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  • fiscal policy. He named some of the crises he has faced in the last few months. He introduced the Members of the Cabinet and then called for questions from the audience. Jim Chambers of the Dallas Times Herald asked what the consensus of the Vietnam
  • AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1429 (6-85) - - ~8 Meeting in Cabinet Room Date: February 26, 1966 Time: 1:05 p. m. Present: President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Marks, Bundy, Vice President, Raborn, Helms, Gaud, General Johnson, Ro stow, Unger
  • that psychological turn-around reached if we remained firm. Thanat said he had only one worry. Referring to 15 Feb issue of Paris edition of NY HERALD TRIBUNE and NY TIMES, carrying spate of stories on 'negotiations', he said he was certain Secretary understood now
  • . p He is. M Th ere is an ad in the WORLD HERALD last Sunday where some 500 people who reportedly supported you in 1964 are now saying that unless you get out of Viet Nam, they will support someone else in 1968. In checking, we find 70% were either
  • . McConnell said if we were to stop the bombing, now is the time to do it. THE PRESIDENT: If they used the week badly it could hurt us. GENERAL WHEELER: I'm more concerned about the effect on the ARYN. They have been doing well. They will sit on their hands
  • SANITIZED", .?-11c:~eting in Pxc!iirlc at' s Office January 2'). 1966 Time: 11:35 a.rn. - 12:40 p.m. ,. .. Preser.1.t: President. Rusk, :McNamara., Bundy, Wheeier, Moyers, and Valenti (Fron1 Notes o! C,,Ieeting by J. Valenti) •• Rusk: I talked
  • anything, President we ought to say it and get credit for it. " ' A Johnson The question is, how it is said in Vietnam. Tonight ·our time. Everybody but the Prime Minister lias signed on. except~ President (?) I don't think I should say anything
  • abrazo for the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Ambassador from Nicaragua. - 2 ­ The President then joined the group and asked what had been said about Hemisfair. ~ talked of the difficulties in getting a family picture at this time that would
  • no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage. That view was shared by: George Ball Arthur Dean Cy Vance Douglas Dillon and myself (McGeorgc Bundy) We do think we should do everything possible
  • that he was especially heartened by the President1 s reference to China in his July 12, 1966 speech. He felt that this time of disorder in China might be a good time to show our flexibility . In doing so, we would look beyond present crises. We should lay
  • ' - ;;~-.ft Stop at 11: 00 a. m. - announced. Let's stop it so I can announce at 7 today or at 7 tomorrow. General Wheeler: We can stop it at 0800 Saigon time or 7: 00 p. m. tomorrow. There is nothing to do. Clark Clifford: Do we have information about
  • conventional attacks for the first time. Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr. provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along? General
  • than fight. Adequate time to reply - ­ nothing encouraging - - we don't want to mislead American public."" Then stop there. Don't say any more. We have done everything that is within the bounds of selfrespect - - we wi 11 not grow weary. Then you have
  • it was not prudent from a military standpoint for them to be there. General Wheeler: That is correct, Mr. President. I have General Brown sorting out all the facts. There are several reasons why no planes were sent. This includes the location .of the ship, the time
  • ? . NARA, Date (;. -.:;J.1)_!'1 ct=l? , MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED Publication Requir" Permiuion of Copyri_ght Hofdw: W. Thomas Johnson Secretary Clifford: I thought final clearance with Thieu was mere formality. I thought we said -- now, here's the time
  • to be given by the President on the Pueblo and Vietnam developments. Secretary Rusk: Some parts of the speech are unnecessary. I do not think it should be given at this time. Extending tours of duty in Vietnam could have a serious effect on the morale
  • Westmoreland over the phone and received a number of cables from him. Westmoreland reported the following: - - The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. St.'1.\f\~E SET That is tonight our time. This is based on communications intelligence
  • there. To me it'• a pure Cl."••tlon of what happen• in thi• ~ountry. If ww hold off thi• bembin& loqer, people are 1oiq to aay ••Wnat in tbe world ia bappeniq." We caa iaform Maufield. the NY TIMES, but we wW never eatiafy the TIMES. - Now, if thia l• what
  • . There was recognition that MIG's based near Hanoi might respond to the strikes. General "Wheeler: Cll.'JCPAC reports that if he receives an execute message by 10:00 P. M. tonight, his planes could be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3:00 P.M. their time
  • 7'·05 51 Meeting in the Cabinet Room Date: April 4, 1966 Time: 7: 10 p. m. Present: President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, General Taylor, Bill Bundy, Justice Fortas, J. Valenti (from notes by J. Valenti) President said Westmoreland
