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  • in urban areas to protect against a second wave of attacks. I told President Thieu that the South Vietnam forces had to go on the offensive. Thieu said South Vietnam could not take another Tet offensive. General Westmoreland has turned this around. sive
  • . Secretary Rusk: We should have an executive committee to notify our allies: Gorton, Thieu, Pak~ and the Prime Minister of Thailand. I still am concerned about the details one puts out publicly. to give exact figures. · I don't want .So, ooo Secretary
  • be Critics) of our pos~~ition believe we're inte~t on creating a constitutional and democratic gover!".ment by pursuing last VC until he is dead. They see capacity of VC to bit the cities. I do not think we can move Thieu to a Greek solution
  • by Hanoi. Thieu, however, statetl that he would talk informally with members of the NLF. We ourselves feel that the best chance for peace ls one worked out inside South VietIJ:Bn by the South Vietnamese. The other points the President made in his TV
  • . The President: Shouldn't Bunker be getting Thieu to go ahead on talking with the NLF? Secretary Katzenbach: I don• t think Hanoi wants to talk about a political settlement in the South. They• 11 say we should talk to NLF about that. - 4 ­ Secretary
  • in the government - - most improved. There has been a change in the political situation for the better. There now are local people getting involved in local government at the village level. We are urging Ky and Thieu to put land control in the hands of the local
  • 3. The matter of reconnaissance. South and have their intelligence. We must have this. They are in the 4. Important political issues. Go ahead and get their views on more formal talks and views on terms for settlement. Thieu and Ky suggested "our
  • about thinness and weakness in VN government. Only 2 or 3 strong men in government. General Thieu and two others. When you talk as I did for long hours with these men, you find they are not broad gauged. Worley is troubled by this. But people
  • and a broad spectrum of US military and civilian officials. I did not tra·vel in Ill Corps but had good sessions with our old and new Regional Officers. In Saigon, I saw a wide variety of people includi1tg Thieu, Ky, Prime Minister Huong, Interior Minister
  • (8-85) April 30, 1968 Sec. Rusk wants to add: 1. Bunker's present plans: hoping to go to Katmandu May 9-140 2. Further modifications and enlargement of Barrell Roll area in Laos. 30 Mr. Rostow's idea: Possible Thieu initiative with NLF
  • . "They came in freely and they voted freely." He said the problem now is one of unification and he did not know if Thieu and Ky are up to it. They are schooled in the authoritarian tradition, Muskie said. James Antell, National Jaycee President, said
  • . The President: Are you concerned about Thieu's problem in forming a new cabinet. Secretary Rusk: Yes, but Ky will go along if there are no changes in Generals. Walt Rostow: The "deal" is that Ky will be main negotiator in "your side, our side" situation. CIA
  • . On October agreed language with Thieu to announce this, but when came to the hurdle he would not jump. There will be a good deal of confusion. They are shotting at our reconnaissance planes and there have been violations of the DMZ. Briefed on NA TO. Briefed
  • B for Thieu 1 s appreciation. 3. ·~ Gene Black in Cambodia. (Sec. Rusk} See Tab C. ··:·":' Report: Cambodians totally negative • . · , : ..:. -' ' ~ . · "~· 4. . Pueblo. (Sec. Rusk
  • Times story by Rick Smith and Marvin Kalb at 8:00 a. m. today may be put together. The President: Tell Bunker to get Thieu moving on telling his people now. Thieu must tell Ky, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister and draft a statement. The President
  • ­ ~amely that ..the American-people-wilrr~:ra.e:l-to-n:i:mring-fronrtho·s-e-i1'RUvtdmitB;1' who- live·ih Southeast Asia who can give a-better -color· of the·~ondition~:-the-~ For example1--Presideht 'Thieu ·should. visit· the -United States
  • report the message was not very clear . . Ambassador Bunker wants it authenticated. Their people think we should release four additional prisoners. I think we should leave the details of this with Ambassador Bunker to work out with Thieu. The President
  • impression of General Ky, and his belief that the present GVN would be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler stated that he had a good impression of General Thieu. He felt that the stability of the present government would depend on our support
