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  • Tac, I was the special assistant to COMUSMACV [Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and to General [William] Westmoreland. I was also, as I told you before, serving as the pacification director in the office of the J-3, and the J-3
  • Hon and Colonel Y; the importance of district-level politics; initiating programs in Vietnam relating to pacification, the strategic hamlet program and other government agencies' view of it; the spread of the strategic hamlet program from Bac Lieu
  • time to the Vietnamese problem that larger policy issues, in a way, were given short shrift. M: Did it have anything to do with their preoccupation with secrecy? Was the Policy Planning Council excluded from important negotiating efforts in Vietnam
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; contact with LBJ; Policy Planning Council; short-circuiting channels of communication; October 1966 trade speech; Ludwig Erhard; Harmel Exercise; Vietnam; foreign policy brain trust for Humphrey; Abe Fortas; Clark Clifford
  • East, particularly Vietnam, and to other countries near Vietnam as a result of the way the war heated up there. a big difference between the two, So that's but I think this is more a difference of circumstances and difference in changes in the world
  • Vietnam
  • programs; problems of the development of foreign countries; LBJ’s support on the Hill; effect of Vietnam on AID program; role of LBJ; Mekong Delta program; multilateral aid; ADB funds; Alliance for Progress; requirement for self-help for receiving aid
  • is July 31, 1969. My name is David McComb. The first question I have for you is a rather large one and rather general, too. I'd like to know what the influence of Vietnam was on Treasury policies? Did it have an increasing effect? Did the President
  • Vietnam
  • Influence of Vietnam on Treasury policies; attitudes towards LBJ and Congress; national public service
  • that sense. So State did decide to assign at least one full-time officer to his briefing. M: Did you first get involved in the general Indochina problem, and particularly Vietnam, when you went to work as Hilsmanls assistant LBJ Presidential Library http
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; contact with LBJ; briefing LBJ while VP; Indochina; Vietnam; Diem; Roger Hilsman; William Bundy; Mac Bundy; John McNaughton; Interagency Planning Staff; Tonkin Gulf Resolution; peace negotiations; press leaks; bombing; "Why
  • INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM J. CONNELL INTERVIEWER: Ted Gitt i nger PLACE: Mr. Connell's office, Bethesda, Maryland Tape 1 of 2 G: Mr. Connell, were you able to follow the evolution of Mr. [Hubert] Humphrey's thinking on Vietnam as the years passed? C: Yes
  • Vietnam
  • Duties with Humphrey; foreign policy assistants; development of Humphrey's thinking on Vietnam; Humphrey's interest in arms control; Food for Peace; the development of democratic institutions; health research; civil rights; NATP; founding
  • Vietnam War impact on the economy and you really can't break these things apart. By that I mean the period from late 1965 all the way through 1968 and even beyond, but I mean particularly through 1968, when the surcharge was finally passed
  • Vietnam
  • program or the President's Vietnam position. This seemed to be overlooked in some of the domestic travel. Oftentimes a cabinet member would be speaking to some business group and the text of the speech would be appropriate, but he seemed to neglect thrusts
  • and Congress and how being in office affected a party's power; growing opposition to LBJ's Vietnam policy in 1966; O'Brien's report on 1966 election expectations based on his nationwide travels; early opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam from Vance Hartke
  • , 1982 INTERVIEWEE: CHARLES A. MORRIS INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: The Hilton Inn, Austin, Texas Tape 1 of 3 G: You [first] came to Vietnam in June 1964? M: June 1964 through June of 1965. My assignments during that period, for about
  • Vietnam
