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  • their technical as s istance program to increase food production in Latin A· . ~erica, Asia and Africa, with assistance from U. S. through PL 480 . 3. Cou ld step up aid to South Vietnam - possibly one or two L ST ships for U. S1 us e . Korea (President Park~ P
  • have to have somebody carry a message to Garcia. What do we do?" General Wheeler responded by saying that our first approach should be to give Isra el military aid and all the support it needs for long­ term military operations. If we are convinced
  • funds or from a supplemental appropriation, Mi:. McNamara s aid both, but felt that, as far as Defens e was concerned, needs co'.ll.d be met largel y from e::Csting appropriations . Mr . McNamara and Mr . Barr noted that the Export- Import Bank
  • Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments. -TOP 3ECRETJSEI>ISITIVE SERVICE SET' ,,. .. . . 'i' 0P SD &R
  • , Presiding The Speaker of the Hause of Representatives ACDA William C . Faster , Director AEC Glenn Seaborg, Chairman AID David E. Bell, Administrator BUREAU OF THE BUDGET Kermit Gordon, Director CIA John A. McCone, Director (Statutory Adviser) Lt. Gen
  • Vietnamese requests for this kind of aid would be costly to the Soviet position, the more so if such aid had previously been promised. 9. On balance, we think that the chances are about even that the Soviets would provide some SA-2 defenses to North
  • Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President Douglass Cate:r, Special Assistant to the President Bromley Sntlth, ~cutive Secretary, National Security Council SEtHlCESET A TT EN DANCE LIST FOR THE 536th NSC MEETING JULY 28, 1964, AT 12: 15 IN THE CABINET
  • 1s quotation about governm e nts based on the cons ent of thi• go v e rned, and b. Deni.ti that th e r e was any U.S. or NATO attempt to intervene in C:r.1•d1oslovakia as a lleg ed by Moscow. Dobrynin ha
  • assistance . To assume that no No rth Vietnamese would ever call for Chinese aid is to underestimate the degree of ideological fervor and anti-US hostility that today exist in Hanoi . 4o Either respond i ng to such a call , or even on their own
  • reporting the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will be a challenge to them to give all aid necessary to make up the loss . The Chinese Communists as well as the Soviets wi ll not sit by. At the very least they wi ll replace the petroleum and the facilities des
  • , Special Assistant to the President Major General Chester V. Clifton, Military Aide to the President Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President Harold Saunders, National Security Council Staff Bromley Smith, Executive Sec retary, National Security
  • captured by the >forth Koreans . S ecr etary McNamara s aid he had little in the way of facts to add to what has been in the p r ess except for one point- ­ that the incident appeared to have been pre - planned. In a d dition to this , two other facts made
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  • has been more than offset by the increased flow of military and economic aid, largely from the USSR and Communist China. 3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hano i to continue its support of military operations in the South