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- Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987 (4)
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- mosquito netting and soap and blankets and stuff like that, that people needed, because this--I'm trying to recall when this was--this was about October, I guess, in 1954. He also introduced me to a guy named Hanh [?], who ran the Ministry of Social Action
- a look at that. So you're getting a tele- vision picture, probably, of bits and pieces of about twenty per cent of the war--maybe fifteen per cent of the war. action out of that. And they only pick the dramatic So that's what you're getting on your
Oral history transcript, Edwin O. Reischauer, interview 1 (I), 4/8/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- not established contacts with the outside world or been interested in that aspect of America's national interest as much as maybe Mr. Kennedy had. In any case, certainly in a country like Japan and most others he did not have a great image the way Mr. Kennedy
- reaction to crucial U.S. decisions; exchanging his role as Asian scholar for that of ambassador; importance of early action to avoid later crisis; SEATO; attempts to minimize the bad Japanese-American relations; the Vietnam War and why U.S. methods didn’t
- ? LG: Oh, there's a trade-off, but I think that a president is able to explain these things and justify them satisfactorily when the cause is justified. For example, take Central America. I think there would be no difficulty whatsoever getting
- on . on fiscal policy . But I think some of the basic ideas of the task The task force emphasized the need for prompt action We've had lots of examples of that in recent years, have urged strongly the proposal for giving the President some discretionary
- Department--the third member was the Finance Minister--and they urgently sought from Dean Acheson and General Marshall support for the French forces fighting in Vietnam in the action leading up to Dien Bien Phu. They urged that we have our light bombers
- deteriorated at lower levels during the latter years of the war and became a weak point. Operations put such a load on small-unit action that leadership at that level became strained. tour exacerbated it. The one-year I consider that the marines were used
- that leading eventually to Che Guevara's death was a side of our operational program in Central America and the Caribbean. But Mongoose, as I understood it, was aimed at Cuba proper and it was to prevent the economy from being successful. I know
- /exhibits/show/loh/oh Abel--I--7 A: He had done it in the beginning. ~~ere he was--I suppose--technically right; blockade is one of a possible range of warlike actions. But to have said that a blockade was necessarily an act of war at that moment
- Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 11 what you might call contingency action. Ordinarily, we only join the Navy on a full-time basis in times of national emergency. Now, we work with them in a good many programs
- of the Voice of America. Frank Stanton was just a sort of adviser to the President; I don't think he had an official position then. He may have been chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. He became that later, in any event, but whether
- INTERVIEWEE: RUFUS PHILLIPS INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: Mr. Phillips' office, Arlington, Virginia Tape 1 of 1 G: What were you doing in Laos? P: I was asked to go up there and start something that was called Civic Action. The Lao government
- helpful to the government, he should report to Washington. G: Can you recall about when you took this action? T: No, I just remember my action when I discovered it. G: Is this when you were chairman of the Joint Chiefs? T: No. Sometime when army
- . He obviously did, as indicated by his actions subsequent to that time. McS: I think That was the main theme of the whole two days, actually. Were you surprised at being invited down to the Ranch? Or had you come to know him fairly well just
- /loh/oh Helms -- II -- 9 Vietnamese and staying behind the scenes, had been advising them on political warfare and covert action and things of this kind. So when he went back again, was sent back again and wrote this report in 1961, obviously
- for the signing ceremony, trying to bring in everybody we could think of in the various transportation interests including all of the modes, some of the suppliers, and such organizations as the Transportation Association of America and the National Freight Traffic
- and '64 and so forth and so on. M: What happens to bureaucrats who push an idea like that so hard and lose? What happened to the theologians? Did the President take some kind of action against them later? L: No, one of the fellows who had been
- that they've done the wrong thing. I used to be a very timid person and even up until I was sixty years of age very cautious about expressing an opinion. But the one thing that would loosen my indignation and drive me into action was somebody doing
Oral history transcript, C. Douglas Dillon, interview 1 (I), 6/29/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- of the suggestions of Mr. Stevenson that were not taken. But I think he agreed with the final action, so I don't think there was any real decision that way. But during this thing, as it was going along, there were clearly differences of views put forth. I think
- they were thrown into action in a distant country against a very elusive enemy. But fortunately, beginning in 1962 under President Kennedy, our Armed Forces had been directed to prepare themselves for this kind of combat. Hence they entered Vietnam LBJ