  • given Bunker the toughest diplomatic assignemtnso President said Bunker moved this thing (elections) faster than we expectedo 11 We went to Honolulu and were surprised at their (Ky and Thieu} attitude. I thought of them as Hitler, heel clicking, power
  • into the Tet offensive, Thieu's state:rrent wasn't what more they could do but that "it is time for more U.S. troops." There is no easy answer to this. If we continue with our present policy of adding more troops and increasing our commitment, this policy may
  • TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: P r ogress on Vietnamese diplomatic front You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political position at the same
  • FOR AMS BUNKER AND GENERAL VESTMOR£LAND. I KAVZ CALLED t HE PRESIDENT'·S ATTtMT ION . TO TKE A'Dl/AHCE · TEXT or THIEU'S SPIECK OF TODAY, THE PRESIDENT REGARDS It OF THE riIGHE~T, REPEAT HIGHEST, IMPORTANCE TK.i\T YOU MAXE A MAXIMUM t1FORT to GET FULL
  • the pressure on; with a little more pressure, I think that will do it. The boys who are fighting for them are hurting; perhaps the leaders in Hanoi aren't as bad as their troops are. President: There's now a campaign on in Vietnam to attack Thieu and Ky
  • WITH THE SPEEU .ANDVIGORWE MIGHTHOPE. IN DOINGSO, HE HAS.MADEHIM­ ~SELF VULNERABLE TO CHARGES OF BEI~G UNDULYINFLUE~CEDBY ~THEAMERibANS~ANDTHIS MAYBE ONE OF THE MOTIVESTHAT :LIE BEHINDTHESE NATIONALISTICINITIATIVES BY KY ANDOTHERS . .THIEU COULDTHEREFORE FIND
  • , call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we. Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds. The President
  • are there. We m1!Jlst look at the contingencies and how we deal with them - - the marginal infractions and rocket attacks. Secretary Rusk: We made it clear to the Russians and to Hanoi. General Taylor: Abrams and Thieu said they may propose a ceasefire
  • could talk to Thieu arid get the corruption cleaned up. The President also said we are mishandling our information from Vietnam. He said Sigard Larmon has just come back from Vietnam and he is violently upset with the way the press is handling
  • : Viet Cong? After the inauguration, will Thieu try to entice the The President: I think very shortly after the inauguration you will get to see social reforms, military reforms and a lot of steps toward improving the country. Ge-orge Christian
  • ~ program, Further, Westmor eland repor ts that t he morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing sir.as of e r osion -­ a n erosion result ing from current operational restrictions . .: President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along
  • as possible. Numbers of our Congressmen go to Saigon, are seen by President Thieu, and are welcomed by the Vietnamese. We should t ake this opportunity to see that their Senators are well received here. SFCRE'ff SENSITIVE SERV\CE &t; f • 1 1
  • politicai groups. 3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make dear that we "'.vish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must 1novc fa~t to b_ring their forces back /.'-v'1 to strength
  • tional 75,000 recruits. President Thieu has mentioned possible increases ranging from 65,000 to 125,000. General Westmoreland estimates that a total RVNAF strength of 751 ,739 can be reached by December 31 of this year. This would mean 66,000 recruits
  • north to obtain be made Hanoi would The period for a period 24 of Vinh. the concurrence Sunday denounce night, of Thieu the 31st. the project of demonstrated of several weeks. and, restraint, thus, Twelve hours later to know how
  • approve __ to: Air Marahal Lt. Gen. Ky Thieu Yea No Yea No Ambaaaador Lodge Yea No Ambaaaador lllem Yea No General Wheeler Yea No Secretary Yea No Yea No General Ruak Weatmoreland Ambaaaador Bunker Yea No Ambaaaador Locke
  • the viewpoint that I expressed when I quoted the statement of Presi­ dent Thieu of South Vietnam in my interview with the • corr~pondents. • RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION Q. Mr. President, in your judgment, did the interview Premier Kosygin gave to Life
  • requirements = total consumption minus local production. - 2 ­ 6. At this point my preference for strategy follows: a. Make clear to Thieu and Ky that we wish maximum progress before the election but that we ,expect the new GVN to take early