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  • believed, however, that because we had sent a note on overflights to the Cubans via the Czechs, we were taking a new initiative and launching a new move against Cas tro. They felt we had concluded that we had interpreted the climate of improving U . S
  • of forming new governments . D . A difficult and uncertain situation exi sts in Greece . 2 . At the NATO meet ing sch e duled later this month in Ice land, our objective will be to pr event disarray in NATO . 3 . The uncertainty in Europe has
  • interest in the copper stockpile. Several persons, including As sis tant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Tony Solomon, responded. The copper stockpile is or soon will be in balance. The shortage will be met by production from a new Arizona mine whi
  • Secr etary McNamara, speaking from the attached that Viet Cong actions had reached a new high in July, including the highest number of weapons lost by the South Vietnamese to the Viet Cong. It has been a difficult month, but the increased Viet Cong
  • of a coalition government before negotiations could be under­ taken. e . Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initia tiv e as IC C co ­ chairman. He asked that the peace offensive be prolon ged long enough for the Soviets to react on the basis
  • are running out of gas. New forces a re needed. U.S. troops are outside H ue. The weather is down on the deck, meaning that there is no fogistic resupply by air. A new attack on Danang is possible. The North Vietnamese Second Division is in the area. More U.S
  • .1 consideration was given to pene~tiori of an ICBM defense. A "new" or "secom generation" of var.heads i s now being develo.Ped with the prt:nary objective of enhancing our penetration capability. Duril:lg mLICK, de ­ s1gn features which
  • terms . 2 . The milita r y case for a ttack on POL: Sec r eta r y McNamara; and then poll the Chiefs one by one . 3. Anticipatory messages to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. FYI. I personally do not believe it is necessar y to info r C'l
  • and that the Japanese Gove rn­ ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever­ sion. He thought that action
  • and launched int o a discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the devel opment s on the Middle Eas t in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that the non-permanent
  • information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we
  • is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to g i ve us . d . The U. S . actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are d etermined
  • the new equipment making possible the relighting of the engines w : thout the descent. He said we are on the very far frontier of knowledge and there are many problems remaining. Those who had operated the pl anes were unanimous in agreeing that it would
  • be engaged in fighting under the new progra m . He also asked whether U . S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had ex ­ pressed their concern to him on this p oint. Secretary McNarnal'a r eplied that U . S . soldiers
  • ious crops . Country per.:'or:r.;.nce in developin5 food resources will be a priority self-help condition for AID assistance . invest~ent In concert ¥ith these efforts , the President has proposed a new Fooci. for Freedom program, which will be closely
  • the enemy militarily; we must make demons trable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by gett ing ourselves into a military posture that we credibly
  • zed but have no interes t in the control of conventional a r ms . Our immediat e p r obl em is to gi ve King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore , we have r ecommended a $14 million a rms sale and a new food ag reement. In this p r ocess , however
  • . reaction and he felt that we should respond today prior to the TV news broadcasts• Secretary Rusk asked again why, if Commander Bucher were an honest man, he made the statement. H e suggested the possibility that he was trading this statement
  • to the Soviet bloc without attaching 1peclal new conditioue. Su::h action would acc:or1 with President Kennedy's decision in r#iay 1963 on an a!moet identical case (forage ba.rvetters) in which the sarn e argument for quid pro quo conditions waa advanced
  • abotJt the "technologica l gap" hus led to various s tc:te:-.1ents and suggestions for corrective i:ct.ion . Jl.znong these is the "Itali2n 11 proposal , on '.·rhich the President cor;t.rnented favorably in the Erharc5. communique and in his New Yor