement, such as an executive agreement. The resolution would h a v e to be accept able to b o t h the United States and the Soviet Union
  • If this to Indian will probably side nuclear the Soviet in Union its is to be have to leaders in some· weighs quite do so. heavily of the calculus. have been brooding the Soviet of in the face of conflicting as systematically for some time
  • in. Secretary Rusk: Let's wait until we have all the You don't have any estimate of what might happen. Secretary Fowler: Th ere have been some money flow. The President: We have three messages: Economic State of the Union -- Budget Message Don't tie
  • AT 151st PLENARYMEETINGOF THE ENDC (ENDC/PV 151, pp.11-12) "In our statements we have repeatedly indicated that if that amount is for some reason unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union we should be prepared to consider, within reason, appropriate adjustments
  • informed the Soviet Union that any further attackS on the Federal Republic of Germany would be casas belli. At the· same time, however, ---SECRET- NOFORN - Page.! ot 6 Pages ✓ -J;" SECRET- NOFORH it became clear to Moscow that the US was attempting
  • time. « ^ In February 19^7, the Soviets gave them the following draft declaration: In connection with the desire commended by the non - nuclear states the Soviet Union declares that in case there takes place an attack by a nuclear power with the use
  • are at a time when this could get in the way of NPT. It is therefore a decision between "Plowshare'' vs. the test ban treaty. The treaty requires you to keep the debris from these tests at home. THE PRESIDENT: The question is would Cabriolet violate the treaty
  • keep NAC fully and proq,tly informed of developments at Geneva • • You should express readiness consider any points 3. by allies and offer such further clarm.cations raised as may be posoible in next two weeks; at same time you should make
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • the Soviet Union. A single Control Group represented all other nations, fate, nature, and infl~encing factors. Senior participants for BETA I and II included representa­ tives of interested departments, agencies- and commands and recognized authorities from
  • proved by the Congress this year. c. Agreed that no major review of NSC 5704/3 was necessary at this time. d. Noted the .President's decision that for the next few months, until further revia w, the level of export controls would be that existing
  • to Vietienne was delivered. to Bunker has not be en. The message THE PRESIDENT: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the State Department in the New York Times. SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We may get
  • the nuclear threat Thirdly, whether it could ally, .!:ln hy nucleE.T been subject£·c by the Soviet Union., On the other hand, agab1::;t India although might be feasible c,£ from t;L~c of the U.So have been targetted 'Weapons for some time now
  • '.Vier. - 3 ­ The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us. Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations
  • ·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities
  • to a non-mandatory apportion..~ent for peacekeeping costs above the one-third limit governing. our mandatory assessment; (b) keeping adequate • . air trans­ port units available at all times for U"N airlift; and (c) proposing a U.S. program to train units
  • the foreseeable future (say 15-20 years), and even within the range of present technology, the number will grow substantially. The Union of South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico may be included. Why has it become so easy to build a bomb
  • a new set of program objectives which could perhaps be achieved in a reasonable time period, say 10-20 years. In early 1964 an effort was initiated to develop a formal statement of objectives which after many false starts finally led to the establishment
  • present position should not be changed for the time being. We should welcome any indication that the Soviet Union would seriously consider a treaty with adequate verification, and we should be willing to engage in technical discussions with theSoviet
  • of the existiI!g ~iological, chemical end physica~ processes end ·balances; Each State shall provide timely announcement and c.ny necessary amplifying - ... information of any mt.rine activity or ex.:;ieriment planned by it or its nationals that coul~ harmfully
  • lnformaUon. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the documenL (C) Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In the donor's deed at gift. ' j P' DD~sn~ I u , , l\Ilt.l lll,} JdU1 USP f • , • I • r ) TH~ NEW YORK TIMES
  • . - 3 - appointed by President Kennedy the same day the enabling Act was signed into law. The Director is also the chief U.S. negotiator in the field of arms control, and much of the time he or the Deputy Director is away at Geneva or New York