  • night and today the picture is not so hopeful particularly in the country side. Dean Acheson summed up the majority feeling when he said that we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps
  • the President's staff each mornin~r, as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of u1 rent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He ccsignated no intermediary. 3t !VI"!t: SET 1 6. At 12:30 I went to the President's
  • . Thompson says ought to see Dobrynin about time Shelepin leaves. .· President: I­ _•VI ~ .' \ ' a.... ........ IT.LZZD SET SANITIZ3D 2 Meeting of January 3, 1966 .. Next prob. is whether we send Harriman to Japan. Bundy: We've been playing
  • projects. Black noted that the Asian Bank war formed about a year ago. This was the first example of regional cooperation in that part of the world. He said he has spent a lot of time making sure tra t this is a sound bank, and noted that they have more
  • military, diplomatic and political problems in that part of the world. However, the Vice President has had a chance to go and spend some time in the area. -- Since the Honolulu Conference 18 months ago there have been five elections in Vietnam
  • ~ -: , ,:.; ..., -~ • • ~~..... ·,, ~ } ' 11' r . . GENERAL SERV1ci;,s ADMINISTRATION GSA DC 73.495 Meeting in Cabinet Room Date: January 25, 1966 Time: 5:30 p.m. - 7:40 p.m. Present: Bipartisan Congressional Meeting from Republican-Democratic Leadership. Chairman and ranking members
  • NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVIC~ WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) GENERAL SERVI CES ADM IN I STRA Tl ON GSA DC 7S·OI l.;f47tL/) VA~ MD;'i·:(; l ,.------­ EY!S' ONL y TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JACK. HAVE s·PENT TIME LISTENING
  • ). Closed in occ~dance w.lth reatrict1on11 conta!J)ad in .the d~or'• deed of c;rift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA DC 73.495 4'/~/66 Meeting in the Mansion on Second Floor Date: April Z, 1966 Time: 1: 30 p. m. SANlTIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 By r
  • a letter from the President asking for more time. The President approved the dispatch of the letter to Vance. Secretary Rusk said the Greeks told the Cypriots that the Turks are bluffing .. The President said it also appears that the Russians want to see
  • FORM OF DOCUMENT #53 me~ting not~s · FI LE LOCATION Meeting1Notes ·. File, ·~ • ' .I\ r " ' GENERAL SERV 1.C. ES ADM IN l.STRAT I ON GSA DC 73.495 17·72) Meeting in Cabinet Room Date: April 6, 1966 Time: 5:20 p. m. to 6:10 p. m
  • . That is not the answer. We are in Vietnam to honor a commitment which preceded President Johnson and which was later authorized by the Congress. He is following exactly the right course. The President finds himself pressured in the Congress, and at times beleaguered
  • contributions but he wanted to reiterate "every time I see you" the necessity of being extremely careful in preventing anyone in the Interior Department becoming involved in any­ thing of this nature. He said this was extremely sensitive in Interior because
  • additional cuts. Congressman Pollock: Mr. President, I want to thank you very deeply for your help in meeting the emergency needs of my people in Alaska. All of the agencies of government and you have been so helpful in our time of need. The President: I am
  • : territorial waters. We are almost certain we did not violate SECRETARY RUSK: We need to take more time on this. GENERAL TAYLOR: Would the fear of military reprisal make the North Koreans hold the men longer? SECRETARY RUSK: They know enough to assume we do
  • in the Legislative Branch. I need your cooperation. First we need to agree on t.li.e time the Congress will take off this year, especially the holidays. Congressman Ford: The Speaker has not announced it but I think he will make the announcement on holidays tomorrow
  • Air Force will ihit Hanoi thermal power plant tonight. TOT planned time is 1900 tomorrow or 7 p. m. Washington time. If the weather is good, these will go. That will leave three other targets. McNamara said there are 7 targets authorized and he
  • is that there was no unusual North Korean activity during the ten day period to indicate that at any time the ship strayed into territorial waters. I do not believe that it did. The President: Ambassador Goldberg said he had a position report two days before which
  • SECRE'f' The Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting of NATO A. Background The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of Foreign Ministers will meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25. This will be the first time that Iceland, a small but strategically
  • advocate" questions: How much time do we use up by our actions at the U. N.? Do we have control of the time situation if we get involved in U. N. debate? What is the danger if we go to the U. N. for some sort of humiliation? (What is the possibility
  • this was the first time the North Koreans knew that the ship would be in t..'1e area. Three thi.'1.gs are clear: 1. It was a conscious effort to provoke a response O!" a lack of response. 2. The Soviets knew of it in advance. 3. T!ie North Koreans have