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  • have hailed e _a ch change in government in South Viet-Nam as a "good change;" each new leader as better than his predecessor. Pearson says McNamara's statement that the Ky-Buddhist rivalry is healthy was "naive and riduculous and an example
  • -Nam. In 1965, 1966, and 1967 Prime Minister Ky took risky steps to get rid of the most highly-placed of the corrupt officials. had no way of reaching the little ones. He obviously He went at it so hard that once it almost overthrew the Government
  • . On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising aurability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a. state
  • Prime Minister Ky, who is very enthusiastic about the dramatic possibilities of Rusk's proposals. The first batch (six) of college students sent to Vietnam for the summer und e r State / AID a uspices has returned to this country. They turn out to b e
  • , would seem to indicate the desire of great numbers of the Soµth Vietnamese people to bring an end to the fighting. In fact, during the campaign, all candidates voiced publicly their support for a peace offensive. Ky may ! I i J . ·I The North
  • PRESEIT IF SAIGON _IS-TO BE ,PRESENT, i i .\ . jI -~- .. .,. 1 ~~ -., . .. ·•l . f .: AND I AM.SlffiE THAT THE GVN WILL INSIST ON THIS. A FURTHER ESSENTIAL WOULD BE PRIVATE CONSULT.ATION BY US WITH THIEU, KY AND DO BZFORE THE VATICAN PROPOSAL
  • in-fighting. about the S. His greatest concern is Saigon politics. He fears that Thieu may overplay his hand against Ky, Thang, Vien, and the young Turks. Specifically, he fears Thieu may judge that Bunker could do more to bail him out of political trouble
  • ~S:WfitHAT.:J~~If'l~(MlN_ISTER :rtoc··.·W ABt·s·.r '·1,THINGS'.-JilOVIOO·,?HO-WEV~R!:.~~VIC~~PR£SIDENt·,·KY-rr· THE:;, lNET.'-HE~_EJPEctS~ 11\!.to.-sERVE.'.~IN:-~.OFFl,CE-.. FOR:Fo t.. 1 :·::.~:>~--:; -.~:\,~>f:·t_:~
  • ~S:WfitHAT.:J~~If'l~(MlN_ISTER :rtoc··.·W ABt·s·.r '·1,THINGS'.-JilOVIOO·,?HO-WEV~R!:.~~VIC~~PR£SIDENt·,·KY-rr· THE:;, lNET.'-HE~_EJPEctS~ 11\!.to.-sERVE.'.~IN:-~.OFFl,CE-.. FOR:Fo t.. 1 :·::.~:>~--:; -.~:\,~>f:·t_:~
  • originally advanced by Prime Minister Ky. The Government has stated publicly its support for the planned election. It has promulgated election laws, ancl-'procedures under the laws are being carried out. 2. Question: Is the Government of Viet-Nam trying
  • ' the consignee:; to h!C."ini -their trac..k.s down to the ships to move goods away expeditiously -- a .::i.d failure ~ ao this had been a major problem. d) Finally, Prime Minister Ky, after many talk sessio:is with u .s Ma.4~ the decision in late December to pu
  • to be the biggest U.S. battle in the war to date. Prime Minister Ky told me at Tay Ninh today that he believes there are two North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam and that "they will keep on sending divisions down until the line of communication is cut". 2
  • yet with Buddhists. Prime Minister Ky's manifestations of South Vietnamese independence of us are desirable. My relations vJ.i. th him in two meetings were very good. b. Continuity in government is more important than whether it is civilian or military
  • are: 1. Getting Ky aboard before we act. 2. See if the Swedish government really would accept the responsibility, if asked by Hanoi and Washington -- and announce it at the time we made the offer. In fact, we might want some Ethiopian, Danish, etc