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  • Soviet counterpart helped me out; he told me what it was. It was a little bit indicative of the way he and I had worked together over the years. I worked with him beginning in 1963, with Dean Rusk and [then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Andrei
  • v i e t structure is built that way, there's not much point in trying to do business, say, with [Andrei] Gromyko, whereas you can occasionally with Kosygin. This was truer in the days of S t a l i n than I think it is now when you really have
  • Biographical information; Vietnam War; Clark Clifford; Paul Nitze; Dick Helms; DeGaulle; Phil Farley; Henry Kuss; morale problems; Wriston Report; McGeorge Bundy; Christian Herter; Walt Rostow; Dean Rusk; McCarthyism; Yalta; Andrei Gomyko; Kosygin
  • in its present form, was done by the Director and Mr. DePalma and Mr. Bunn, mostly in New York. Once or twice here there was a lunch; there was a dinner with Mr. Foster and [Andrei A.] Gromyko, I believe, in Washington. But there were a good deal
  • 1964 Presidential message to 18 nation Disarmament Commission; Pastore resolution; William Foster; MFL; Walt Rostow; Aleksei A. Roshchin; George Bunn; Sam DePalma; Tsoraphin; Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter; Ambassador Knappstein; Mr. Gromyko
  • had been the head of the Soviet delegation to the UN at one point. He was one of their top-level diplomats, right up there with Andrei Gromyko and the others. I do not know what ever happened to him. Big man. And so he--this was just something to note
  • in Rangoon if we were prepared to do so; or he may be conducting a black operation. He may be trying to deceive us in some way. I had several talks with [Andrei A.] Gromyko immediately following that episode, and there was never any indication from Gromyko
  • a problem with the Soviet Union. There isn't going to be any settlement of the German problem to which the Soviets don't agree. I talked with [Andrei A.] Gromyko many times about the German problem, and tried to show him what vast changes in the situation
  • think we would all have been somewhat impatient . And in the end, about the 18th of March, [Andrei A .] Gromyko gave the British as cold a turn-down as you could get . That's an interesting episode in hindsight, whether the Soviet hesitation indicated
  • . We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei
  • . We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei
  • about the agreement--[Averell] Harriman-[Andrei] Gromyko activities--until it got to the Senate. This was really not a legislative process as you would normally have. By the same token, interestingly enough, it was one of Kennedy's finest hours. He had
  • with [Andre] Gromyko and [Dean] Rusk and McNamara and others during that time, did you not? B: Yes. M: But no particular new initiatives from either side? B: Indeed, the one serious subject we tried to open with them there and had hoped we would move
  • recommended He and Nasser considered themselves quite close, being so-called neutrals. And I'm rather interested that Gromyko now is on his way to see Tito, having just returned from a visit to see Nasser in Cairo. It may well be he went to talk to Nasser
  • . So they have no complaint for almost all They did have a complaint on that very first week or so when the Secretary was working with Gromyko and others on the text of this thing. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
  • Washington informed. Now it's important to note that Wilson and Brown were both a little disappointed with the composition of Kosygin's delegation when they first were aware of it. For variornreasons Gromyko wasn't coming, and indeed there were very few
  • that there was a considerable amount of uncertainty among the delegates from Russia, that no one felt he was powerful enough to speak for them. this time there was a great many of the old guard, Gromyko, Bulganin, Zhukov-- And at Mikoyan, � � � LBJ Presidential Library http
  • way around. but it's there. The minute he goes, Gromyko says, IIvJe want better relations. That speech has t\'/o purposes. tion to the AB~1, One is that it hardens the opposi- quite clearly. And although Herman Kahn. who defends the ABM, said