- of action more people than the enemy was capable of recruiting from in-country sources and infiltrating from North Vietnam. G: Do you know what the infiltration rate would have been at about that time? M: Without looking back through the documents, I can
- we got the Bulgarians' agreement just a couple of weeks after Dorset's departure. And then we signed the agreement itself early, I believe, in July, soon after the fourth of July. P: Did you see evidence of an independence of action in Bulgaria
Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 2 (II), 7/17/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- , but no action is likely to happen unless somebody pushes it. When we got back, we started to push. And as a result of this, a telegram did go out to Lodge a day or two after we got back which was pretty forthcoming. To be sure it contained an awful lot
Oral history transcript, William Healy Sullivan, interview 1 (I), 7/21/1971, by Paige E. Mulhollan
(Item)
- a charter; this was worldwide responsibil ity. M: You were not specializing in Indochina affairs at that time? S: No. As a matter of fact, the day before the assassination we had just come back from Latin America. We'd been down in Latin America. I
- , a Vice President of Time Incorporated and President of Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., served in the Government for 20 years. During his Government service, he served for 13 years with the Voice of America and 7 years overseas with the USIS in India
- on hotheaded instructions from Washington~ ~- I burned into action by the American press, to get on with it and tell this guy to apologize and eat crow and do things that he couldn't possibly afford to do as president of the country, which also would
- as fast as we could. Added a group or two, expanded the groups that existed, and tried to have an element in the Pacific, an element in Central and Latin America, an element in Europe, the Tenth, an element in general reserve at Fort Bragg. I believe we
Oral history transcript, Frederick Flott, interview 2 (II), 7/24/1984, by Michael L. Gillette
(Item)
- under house arrest. They could just shove him off to a side and not give him copies of all the telegrams, and he was just as much out of action playing tennis in Saigon as he would have been under house arrest in Dalat. The other four were more active
- on the adoption of the agenda. But there was never any subsequent action taken, not because of any lack of initiative in this regard by President Johnson or the Johnson Administration, but rather because the Russians didn't want to have LBJ Presidential
- of America, USIA, during the late 1940s and 1950s. Z: That is essentially correct. Is that correct? Let me summarize it very quickly. I was with the Voice of Arneri ca from 1948 through 1961 , and my final position there was as program manager, which
- antipersonnel weapons against harmless villagers. R: Where was that dropped, in the North or in the South? G: In the North. R: As I said, if he wanted to believe a North Vietnamese communist over Of course, this was later-- Americans, only in America
- all." And he [changed]. for anyone. two minutes later, of course, But I mean I don't think he had very much good to say But, on the other hand, his actions belied this, I mean held keep on trusting people. M: Could you tell that he made a~y
- ] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Pike P: ~~ I ~~ 26 Self-immolation is an ancient gesture in the Buddhist religion as a protest against actions by the state seen as against religion. Buddhists did
Oral history transcript, Norman S. Paul, interview 1 (I), 2/21/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
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- , you might say, my course of action--which incidentally I think was quite close to the course recommended by the Joint Chiefs, except possibly for stopping the bombing altogether-whether we would have been any farther advanced today, no one can say. I
Oral history transcript, Stanley R. Resor, interview 1 (I), 11/16/1968, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- These forces also were useful in civil action programs which we are currently conducting in South America. P: How much did the Tet Offensive set uS back in our progress, and why could we not prevent it? R: The Tet Offensive, I think, set us back
- , they needed somebody to coordinate the action and honcho the thing along so that there would be a result of some kind in a fairly short time. That's the sort of thing that I was doing. However, you run into some very odd things. For example, Mrs. Cabot Lodge
- people out of Vietnam in 1975 and Jacobson's regrets over U.S. actions toward the Vietnamese; lessons learned from the Vietnam War; Jacobson's view of author Frank Snepp; what Jacobson would have done differently in evacuating people from Vietnam
- a counterinsurgency plan of action, which had never been implemented. And I think he was very skeptical of the ability of LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More
- the aircraft? General He said, "Brown, did you let They had to jump out of our own." He said, "Goddamn it, go find out." and leaves the table. Abrams says, Brown said, So he jumps up In the meantime, the action officers and the chickens and whatnot
- -S-V-N? D: Yes. They said, "We failed," and they went into a long list of why they failed, and then they prescribed, as they usually do, some corrective actions. As I say, I have a copy of it. Nowhere in that document is there any remark
- Polaris coming into the force. That's another historic story, and I have first-hand knowledge of it because I was the air force action officer, and every time the Titan, the Atlas, the Polaris or the Minuteman came on board for discussion [in the] JCS