  • First duties and associates in Vietnam; III ARVN Corps; the problem of counterintelligence duty in Hawaii; early buildup of the Vietnam War; background of the war; the Oriental soldier; return to Vietnam in 1967; briefing preparation for McNamara
  • were all concerned, with the so-called Vietnam plank. I remember working with Bill Welsh, Bill Connell, Bob Nathan, and others. We agreed on a domestic issues draft very quickly. By very quickly I mean within a week or ten days; we then came
  • Working with Vice President Hubert Humphrey to develop his campaign platform before the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago; working on a Vietnam speech for Humphrey to give in Chicago; LBJ and Humphrey's views on Vietnam; consulting
  • to Laos, but during 1946 you were in town in the State Department concerned with various aspects of Indochina policy, including being the chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Vietnam early in 1964. When did you first have any contact with President
  • Vietnam
  • Informing Vice-President LBJ of international affairs; announcing that the U.S. would be out of Vietnam by 1965; Sullivan’s appointment and work as chairman of Interagency Task Force on Vietnam; contingency planning to get North Vietnamese
  • , the problems with India, the problems with Pakistan to some degree over Vietnam, as well as the India-Pakistan conflict, were evident major factors in his decision. I think he has several times indicated by action what his rationale was. He did not want loans
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; AID operations; Far East; additionality; Congress; interagency relationships; Vietnam; diversion and control of AID supplies; intervention; other development programs
  • television program and I was just watching, sitting there, he was being pressed pr.etty hard about Vietnam and at that time the Dominican Republic, and it was fairly obvious that he was not in sympathy with the Administration's approach on either
  • Vietnam
  • during early years as president; complaints from LBJ about Abel’s Vietnam War comments; reactions of press representatives to events in Vietnam; concern of Dean Rusk about British government’s role in SEATO; dissent of State and Defense mid-level people
  • do I view that? G: Yes. How did you at the time? C: At the time, Vietnam. That was the overriding sentiment around here: that he wasn't running--the sentiment was that he wasn't running because of Vietnam, and secondly that he waited too long
  • Factors that led to Lister Hill's decision to not run for re-election in 1968; Cronin's reaction to LBJ's 1968 announcement that he would not run for re-election; public opinion regarding Vietnam; Hill's support for the administration's actions
  • later said that I was a traitor to my country, by the way. Bob Sherrod was going out to Vietnam, I think it was about 1966 or so, and as a lot of people did he went and got briefed in the White House. Lyndon always wanted to know who was going out
  • Vietnam
  • Early contact with LBJ during 1960 campaign; going to Vietnam for the first time; learning about Vietnam and gaining the confidence of the people there; deciphering the motivation of the officers that spoke to him; Homer Bigart; John Vann; John
  • they? No, I'm not sure he was able to help him. I think, you know, that it is quite limited, the kind of help that can be given. And with the problems that this Administration had, on Vietnam Specifically--almost entirely really--because certaiinly
  • Vietnam
  • Lady Bird’s influence on LBJ; preparation for 1968 campaign; 3/31 announcement; work on task forces; task force reports; HHH campaign; transition period; LBJ’s greatest concern; frustration over Vietnam; assessment of history’s judgment on LBJ’s
  • degree of policy control does one maintain. Certainly all the tactical decisions in Vietnam are made by General [Creighton Williams] Abrams and his staff in Vietnam. When it came to those interfaces between military decisions and political decisions
  • Vietnam
  • ; the Defense Department's relationship with Congress; public perception of the Department of Defense's involvement in Vietnam; LBJ's public reputation; LBJ's 3/31/1968 speech announcing he would not seek re-election.
