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  • of payments costs for our troops in NATO are temporary . They buy time but they don't cure the problem . Ovet· the Longer term we look for the British to do mo re in Europe which could enable us to do less . We can also anticipate the UK working towa r d some
  • not recommend movlng US combat unlh into or contiguou£ to the RVN at this time. Moreover, the intro• ductlon o{ US combnt forces whkh would alt idle could well h ;,\ve 11. p11ych9lo&ical impact on b oth friends and enernlee the reverse of tbftt do aired
  • charts wh ich we re displayed to the Council mem­ bers are attached . The President asked several times at appropriate points in the brief­ ing for comparabl e U . S . figures . Secretary McNamara responded each time, giving comparative figures
  • times that in the U. S., because of chronic ~al ­ nourishrr.ent . In Libya, a mother must have five children to have a good chance t~at one will l ive to 15 yea~ s . In Vietnam, 4o percent of the ch ildren die of disease by the age of four . 2. After
  • and at that time we would decide to go ahead. If we agreed to give the sup e rsonics, deliveries coul d be scheduled for 19 68 ­ 1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares
  • their countri es of the Czech liberal reforms . 3 . The Czechs were printing, for the first time, supressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarred. 4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR
  • Union would be a helpful move at a time when they are in deep trouble with the Chinese. There appears to be no way to prevent the Russians from getting the machines from other buyers in Europe. Secretary Freeman asked again whether we wanted to help
  • time. w. J. J~ .SERVICE SET Wednesday, August 3, 1966 Mr. Preaid.ent: The suggested order of W.ine•• for the 45-mhmte NSC on Indone•ia i• aa follcnn: di~asion 1. Your opening remark.a: a. Meeting called to diacua policy pan
  • for a long time, said he shared Secretary Clifford' s view wholeheartedly. He said our pres ent position reminded him of the positions in the Arab - Israeli dispute, i. e . , both sides dug in. As there are risks in any kind of war , there are risks also
  • in the New York Times which was quite misleading in that it l eft the im.prcssion that the Viet C ong had achieved a major victory over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong loss es in this battle were sizeable . Although the week has been bloody, it has been pretty
  • was insulting, and the press from the first day said the pause would not lead to negotiations. This time, none of these things happened. Twenty - five secondary demarches are under way. that Hanoi is under great pressure. The Yugoslavs tell us Diplomatic effo
  • thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks . His report largely reflected the State Department memorandwn submitted prior to the meeting. One of the principal
  • show that we are on top of the subject. The fl.aw in the Strauss plan, as the Secretary sees it, is that there is a t least a four t o five year lead time before any desalting plants could begin to produce. Therefore, the S tr auss p l
  • Corps is tremendously impressive. 3. 'Ihe ARVN is improving, according to General Abrams, who is devoting his full time to this problem. 4. The ARVN fights well in some areas and not well in others, depending on its leaders . 5. The Vietnamese
  • . Ambassador Thompson had talked with Kosygin, and S ecretary Rusk had raised the matter with Ambassador Dobrynin the previous Thursday. The President said that he had 11played for time 11 with the Israelis . He had hoped before Secretary McNamara left to have
  • good for a period of time. -- Export tax incentives: We still don't know what form they will take or how much they will be. -- Imports: Nothing special expected although there may possibly be some restrictions through licensing. Generally, the French
  • ~y cr ~ ~ical :::10~ harves~ alo:1e, time, political strain ' . 'T'QD £ ... 6'"' EC'tET .l ' . F . The Soviet man in the street is ·-.. for the moment . . ' 1. His cash income i s high , and he can ex ­ p e ct. further increases
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • to their new role in the world. , I, ,, ,.,,, . !' ·1 NL~ P v __..._~~- . j SECRET/~ENSITIVE - 2 ­ .-SECRET /SEMSI !Iv E A. The UK is steadily withdrawing from its security commitments in distant areas but at the same time is giving more support
  • and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50 - 100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects
  • wou lc~ }:;e possible e::ce!_Jt after c. cec l c. r ~tion oi \·;c:r by Frc.nce . No Fre r.cil co:,1mitr.'.ent c c.n be given regc:rd ing such re - entry in time of N.=,To a l ert or crisis . Th e y a r e , howev er , ·w illing to perr.,.:..t c
  • , with representatives from the Departments and Agencies listed on Attachment A. Since that time the Committee has had under continuing r eview the criteria upon which the stockpile objectives are determined. President Johnson specifically charged the Committee to give
  • of the South Vietnamese troops were on leave for the Tet holidays. Secretary Rusk: attacks. We were not surprised except as to the timing of the Tet The President: Control is very difficult. people can get inside the White House. Despite 300 White House