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  • depend upon how the elected government reacts. He said we cannot overlook the vote given Dzu. He said the pacification effort will be long and arduous. He doesn't agree with the liberty of the press impressions from Vietnam citing that two
  • :•-"' July 30, 1968 NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH BEN MEYER, ASSOCIATED PRESS July 16, 1968 Mr. Meyer: I thought your Central America trip was very useful. Luci stole the show. The President: (Read talking points, attached, a copy of which he gave
  • the President gave to the Pope and to Cardinal Cicognani copies of a proposed press release dealing with thei conference. The Pope objected to a line near the end of the release which said "We will never surrender South Vietnam to aggression or attack." R
  • . Bunc!y said that the President might get a press quel"'y a.bo\.!t tear ga.:; ii he held a press coI'..ie:-"'nce tor."lo:.·:row. McNamara suggested that the President respond by stz..ting (1) tear gas is a hu~ane way to restore order under certain
  • go either way on whether they would continue to press for complete victory. The President asked whether there were any politics behind the situation. Secretary Trowbridge said that he thought there was, that the Republican Governors of the western
  • available to the press. He read the papers, he said, and noted that Gov. fttnney had explained his Vietnam views by saying he 1d been "brain-washed" in Saigon. 'lhe President observed that an;y man "brain-washed" by diplomats and generals might have problems
  • Press relations
  • Economic Issues: Mr. Robert Komer .,·· · 6. Guidance on Further Discussions and Press Handling of Ambassador Lodge's Visit I I_ .. t. I~ I '' ) I I: i•II f f1 ,. BECl'tS'i' ( r t ~·~~·~~~~~~~~~!'. .. . _... •1• i ,.-. 1,4 , i tJllili
  • not be sufficient. He had held this view for many months, but it had been reinforced by recent events in the field. The President pressed General Taylor as to the reasons for his current unreadiness to recommend larger action. Under this questioning General Taylor
  • and comprehensive steps to solve the reserve problem. b. Press hard for a change of the DOD P 80/$ official exchange rate to the personal purchase rate of P 118/$ no later than January 1, 1968. This alone would cut GVN dollar earnings on US account by almost one
  • in the press? We are trying to do so many oth~r things with our economic and health projects. ConstR.ntly remind the people that we are doing other things besides bombing. .­ UtM€R: Took this question up with Zorthian end I pres~ p~ople. { ' CJc
  • engage :.n -chis 'a ctivity? Why must we have a spie ship? !s this no~ an undignified posture £or a democracy and ~s there' no~ some element of a progr~r.1 associated wi't.h spy.:£.:.1.g upon some other nation? 7he answer to that question ~~ that we
  • for a Vie tnam peac e settl e m e nt. The effect of this concession on the Viet Cong will be very great. ~p 5ECRE'I' - SENSITIVE -12­ +GP SECRET - SENSITIVE (Secretary Rusk, continued) Following a gap of two or three days, we can press in Paris
  • believe we shall press forward, through times that strain our unity and disturb our confidence, to a better America for all the races that history has brought together on this continent. I ·­ 33 HOUSING One day shortly after I had taken office, I
  • Notes of June 25, 10:00 A. M. Staff Meeting with the President In the Cabinet Room The President expressed concern over some recent press reports that the White House staff is tired ... that many officials are soon leaving.•. and that the machinery
  • Press relations
  • AND PROBING MEMBERS OF THE PRESS P~ !1ESARD THEIR FEELING ABOUT THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE: WICKER, SC.e.LI, DONOV.~N, KIKER, KILPATRICK, POTTER, HOFFMAN, STOLLEY, ?.'J~:'.R s, ~· _ ,Z. .­ ET Al. GE~JERAL FITLING AS FOLLOWS: 1. S¥E?T I CISr·! t.i!HI CH
  • and then let them have it. (What President wants Rusk to tell idmax:oc press) "It's been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to 11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113 nations. We know we've done everything we can do and should do to talk rather
  • the crime. No additional air strikes should be made now. (The statement to be issued by the White House was approved and given to George Reedy for release to the press.) Secretary Dillon: If we encourage an air strike by the South Vietnamese, everyone
  • "is it too much to ask (Ambassador) Bunker and (General) Westmoreland to make a report to the nation once a month, on a "Meet the Press" type of program?" McNamara said "perhaps Bunker can do it one month and Westmoreland the next, rather than both together
  • to Saigon and argue with them (the press). He said we've got to do something dramatic. Wheeler said he read Larson's report. He cabled it to Westmoreland and asked for a report along the same lines from the I, III and IV Corps areas. The President sent J