  • it. he does these things, you know. Although That is, he sees it differently. Let me tell you the way it came back to me was that at the dinner we got to talking about Vietnam or the military or something like this. And we disagreed. I was supposed
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; departed government in 1964 over policy in Vietnam; JFK, Harriman, Forrestal and Hilsman were all for a political approach while LBJ was for a military approach; LBJ: “It’s the only war we’ve got;” Rostow and McNamara were
  • of that meeting? Z: Some of it. I don't remember whether I've given you this before or not, but if not, it dealt with the press in Vietnam and the coverage we were getting. Leonard was there as director of USIA, John was there as the new director
  • Vietnam
  • 1965 meeting with LBJ about press coverage in Vietnam; Frank Stanton; Arthur Sylvester; LBJ and the press; Walt Rostow; different interpretations of the situation in Vietnam; Bill Moyers; government response to press criticism; qualifications
  • about that, about the President's credibility gap. Part of that was just him cutting a corner here or there, but part of it came from the way we were funding the Vietnam War, assuming it would end at the end of the year as we did in 1964, 1965, 1966
  • ] McNamara's view, critical to moving troops and supplies and what have you in connection with the Vietnam War. The possibility of a railroad strike got everybody rechurning on whether there should be some kind of general emergency disputes legislation. In late
  • that's when [Dean] Acheson, [McGeorge] Bundy and that crowd were in telling him give up the Vietnam War. But we didn't know it. We got in and he was writing something at his desk. absolutely exhausted, tired and exhausted. sat down. He looked He came
  • is that Komer--after Robert Komer took over as the deputy to General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV [Commander, United States Military Command, Vietnam] for Pacification and Development--I'm not sure that was the exact title, but that is what he was doing, among other
  • : Michael L.Gillette PLACE: Ms. Bonanno's office, Washington, D.C. Tape 1 of 1 B: I guess as you go into this last period, the two things that always end up being most real in your memories are his trying to make a deal with the Soviets and Vietnam
  • LBJ's attempts at negotiation with the USSR and North Vietnam; LBJ's treatment of Hubert Humphrey in the final months of LBJ's administration; Humphrey's personality; LBJ's decision to not attend the Democratic National Convention and support
  • Benning, Georgia, in August 1964. I was assigned to Vietnam because I had volunteered to go there from the career course at Fort Benning, Georgia, the infantry career course. So it started in Vietnam, I was assigned as a district adviser in Ben Tranh
  • , and the President's special representative to the Vietnam War conference, Deputy Secretary of National Defense. It included a man who was formerly, I believe, head of the Federal Aeronautics Administration, a fellow named Jeeb (Najeeb) Halaby. It included -- well
  • Vietnam
  • ; briefings for Senate Foreign Relations Committee; efforts as ambassador; relations with Ayub Khan; role as Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam; team of Bunker and Locke; manpower mobilization; pacification program; political atmosphere at home; changes
  • /loh/oh But many of those college students on every campus in Wisconsin, as everywhere else in the country, were zealous young students articulating for McCarthy and condemning the President, and only on one issue, particularly the Vietnam issue
  • there and their involvement in their trade and in the [Vietnam] War itself. Do you think the reporters became emotionally involved in the conflict? M: Yes. Certainly a significant number of them did, probably including myself. I don't think it was possible not to. I'm
  • Emotional involvement of journalists covering Vietnam; whether reporters reflected to perspectives of the publications for which they wrote; how transportation within Vietnam was arranged for reporters; how reporters decided what area to cover
  • that there was as much cooperation as there was, although it was very poor initially. By the time I left Vietnam it was improving somewhat, but it still was a very difficult thing because the militia, being largely under the control of the province chiefs or under
  • failures in Vietnam; the Viet Cong's invincible reputation; difficulty in accurately assessing gains and losses; problems with communication, supply and maintenance systems; Father Hao; charcoal production; the introduction of helicopters and armored
  • think he probably thought of it more as an executive or management job than, as I say, because I knew anything about Vietnam, which I didn't. either when he went out there. Of course, he hadn't This is of course hearsay, but I believe that he had
  • Vietnam
