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- AND !THE EFFORTS OF ITS PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT TC DEFEND THEIR .FREEDOM WHILE REBUILDING THEIR· NATION. THE SENATOR QUITE ·.Ni;TURALLY SPENT MOST Or HIS LIMITED TIME IN VIETNAM LOOKING .. :INTO THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH HE WAS MOST CONCERNED, CIVILIAN .WAR
- A (National Security)-SANITIZED
- politically. with Ho. In 1946 Ho stayed at his home in Paris. He has close relations I have little confidence in M's judgment. I have greater confidence in A's judg ment. If it served his purpose A might color his report, however. My contact began last
- the election. Secretary Clifford agreed, saying that the President's Saturday speech to the National Alliar..ce of Businessmen had caused concern among thoughtful people because the President seemed to be saying that he was going to win the war no matter what
- A (National Security)-SANITIZED
- military people feel it can be handled. The President said he had been assured by the Joint Chiefs that Khe Sanh could be defended. 3. On Korea, the President read Clark Clifford's statement to the Congressional leaders a day or two before, outlining
- McNamara and Walt Rostow said they had discussed his reso lution, pointing out the flaws in it • .SECRETARY McNAMARA: The strongest argument we have for our presence in South Vietnam is that the · other nations in that area want us there. THE PRESIDENT: I
- or comments that you may have. SPOKESMAN: Our principal question is how can we open the way to a stable, acceptable solution of the Vietnam problem. The doors must be open for the national aspirations of North Vietnam. We are impressed by the need to keep
- . m. The President opened the meeting with reference to the anticipated March on Washington October 21 and 22. Secretary McNamara reported that he checked this morning with the Bureau and that the sponsors still claim they will have 200, 000 people
- as of this date. M This Primary comes early and will have a lot of national attention. p I have thought of letting him have several states because the President has to do many things such as 1. run the war; 2. the economic situation. Obvioulsy I cannot
- ourselves to some of the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In these circumstances I would again propose that the Soviet Government agree with us that arms supplies to the Near Eastern countries should be registered with the United Nations. I would be glad
- against us. Cyrus Vance should be in that group. We will not change any dove any time with anything. Abe Fortas: There are three problems: (1) The general public attitude (2) The merits of the situation (3} . What we can do to get people behind your
- the case that an open meeting with the committee now is not in the national interest. 2. Reply to Fulbright by letter now, saying simply that ' 1I have read Secretary Rusk's letter of last December, and agree with it." 3. Telephone Fulbright and tell him "I
Folder, "October 17, 1967 - 5:35 p.m. Congressional Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
(Item)
- national party. We need to make up our minds and agree what course of action all of us should take. Congressman Albert: Mahon is trying to get around Bow and run the government for the next thirty days. We need to show the advantages of his proposal over
- for these attacks. We unde!'-e stimated the morale and vitality of the Viet Cong. We over-estimated the support of the South Vietnamese government and its people. The President: I don't agree with any of that. We knew that they planned a general uprising
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- Policy Advisors] Box Number 2 Restriction Codes (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access t o national security Information. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document. (C) Closed In accordance wit h restrictions
- ~N-tr,~~!J WITHDR.A WAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARI ES) FOR ?'.; OF DOCUMENT Tom Johnson 1 s _ote.s . of Me.e tings ,~ Box ESTRICTION CODES A) Closed by Executive Order 12356'governlng access to national security information• . , B) CfOled
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 10:30 a.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
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- the American people rather than reassure them. The President: W 2 must lay out this situation in a clear logical explanation of what happened. I do accept your advice that it would be ill advised for the President to do this now. The President then asked Tom
- mean that.'' The President: "Colonel, I appreciate that. I hope the men are with us. The hippies and the draft card burners certainly aren't. "But I believe the basic soundness of America is still there. There are a lot of people who are saying that we
- - - it is like slapping me and I would slap back. We don't want a wider war. They have a signed agreement that if they get into a war, the Russians and Chinese will come to their aid. They have two big brothers that have more weight and people than I have
- undoubtedly some of this senti ment has been instigated by those who are sympathetic to Hanoi's position - or unsympathetic to the position of the United States -- there are nevertheless a substantial number of responsible people who have taken this view. I
- our own people. SECRETARY McNAMARA: If you think you've got problems, you can imagine what sort of problems I will have with the military. All we can point to is the silence along the DMZ. THE PRESIDENT: What cb you think is responsible for the silence