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- Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941- (68)
- Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003 (12)
- Christian, George E. (George Eastland), 1927-2002 (9)
- Jones, James R. (8)
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- of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing? The President: Just almost any step. have not taken any yet. As far as we can see, they And we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen
- ), Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler, Ambassador Taylor, William Bundy, John McNaughton, Robert Manning, and McGeorge Bundy The meeting began with the President's review of a memorandum, "Courses of Action for South Vietnam," dated September 8
- : Because we did not permit any retaliatory action on the attack on Blue House. The depth of feeling over that is. very deep. It was con sidered a personal affront and a loss of face. They considered it very serious that the raiders got within 300 yards
- B OFFICE OF THR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1 November 1967 MEMO FOR The President Yesterday at lunch I stated my belief that continuation of our present course of action in Southeast Asia would be dangerous, costly in lives, and unsatisfactory
- all along to limit this war. "The action which General Westmoreland is proposing would be a significant act of war against Cambodia. This would change the entire character of the war. If Cambodia is attacked, they may ask the Chinese to side with them
- of the North Koreans for the holding of the March 1 meeting of Com munist Parties which the Soviets are planning despite Chinese Communist opposi tion. Kosygin is expected to stay two days in North Korea. U, S. Action now \ puts heavy pressure on the Soviets
Folder, "August 22, 1968 - 9 p.m. Cabinet meeting, and staff members," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
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- two voted against it. They were the Soviet Union and Hungary. There would be 80 - 90 votes on this issue in the General Assembly. This action has created violent world reaction. The National Assembly can speak. Minister can also
- waters the action which the North Koreans took is not a very appropriate one. Secretary Katzenbach: The evidence is quite good and quite strong that the detention was made in territorial waters. We have a fix on the Pueblo at 8:30 when he was 25 miles out
- praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and thia was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment
Folder, "August 4, 1964 Leadership Breakfast [1964 Leadership Notes]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
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- . McCone to give us his estimate of enemy action--what their responses would be. RUSSELL: Mr. Mc Cone, I notice you did not mention the submarine. Does anybody know what kind of anti-submarine warfare there is in that area? MC CONE: We discussed that today
- and the Viet Cong. General Wheeler: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North VietnCl.mese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the thr e e targets are not necessary from a mi litary point of view. Howe v er , a South Vietn
- action. It is important that we make no public move until Saturday. The President: What is the military situation? Secretary Clifford: There is more activity, but we don't know whether this is the third offensive. The attacks are not coming off v ery
Folder, "June 4, 1968 - 1:45 p.m. President's Tuesday Luncheon," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
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- Clifford and Symington ought to confer. they should go to him to see what ways we can cut. Walt Rostow: Our financial people are talking with the head oi the International Monetary Fund to see if we should take any actions tETIP~C t•S:t:tS CGP!RIGtiTED M
- action to minimize adverse impact or (b) restrict deployments and-;:;-ilitary construction and run the risk of a growing communist military advantage? Recommendation: Option a. Subject: Military Situation - I Corps and 1st Division {Tab D) Problem
- . The President: What is the nature of the enemy forces in Saigon? General Wheeler: The forces in the Saigon area are decreasing. is still the build-up and the threat across the Cambodian border. There At Khesanh we got that C-130 out. a very gallant action
Folder, "[June 17, 1966 - 6:05 p.m. National Security Council Meeting]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
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- -~¥ SJ GI~'-./SENSITIVE "-· _·__:~;_;_~~-'-~~~~~- FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SUM:MARY NOTES OF 559th NSC MEETING June 17, 1966; 6:05 to 8:00 P. M. Vietnam - - POL The President summarized the actions required and the judgments which will have to be made
Folder, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2
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- AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557 STATE GRNC BT -S E e ft E T AMM.AN 3270 NOD IS FEB 3, 1968 8 :14 ;p .M. , FOR YOUR INFORMATION . SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES TOWARD SOVIETS \ t. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE
- , that it is the right long-term course to take. We are not sure under the circumstances which exist that a conventional military victory, as conunonly defined, can be had. After this study is made---if there is no clear resolution in the actions of the next 3-4 months
