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strategic
superiority.
Maintain hard appearance but
seek conciliation.
c.
Back-peddle with all haste on basis we're
overextended.
We elect
1.
to exercise
Option B with following
themes:
Vis a vis US:
a. Only obstacle
program.
to detente
b. Germany
- ~
~ ~non.
t...&.Q ~~nt• la~ .C~ al CelanH ca~
- ~hldl bocom9 -
By
SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 9"'1 - 1013 ..,-q3,tp5
~
NARA, Date .3--A1 .... I 3
Jo.. oa
darrta;..t be,-oM ~·
~
Vi)
~
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(to
-
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.:..~
r
-
Party to this Treaty so desiring
may, pursuant to a special
agreement or agreements,
obtain any such benefits
on a bilateral
basis or through an appropriate
international
body with adequate
representation
of non-nuclear-weapon
States.
f
ARTICLE VI
Each
- and subassemblies
being considered here and to
attain a reasonable
production
rates- ma.n.n.0unced spot checks
of facilities
subsequent to th-e ir~itial
!.'1$pe ....tion should be
adequate.
7.
Undeclared
Production
Inspection
teams wou.ld vis:1t, in accordance
- -.,"1..11
view threats
nuclear blackmail wlth the utmost ceriousness
the u ..s. intends,
upon, to give its
the.
of
and that
in whatever way :f.t may later decide
,
.
strong supi;,ort to the threatened
State.
G6NFit!,1ttI1tL
-21·
VI
o
THE ACTIONS