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6 results

  • strategic superiority. Maintain hard appearance but seek conciliation. c. Back-peddle with all haste on basis we're overextended. We elect 1. to exercise Option B with following themes: Vis a vis US: a. Only obstacle program. to detente b. Germany
  • ~ ~ ~non. t...&.Q ~~nt• la~ .C~ al CelanH ca~ - ~hldl bocom9 - By SANITIZED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 NLJ 9"'1 - 1013 ..,-q3,tp5 ~ NARA, Date .3--A1 .... I 3 Jo.. oa darrta;..t be,-oM ~· ~ Vi) ~ C""""" • (to - ~ ;: : ;: > ~ :c .:..~ r
  • Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. f ARTICLE VI Each
  • and subassemblies being considered here and to attain a reasonable production rates- ma.n.n.0unced spot checks of facilities subsequent to th-e ir~itial !.'1$pe ....tion should be adequate. 7. Undeclared Production Inspection teams wou.ld vis:1t, in accordance
  • -.,"1..11 view threats nuclear blackmail wlth the utmost ceriousness the u ..s. intends, upon, to give its the. of and that in whatever way :f.t may later decide , . strong supi;,ort to the threatened State. G6NFit!,1ttI1tL -21· VI o THE ACTIONS