  • for immediate purposes. - -- -·-- liaison ... . . __ _______ Mr. Nixon said that, despite observations in the press, he had made no decisions on his Cabinet. He hopes to have his Cabinet appointed by December 5. He would naturally like to have someone keep
  • : Tell us about our meeting in Paris. Secretary Rusk: It was standard. There was not much progress. North Vietnam blasted American politics. But the tea break produced an agreement for a Saturday meeting -- a private talk. We might press Hanoi
  • developments in the Congo following a briefing by Under Secretary of State Harriman and CIA Director McCone, ~· Noted the President's instruction to the Secretary of State (1) To press certain Western European and African countries to take all measures
  • can. Suggested that Benton and Maheu brief the press on their meeting. -2­ President pointed out the importance of maintaining Congressional support for UNESCO'S budget. It is important to limit budget increases and be able to justify them
  • between the U.S. and the USSR. The President and Mr. Carroll concluded with a discussion of the press. The President said he thought too many foreign correspondents followed the lead of a few columnists, and did not portray the facts. He said he wished
  • =-... -· =====-= ~- - --:.:=;·--=- · -..·-.........·- ---·---. ...-_ . -. - ----·--- .. ... . ,. .. .. - ----,.·-=·~""" -- -""'.,-~--,~.=-:--::-=... - _. .. -=--:.-.::-.....:.....-:' -. - • A .. WWW ' MFG. 7•00 ' any possibility n that earlier resumption would be·· miscons.trued - ~ in~.~:',;< .· ~ l ""PA P:»s .M5?J"Y ~Ai¥: !it.tu ~· relation to Mr. Kosygin's visit t~ LondonA' Operations have now been ' · resumed. END QUOTE . ·' Press
  • . _.-/---·-!___. .-/ I .- _,))L--W Mr. Jame ' 'Sufferidge '--------·. 0 ..----> "') . ---·· ----- - --­ Mr. su£7eridge had been one of the election observers in Vietnam. He said thc;lt the press is doing a poor job of reporting, always playing up the da/k
  • to the press. You may wish to consider a full leadership meeting of this kind, introduced by yourself, after which you could put the whole thing on television, perhaps when Bunker is here. 2. They both concluded that there was very great progress since 1965. We
  • be pressed to make a settlement based on the Taylor report, but he said that there should be no threat of a Taft-Hartley action, that such a threat would antagonize the unions. The President agreed with him that such a threat would not be wise. Senator
  • the press know about the shape of responses. Bundy: Could tell press to go after the Ambassadors and it would be more persuasive to let them ·say it, not us. President: Alright 0 we wait to see Goldberg • • ..I~ - • -~.-- ...--
  • frank, I would hard pressed to show trucks on the road. Also b ·~ difficult for the jets to hit them. Vietnamese are on alert. Probability is exactly what you have outlined -- we must control ourselves without violating the military requirement. it may
  • forum to explain this, Would be inopportune to hold debate, Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium. President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions. Bundy: One
  • they It If they violate the facts of life, we would be back with "business as usual. " SERVI,. ..: SS'" Sf!!@!f& y• -4­ Secretary Rusk noted that we had just pulled back the NEW JERSEY from around the Vinh area to a point closer to the DMZ. The President pressed
  • . The general feeling is. to press forward with this program. Douglas Dillon and McGeorge Bundy agreed that South Vietnam should and must do more. Walt Ros tow said South Vi~tnam must improve administration, fight corruption and be more aggressive
  • . Mr. McNamara stressed the need to increase combat intelligence as well (CIA and MACV-J -2 were working on this pro blem) . The President indicated his deep concern about press stories from Saigon that US forces were bombing innocent civilians
  • to this problem. We must keep the British in front on this question, but we should also restate as our mm policy our firm commitment to majority rule. The Africans will press for an early decision on revocation of South Africa's mandate for South West Africa
  • ­ Helms interrupted to say the 100-Day program "is set to go and could be implemented immediately. Walt Rostow said he received a cable toaay with Bunker's recommendation of the main items that they will press on ·the government of Vietnam. Walt Rostow
  • Press relations
  • entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel. In fact, we can take some credit for Eban 1 s acceptance of the resolu­ tion last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying
  • TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA FOR TOMORROW'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I MEETING, ORDERED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET THREAT IN EASTERN EUROPE. I., 1 • PRESS SECRETARY GEORGE CHRISTIAN ASKED IF THE CALL
  • was not the proper moment to indicate any desire to return to conference 7 table. When I pressed him on Thai reaction he said, after con­ siderable pause for reflection, he thought he could bring Thai government to new conference, but only when we had continued