Discover Our Collections


  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)
  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Type > Text (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Meeting notes (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

50 results

  • live." Joseph Scerra, National VFW Commander called this a "showcase election. 11 Stanford Smith of the American Newspaper Publishers Association said there was no plot to rig the election. 11 1 had some misgivings before I left but I readily agree
  • for it. Mansfield:Ires McNamara say that infiltration reached 4500 a month.? McNamara: This is dry season. Usually associated with larger infiltration. Indications of larger infiltration. Mansfield: Instead of 22 per cent under control, only 18 per cent is under control
  • -2­ VI. (FYI: The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as a nwnber of private enterprises, will be examining Indonesian develop­ ment possibilities in the months ahead.) You may wish to conclude by asking that a development program
  • to distract attention from Vietnam. The President: They may a~so want to detain the Carrier Enterprise. The President then read the Reuters wire accounts of an alleged confession by Commander L. M. Bucher, Captain of the Pueblo. The text of alleged
  • . The two key ques­ tions would be: What actions could be taken; how should the Congress_ be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is pertinent). In presenting these questions to General Eisenhower I stressed
  • Walter Ridder, Ridder Newspapers James Cary, Copley Newspapers Bernard Gwertzman, Washington star Richard stoiUey, I!fe Wayne Kelly, Atlanta Journal Cauley asked the President to discuss his philosophical approach to his office at this time in his service
  • engage :.n -chis 'a ctivity? Why must we have a spie ship? !s this no~ an undignified posture £or a democracy and ~s there' no~ some element of a progr~r.1 associated wi't.h spy.:£.:.1.g upon some other nation? 7he answer to that question ~~ that we
  • . I doubt that he would have put the missiles in Cuba, but once he got them in, he wouldn't take them out. '' The President said that Kosygin was constrained by restrictions which had been placed on him by his associates in Moscow. The President said
  • . The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agencyt the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and i had seen eye to eye, he had
  • Manatos Joe Califano {,) George Christian ;.-:r
  • important that we continue to support through peaceful means the right the people of South West Africa to self-determination. of South Africa. Facing the problem of opposing tend2nci es --to associate with South Africa or to disengage from it entirely
  • to do to get the government shored up -- move in with power and stay there. Vice President wanted to know more about Thi. Taylor says he is flam­ bouyant, rash, and an associate of Tri Quang -- but a brave commander-­ troops like him. Vice President: Thi
  • building and savings and Loan associations, loss of gold, unfavorable trade balance, the consequences of the choke on credit by the Federal Reserve. Okun pointed out what was going on in these areas right now and then presented some charts to compare tax
  • sent during the conversation. 2. The Pres~dent opened the conversation by recalling ·a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen flince I took office
  • are in any way weakening. We should send only support troops. General Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The inte rprctation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position
  • to the report on the OAS Association we have been pushing. We have been going a year, and have good things to show. It is not on a national scale yet. We hope to build protection for the OAS in case any future President wants to sweep it under the rug. But we
  • - The President then read a list of organizations representing labor, management, press, foundations, and other associations. It '1.0.S agreed that this group could be invi.ted to go to Vietnam as observers of the up-coming elections. The President instructed
  • for your support as responsible Negro leaders. (The President read Associated Press item on Stokely Carmichal.) UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH: The loss of this leader is so tragic. We must see what we can do to further Dr. King's objective. SECRETARY CLIFFORD
  • . McGeor ge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia D evelopment Association. Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr . Rusk both indicated their -- ~,,,,..¥ _, :,"... '1
  • joined with neighboring states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which met in Bangkok. Regarding the $100 million, he said that at present $20 million might come from AID, $20 million in rice, $20 million in cotton. This left a shortfall
  • troops. Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position. General Taylor: I am dismayed. The picture I get is a very
  • been exposed for two years. For them, it is SOP {Standard Operating Procedure) to attack the bases from which the planes originate. The pilots feel strongly on this issue too. I feel they are wrong. There are very significant risks associated
  • and press conferences. Too many signs are bad now. There has been nothing good since the hearings. We need to be a little more outspoken. SECRETARY McNAMARA: Eban wants no association with our intentions to provide arms to the moderate Arabs. Eban wants
  • Clifford: There is great merit in what you say. Thieu and his associates are not reading the situation clearly here. The President: I agree with that. \. ' ' ~. .•s We must get over the situation to him as we see it. ,t;'•· 1. If he keeps us
  • , General Wheeler pointed to the position of the ship at 9 :25 the night before and at 12 noon it was 25 miles off shore and 16 miles away from the nearest land associated with North Korea. Secretary McNamara said it was unclear whether or not the ship
  • foc:I i~ies associated with infiltration routes through Laos--spe cifl co lly a stc:g' ng crea in North Vietnam on Route 12 near the bo rder, and onorher s-og ~ :"lg o:-eo o t Ben Thay on Route 9 in southern Loos. 3. Laos: The intemol crisis rem
  • ? Communist plot? Was it a USIA Director Rowan : Peter Arnett of the Associated Press didn't write his story out of the blue. We should find out about his background. Secretary McNamara gave his account of how the gas story got started and, in reply
  • it could to make bargaining effective; that it associated itself with the Taylor Panel's recommendation; and that it would issue a statement asking the people to come to Washington. , The President asked what other people thought and everyone in the room
  • be: What actions could be taken; how should the Congress be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is pertinent). In presenting these questions to General Eisenhower I stressed that the discussion
  • -called National Liberation Front and those individuals now associated with it. I am inclined to make a sharp distinction between these two. On the one hand, we appear to be seeing today a subtle aM­ sophisticates propaganda offensive designed to depict
  • : We really don't know? CIA Director Helms: Yes. General Westmoreland: Attacks are associated with major offensive in Northern I Corps and III Corps near Saigon. This is a prelude to a general offensive. I expect it about the 24th or 25th
  • within South Vietnam. We should negotiate a cease-fire rather than accept one. This is the most dangerous proposal we could tie on to. Secretary Rusk: A cease-fire has to be associated with a withdrawal of forces. General Taylor: I would echo those views
  • over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win them over by discussing our overall strategy. General Whe ele r: W e should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on infiltration-associated targets which we have advised on the basis
  • portions of barracks and supply lt lS 2C dumps and associated buil dlngs , as well as vehicl es and guns . 21 c . Estimated risk l oss . a. Readiness and timing . Upon compl et ion of intercountry 22 2~ nec-oti.at1ons J.nvolving US , RVN , and RLG
  • . This is important. We must determine what they mean by it. associates "his colleagues" with it. He also He says a complete bombing cessation could lead to a breakthrough. He says this would lead to a peaceful settlement. Kosygin says if, we take such a step
  • not be made overt (legitimized) until these operations and De Soto patrol operations become so intertwined that they can be associated. or until the US ia prepared openly to support MAROPS militarily. b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not agree
  • :. associate . d support , ( e1' eng:r.ee::rs, . ..incer a~ tac., , (,d ) str1'ke a1rcrart ?:irnar: :y :c construe: additicna1 air ~ases, and ( f) flesning out, accorc.~g ~o Gene :-a. Westmore!~nd 1 s requests, of axisting operational units anc acvis
  • LBJ LIBRARY I . ." ·. ..·. . /S~CRET Daily operational expenditures by the Zambian government !or the fiscal year ending 30 June 1966 were almost 40 percent higher than originally estimated, largely because o{ emergency spending associated