- with the President from 2:30 until 5:30. A list of those present is attached at annex. Preparatory Meeting - 10:30 Secretary McNamara noted that the only Section of his report which contained specific action recommendations and the only one fully co ordinated
- to the 19th.. They may have to ask for total cessation or no more conversations. There is a question of face involved. 4. Curious oriental approach -- this action could give them reason to break off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not like
- hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of action, Africans didn't want mutual because of our bombing. That is now out. Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did. Presidens Rusk: Let Goldberg find
Folder, "October 14, 1968 - Foreign Policy Advisory Group meeting," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3
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- and especially pressure from the farmers. But he said that the one deterrent to Soviet action against Germany is the "presence of U. S. forces in Europe" not the nuclear weapons, but the forces. Kie singer was a bit of a 11 Secretary Clifford observed
Folder, "November 8, 1967 - 9:42 a.m. Vice President and Walt Rostow," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
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- to reasonable peace negotiations. !r! · On the military front·, Westmoreland feels that he has the initiative. j In the pacification program, the re is a forward movement and action is being taken to eliminate corruption. I Walt Rostow said that Ambassador
- missing, or wounded, or killed in action. General Wheeler: I have here a paper which was written on 31 January by the Military Affairs Committee and the Current Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army. We believe this document to be authentic. In ihth'e
- of the Secret Service Advisory Commission. The President went over the lists of legislation on which action is needed and emphasized particularly Foreign Aid and Housing. I provided the Leadership with copies of these lists. The meeting broke up about
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 10:30 a.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
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- of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions. General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the message
- -10 ground operations (briefed group on latest military action). President: action)? What accounts for substantial difference in KIA (killed in Wheeler: 1. Heavier fire pow'e r -- fighter bombers and artillery. 2. Mobility -- choppers. 3. Good
- pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgement. Goldberg said I don't agree. Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara
- . Somebody should talk with Walt Rostow: {To General Wheeler). Nobody is advising the President, to my knowledge who has been trigger-happy. General Wheeler: Personally, I find none of the military courses of action particularly attractive. Walt Rostow: We
- : Next Steps. (Sect. Rusk) 5. Time Scenario for Troop Decisions. (The President) Specific matters you wish presented to you for decision and action. 6. Other. / lJ}.~ TOP SECRE7 attachment (Tab A) Rostow TAB A {para. 7 from Ambassador
- \JTHORTTIIES IN Jt".NOI, lltffORTUNATP.l.Y, HA~OI HAS RESPON!:lED WITH THE OPPOSITE OF RESTRAINT AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EFFORTS ' TO TflXE OVER THE SOUTH DY FORCE. S\JCH' ACTIONS CREf\·n: s~:RIOUS DOUBTS IN OUR MIND TH/\T COMPL~TEL.Y STOPPING THe: BO~:s H"G
- to "grab" for immediate success. I think the enemy overestimates the degree of support in the Vietnamese populace and underestimates our strength. General Wheeler: He is taking both actions concurrently. He is attacking the cities and also launching
- of military actions aga inst them. VC unhappy that Hanoi {unreadable) worldwide - - frightens them. Goldbe~ I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public statement was not good but could have been much worse. He said
- of many delegates and figure heavily in the general debate . . The Soviets and other Conununist delegations are likely to attack our policy and actions, and we think it probable that some non-aligned nations will display concern, ·if not out right
- will adjourn without action and throw the matter back into the Security Council. There are two questions raised by the resolutions - whether there should be withdrawal back to the situation of June 4 or simply a statement eliminating the state of belligerence
- , and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease aa al ---- , Washington time. President Thieu and I have reached this decision on the basis of developments in the Paris talks, -- and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful
Folder, "[January 31, 1968 - Meeting with Congressional Leaders]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2
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- . The mos~ . seriou~ situation apnears to be at C..iJ./tU u()
- forces to be available at all times. 2. Make available troops for an amphibious landing north of the DMZ if that action is decided upon. The 82nd Airborne and the Sixth-Ninth of Marine division can only be deployed if we eliminate the restrictions
- should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for ·them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly
- , and artillery bombardment k:Z-_' ~~ '~ of North Vietna:::i:::,ta ~ Ih~v~::::::t:::ii~:~cision on the ~~ . . basis of developments in the Paris talks, - - and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peacefu~ settlement of the war. I