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  • have been going to meet those two leaders of South Vietnam. G: [Nguyen Van] Thieu and [Nguyen Cao] Ky. J: Yes, we might have been going to Hawaii to meet them, or somewhere. And McNamara showed us a secret film from Red China, I think, showing
  • /show/loh/oh where their exchange ratio was twenty-five to one, which for an ARVN unit was really water-walking. But on the other hand we had the 5th ARVN, which had a division commander who I suspect was a crony of [Nguyen Van] Thieu's, the president
  • with the president, President [Nguyen Van] Thieu, in selecting and placing province and district chiefs one by one. 12 LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ
  • was the South Vietnamese chargĂ©, I think that's what they called and at that time, Khoi really belonged on . hadn't The real it at the time, in Bangkok, really made up his mind which side he heroes--Ho Chi Minh and [Vo Nguyen] Giap, you know
  • that led to the later land reform program under [Nguyen Van] Thieu, in which the individual was given the land without a requirement to repay. In other words, we were still thinking in terms of the Taiwan, the Japanese, and some other models, which had been
  • [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and with Vice President [Nguyen Cao] Ky. Now, the situation I found was this: it being Tet, a substantial number of the South Vietnamese units were only at half strength, because, follm'ling the Vietnamese tradition, they had returned
  • : Because I don't think anybody but Lyndon Johnson knew that he was going to do what he did. G: Good reason. I understand that he did, of course, invite [Nguyen Van] Thieu to meet with him after the announcement. B: We kept working
  • , but then he could get that way about the Clean Air Act, too. What else? G: He met with President [Nguyen Van] Thieu in Honolulu in mid-July. B: Okay. We're jumping forward. G: If you see anything between there. (Interruption) B: The President received
  • Nguyen] Giap had gone conventional in his offensive. No doubt about it. I mean, they were using tanks, they were using carriers, they were using artillery in volume. You're not going to do anything in Afghanistan, and it never will go like the Vietnam
  • Van] Thieu to hold out. RG: Safire is a great reporter. He could be right, but in this case I sincerely doubt it, because to the best of my recollection at that time the only people on the NSC staff who knew about it were Rostow, Brom Smith
  • -- 16 [Nguyen VanJ Thieu." And in fact he wouldn't talk to anybody until he'd talked to Thieu, and then he talked to us. He said that one of the reasons he defected was because Hanoi had told him that within all of the villages down in III Corps
  • Minh had said, something that some North Vietnamese in Paris. had said, led him to believe that there was an important new element-G: Just for the record, I think it was Mai Van Bo. M: That's right, it was Mai Van Bo, who in Paris? Yes
  • , but I think I worked with seven different directors of information or ministers of information, depending on the title of the department in that particular government. A couple of those had been educated in the United States. Nguyen Ngoc Linh had been
  • and then the first government of Huong, and then the military and the Buddhists from opposite sides went to work on untenable [Tran Van] Huong and made his position very difficult and eventually by January . So that was a part of it . Then, taking that as one
  • believe, June. Then I started conversations along with Phil Habib, with Ha Van Lau, and Mr. Vuy, and those continued through several meetings. And then we expanded them to include Mr. Harriman and Xuan Thuy, and they were joined by Le Duc Tho on the North
  • that the semantics were known to them, but I am not sure, you know, I am not sure whether in Trinh's mind, or in Pham Van Dong's mind, when they first gave this interview to Burchett, they themselves realized the significance of the "could." It was only later
  • /exhibits/show/loh/oh 1'1I f 18 at the time of Hartin Luther King's assassination. The President ~.ent to Ha~"aii on two occasions. One was to meet President Park of South Korea, and the second one was to meet with President Thieu of South Viet
  • Clifford, I think, was later very much embittered by the Thieu government's screwing up the Four Party talks in Paris which probably cost Humphrey the election. Certainly in an election as close as that one had the momentum that originally arrived
  • Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Jorden -- IV -- 13 southerners originally had been agreeable but then backed down. Do you recall this, when Thieu--? J: Yes, vaguely
  • . So they were beginning to come, but they were tied up in a lot of bureau­ cratic end-of-the-roads and of course every time they'd get a man who could do anything, he ended up in the army. They were drafting them so rapidly I went to both Thieu
  • would go to Guam for the conference and then to Vietnam without ever coming back? L: No, no. I came back to Pakistan. had his new team, you see. there. But he wanted me to be in Guam because he Bunker was going to be there, and McNamara was Thieu
  • of the amount of influence we had in this current election. T: Yes, I think that Thieu had arrived at that conclusion without anybody having to help him. F: What I was getting at, they don't seem to be an easily manageable leadership over there. T
  • /show/loh/oh -3- and I think a good deal. on the Ambassador's absolute to President commitment. Thieu judgment [saysJ The traffic {of South VietnanJ, people will, rather "I explained who nodded'!- that a 11 kind of thing. M: I see