  • Circumstances of assignment to Vietnam; attitude toward Diem; Edward Lansdale; meeting with LBJ; Taylor-Rostow mission; the Thompson mission; Trueheart Commission; strategic hamlet program; meetings with Diem; Mike Mansfield visit; Buddhists; period
  • . That will be the definitive story of John Paul Vann. My own association with Vann occurred when he first came to Vietnam. I was in the MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] situation in charge of organization and training, a part of the army section. And it took all
  • Vietnam
  • Jacobson's opinion of John Paul Vann; Vann's work for Agency for International Development (AID) in Vietnam and his death; Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) relations with the press, including Joseph Alsop, Don Oberdorfer, Peter Braestrup
  • it and that we shouldn't blame Gore. I was just mad as a wet hen at Senator Gore at the time, but that he had been authorized to say it for the reason--this is the way this logic went--that the President wanted the world to know in the heart of the Vietnam
  • was not. M: Either to Vietnam or to Berlin? S: No, no. M: Your most famous association, of course, is the one that came in December of 1966 in connection with your visit to Hanoi. S: That's right. M: I know that you've written a full book as well
  • Vietnam
  • that, as a reporter, he had no political agenda; Pham Van Dong’s off-the-record comments; private negotiations between the U.S. and North Vietnam; keeping contact with the U.S. while he was in North Vietnam; press access to information Salisbury found out while
  • in Vietnam was going on and how we could improve the effectiveness; what kind of equipment we needed; anything that had to do with the Air Force as a separate service, mostly to improve i·ts effectiveness. He was very much interested in the Air Force. McS
  • Vietnam
  • . air power in Vietnam before and after Gulf of Tonkin incident; method of selecting bombing targets in Vietnam; Tet offensive; objectives of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam; evaluation of the administration of Defense Dept. and its effects on the Air
  • in the Bundestag. There we were upstairs in the White House in his rooms, and there he was concentrating almost completely on Vietnam. He did get reports while we were discussing with him. He was very much upset. Also, I don't know when this would have been. I also
  • Vice President Johnson's 1961 visit to Berlin; meeting LBJ in the 1950's in the United States; LBJ's affinity for Germany and German people; Brandt's visits to the U.S. in the mid-1960's; Vietnam police; LBJ's opinions of European relations; Robert
  • Adams -­ I -­ 2 G: In a sense you spend your whole life getting ready to be an analyst. A: Yes, right. G: When did you begin working on Vietnam? A: Early August 1965. G: Is this essentially what you said in the Harper's article? A: I think so
  • Vietnam
  • Adams' work for the CIA in Vietnam in 1965; identifying the enemy in Vietnam; self-defense and secret self-defense militiamen in Vietnam; Adams' involvement in Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67: altered statistics reporting troop
  • wrote in my book that I did on Vietnam, was that there was substantial consistency between what was being said publicly and what was being said privately, and that the Papers, rather than proving duplicity, proved that people were saying what I think
  • Vietnam
  • Circumstances of going to work on what later became known as the Pentagon Papers; the study to answer questions about the Vietnam War; granting of authority to requisition files within the Pentagon; CIA provides materials; White House material
  • , by this time of course Vietnam had become a matter of controversy both here and there. Did you have much fear of problems with the anti-Vietnam demonstrators? W: We knew we would have demonstrations, and considerable precautions were taken to limit those
  • Vietnam
  • Foreign investments in Australia; U.S. investment in Australia; President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey’s 1966 visit to Australia; Australian anti-Vietnam War demonstrators; planning LBJ’s trip to Australia; planning a Prime Minister’s visit
  • , to Christian. R: And that was in the summer of 1965. M: Sixty-five, yes. Of course, that coincided with the escalation in Vietnam. R: Yes. And it coincides with another thing, a series of things. That I do remember and I did write about; that he
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; 1957 Civil Rights Act; Presidency; LBJ's relations with the press; Eric Goldman; anti-communism; Vietnam
  • with the rising costs of the Vietnam War and curb inflation because that was becoming a troublesome matter. The proposal was not submitted to the Congress until late 1967, August, and no action was taken until the next session. He renewed the request early in 1968
  • The 1968 proposed tax surcharge to address rising costs of the Vietnam War and curb inflation; support from the business community for the tax surcharge; Civil Rights Act of 1968; Everett Dirksen's role in passing the cloture vote; the Housing