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- and Teetering 22B: The Pleiku Attack and the Shaping of a New Course 23: Competing Pressures and the Baltimore Speech 24: Negotiations: Word and Deed, Public and Private 25: Shoring Up Proves.Not Enough 26: The June-July Policy Debate: The Framework
- may object. to the' term. . . --. -·-. .... -· -· - .... - CHICAGO DAILY NEWS Sept-ember 15, 1967 .... - ,,-.---- .. ---- ... ·Connnent ';vI cNa1narciCredibility·Rating Plunges B3 William McGaffin an indiscriminate bombinJ of in private talks
- Council health Council Southern .) year~ Yuntil in the next it almost political triumphal In this Suu himself the admin in sel This Phan Khac Suu ~-~ to the J . in the Navan but stage, somewhat he guided new Charter
- equi;:,ment Washington substantial number But even at the anot~er ½;ii:c Laos.** and flow of new weapons in and perhaps Hanoi * rifles Chinese) became highland border ;:aobili ty basic (mostlv regiment, in If was Cong
- ..,,_ has been considerable, .. ~ inflated_by civilians.·. .. ; ~ .... _ ,,,._ incltli¼io~ ~~ To some extent .... by measures already taken. 2 - Heavy S•E•C ft•E•'f infiltration of both new units is continuing. made prior A strenuous
- . also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 1. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence as sets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to-their :.Wlilitary Attache
- , for it would be folly to undertake i. I I I a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent •1 I extensive little time and effort effort persons to tell the story has been spent trying working with veterans
- and Secretary of his· own which summary Rostow on the situation In addition and met a daily In addition, had requested. Taylor plus for for a Vietnam our world the San Antonio working out on new posture." formula. speech Rather asked
- , and labor. Our economic statistics are the best and most compre hensive in the world. But they can be and need to be further improved. The costs will be exceedingly small relative to the benefits. To this end, my 1969 budget provides for several new
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
(Item)
- communist 4 8 -- State climatic may attack Vietnam in Vietnam-------------------- daily around public message F G H I a b d e f g stop--------------- --------------------- with the G VN
- the feeling of security had been strong. Those who had been "within the protection of the · Government" found out how wlnerable they were. There is a fear of further attacks.and there are new opportunities for Communist . .:. propaganda and subversive
- . Their principal and to inflict I Corps. and military defeats Tne net result, situation new VC units, large units phase so2etime within objectives in nuch of the country; making a ,'ig are to destroy· also to reduce the on US forces in battles
- the new constitution and Dr. Dang Van SU!lS, an eminent civilian, was elected President. Ky stepped down but continued to serve as Although the Govern Commander ot South Vietnam's Air Poree. ment included more civilians than ever before, it was quite
- /Commander through Major General and their civilian counterparts. It consisted of three moves and lasted one week, from 26 to JO July 1965. Using qualified "experts" on opposing teams and Control, its purpose was to obtain new perspectives on the developing
- . .D. . . . THE..FIGURES SHOWN. IN COLUMNCD ARE PREL.IM.INARY, UNRE.FINED. . ••BATTLEFIELD REPORTEDCASUALTIES RECEIVED DAILY. . . FROM. . COMUSMACV t·HE -FIGURES IN COLUMNS(2> THROUGHC5f ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTINGCASUALTIES.REPORTEDDURING
- aircraft and _JOPSECRET : replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas urider pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical
- with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South ·viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy." The new emphasis should
- COMNANDER HAS TO APPEAR DAILY THE SITUATION HERE MUST BE EXTRC:MELYSERIOUS, CERTAINLY· 110RE SERIOUS THAN WEBELIEVE IT TO BE. IF, AS IS CASENOW,ENEMY ACTIVITY TAP~:RS OFF ANDCLEANUP PROGRESSES TJ-1£RE\1ILL BE .LESS NEWS ANDWEFELL TK~T IF \vESTYwERETO GIVE
- . • . . • . ! . • . ,. . • • •· .. · • .; . • .: sho .~·nin column (1). _are p1·eliminary; unrc.r°inecl •t -:·-:.-:: ;... ·battlefield-reported ca.sual ties· rec:e i ved from COM{)Sf,tAC~ daily. ••. =:••:·:-.~-.~ The· figures :.:.:: ..... ::: :· 1
- :. • .. . • • . • .... -.:........ .:,. .. :.,:........ .. , •'·" ...:..; ' ...• ..."'·-:-'· . . ..... ..... . .. • ; . I ... . ·. . • --· ~--·---- . ,. ·-· .. ....-. . . . ID SUPPLY CONSUMPTION DATA IN KHE SANH • 111 reply to the question as to daily consumption. (on gross . basis) of Class I (Ratio1is), Class III {POL), and Cla~s V (Ammo) sup~lies at Khe
- ~-~!)'_ : . '~ ~9, 1968 ~V/;.ro/' Mr. ... I SECRET ... . President: conversation of Herewith Westy 1 s telephone today. The best news is that Highway 1 should be open by March 1. . • Y1 ••• Gen. Johnson suggests a weekly rather than a daily call from
- Assembly. That body went deliberately to work fra.ming a new constitution for the war-ravaged country. ~T ' - NOFORN A-2 (BLUE) Page 2 of 9 Pages SEC~ ;,;;,- - NOFORN Prior to the US elections, a prominent opposition spokesman stated, "The recent
- . describe even emotio:i board, inc::::-eased. past that away from drawing side, inevitably was bound such t: ..e US role, t..'-1e old addi tio::al one's New Yo::::-k.e=:cartoon Vietna.~ese also for any Back, to see .,., I
- ••• Tau Foree reconuae!Mlatlou lnvol:n expan1lon8 pro1ram• (aa oppo ■ed to new le1t1lati¥e prepe•al•) .. eh rep••••ntative 1hould be prepared to tell th• Tau Force the TaR Foree report 1houlcl indicate (In preel•• tabular of m•ttna ••••Y •• and f•nnh 1
- announcements in Hanoi and Was~..ington that formal negotiations would begin 1n Rangoon on 25 November. Conferees were to be the United States, Sou~h Vietnam, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, the Soviet Union
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- is the.earliest the new provis~ons for drafting • be thoroughly conunanders, clea~ed divisional up? conunanders, possible date when they can get through of 18 and 19 year olds? In the light of the changed situation, does some rede ... ~oyment ~ or example
- a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o, ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated