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19 results

  • are sounding Phil out on the pos~ibility of urging the " coup government simply to expel Andreas. No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until he is out of the picture, so expulsion would meet our domes tic needs while at the same time being a gain
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • senior and action level teams, each rep­ resenting one of the following: the United States, the Soviet Union, ~he Viet Cong, North Vietnam, Red China, and the Govern­ ment ot South Vietnam. Action level players analyzed the sce­ nario situation
  • frequent conflicts with party leaders, Mao's authority has not been seriously challenged sµice that time. In July 1935 he was elected to the Executive Committee ot the Comintern and thus seems to have enjoyed the Soviet union's blessing at the time. The Red
  • expressing fear that these developments would lead to a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. A prominent commentator pointed out that time to achieve a settlement was rapidly running out. In January and February, torrential
  • to dis cu s some urgent problems. I have told her that· I shall be very glad to do so just as soon as you get back, and I send this note to askii you will call Mr. Marvin Watson on your arrival so that no time will be lost in having this discussion
  • 1ith the Gandhi visit bed;nd us. it is time to begin shoring up the Pakistan side of our affairs in the s ubeontinent. first step is to tell Ayub ~ hat you said to _ rs. --andhi about Indo- ak relations and l ashrnir,. since- we promised to "'eep
  • with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developmento From 1958 to 1961 he was again in Washington, that time as Indian Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, a post especially created to deal on a global basis with questions of foreign aid for India. 0 0
  • the Paks have openly flaunted both the Indians and the United States by inviting the Chinese to visit Pakistan at the time the Indian Prime Minister is in Washington and secondly by displaying Chinese tanks '\ openly in a recent parade. Indian leaders hope
  • ~ ecise answer at this time in vi.Aw numh?"t' of unknown facto s cited by Embassy question~ fa~tor o .amp lic4t. ·n g de~i~U s~ go 0 Clearance11 s/s - Mro Morris NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • rnma of not putting domestic plan ndi at the same time a fo as s r noted th·s year .. o how we because emphas ·~dng the r m g hat given ot of b Q iet c agitationo J -the g tenn g 0 it needs no maki g a claim s) e., here
  • into another unmanageable idea like the MLF after I get out of here. (I myself spent a lot of time backing the MLF, but once burned, twice shy.) McG. B. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, January 28, 1966, 9 A. M. MR. PRESIDENT: Another Wise Man bites
  • affirmative response of the United States to the proposal of the Secretary General of August 16, 1965 (which we have never surfaced) at which time the Secretary General called for "a return to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement. 11 Ambassador Goldberg also
  • • t rougly antl• Ame r lcaa mood a .l tho, preaeat time.• McQ, B .. (P• S. ) _ Stadelhofer has standing instructions from us to press very hard in such cases, and we have made it clear to him that they operate in this case. But it seems best to go
  • to build up national language and at the same time prepare young people for higher education. He pressed his case for a secondary school in English language and his hope that the United States could assist. Again Vice President expressed great sympathy
  • "face" by demonstrating we cannot be defeated militarily (compared with total withdrawal). 2. No assurance that we could make a better bargain. 3. 3.. Permit our allies and South Viet­ Nam more time to ·adjust and make their own deals
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • there is a greater linking of the idea of talking than there has been at any time since I started following North Vietnamese matters in the autumn of 1963. (Since that time, I have talked with all of the Indians, Canadians, and Poles about their visits to Hanoi