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  • Series > Transcripts of LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
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  • , and who would be equally good in your shop. I cannot recommend too strongly that you take whatever action is required to get Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, Infantry. There is not the slightest doubt but that this officer is the best adviser at any
  • strongly. I think and I gathered--I say this from the things that you heard and the actions and comments--that anything he did, or anybody did, that would help conclude the killing in Vietnam, end the thing in Vietnam, they were just almost under a duty
  • . That was a particularly moving campaign because if you'll recall in 1960, it wasn't just the race issue in places like Tennessee, it was the religious issue. There really is a belt in America that starts in sort of southern Indiana, and is like a cone expanding, like
  • in the community of Des Moines and in the Democratic party, and I had held such offices as state President of the Young Democrats of Iowa in LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID
  • Biographical information; work on Credentials Committee at 1964 Democratic Convention; support for Adlai Stevenson at 1956 and 1960 Conventions; JFK’s nomination at 1960 Convention; becaming a State Dept. employee 1965; contact with Senator Robert
  • Hampshire primary a little bit, I don't think he ever did anything affirmative to get in thereo I think that Johnson over-reacted by ordering Bobby to fire a fellow called Paul Corbin from the Democratic National Committee. Paul Corbin, C-O-R-B-I-N, had
  • with Lyndon Johnson prior to 1960, in the fifties. T: Prior to 1960, no. M: What was your earliest acquaintance or contact with him? T: That's hard to recall. I saw him [when] I was at the Democratic convention in both 1956 and 1960. One milled around
  • of the Senate as Vice President at the time my confirmation hearing came up, and he noticed my name on the calendar. That afternoon, after the confirmation hearing, I was in the office of Robert Giaimo, the Democratic congressman from my Connecticut district
  • ; naming the 1st model cities; working with the White House as LBJ’s power waned; Robert Wood; Vietnam’s effect on domestic spending; problems with progressing from plans to action; difficulty with appropriation of funds; working in cooperation
  • because most of the action took place down at the squad and platoon level, with some exceptions. You didn't have big operations, and it was almost impossible for a correspondent, particularly a TV correspondent, to get out where the action was. He
  • ] about the instructions I asked for in September 1960 to help Diem to get a better hold on things and get things going in a better direction, more democratic and that sort of thing. Well, Wolf was all for me on that sort of busi- ness because the land
  • the downfall of the Democratic Party and many people in the Congress can be explained by the war. In terms of the budgetary impact, I doubt whether it's a significant factor. Because the fact of the matter is that we haven't been able to get nearly as much
  • thought, "Well, that's cheap. She'd pay a hundred for it in America." So I just took it right there. And after I had paid him he looked at me and he said, "You've only been in our country a short time I can tell. You didn't handle this very well. You mind
  • This is his last year before he leaves. He wants a plaque to be put up in the building or on the building where we met, where this historic action was taken to bring greater equality of opportunity for all young Americans through this system of grants based
  • America and bomb the air fields in Cuba. And then Cubans would land over in Florida and say that they were Cuban Air Force people that had defected, and they had participated in the bombing and so forth. This got tied up and wasn't very well executed
  • it the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, not North Vietnam or South Vietnam. The fact that this is one country and you shove anybody in who's around. G: Another thing that puzzles me is the Tet attacks which, despite the disclaimers, were largely a surprise
  • , at that time, for congressional liaison, was seconded over to the Democratic committee; I worked through filr. Birkhead. B: He was, technically, then I think, with Rural Americans for JohnsonHumphrey? t1: Yes. B: What were the circumstances of your being
  • possible to have adopted the course of action that you were recommending at that time. fair understanding of it? It was not already set. Is that a LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral
  • of the administration, which he, Lodge, as a Republican appointed by a Democratic president, was about to serve loyally and well, and more gung ho than anyone else. It was that sort of reaction, I think. I know Paul Kattenburg personally and have high regard for his
  • own defenses as that we've issued a warning against action LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http
  • -- II -- 28 economists agreed--that tax cuts and tax increases should be used for stabilization purposes: try to fight inflation. tax cuts in recession~ tax increases to That's the basic theoretical analysis ·and research relating past tax actions
  • of this, but let Joe go without his having to suffer." I'll let you judge on the facts the significance of this type of action, which I don't think was the first or last of its kind. The result was the President did get a lot of criticism; the travel tax never
  • , I guess this belongs over in the President's file, rather than my files." Of course, I wasn't suppose to see it--that it had been to all these guys. action. So that was my first It's very hard for me because by that time I was conduct- ing a lot
  • or something because I thought he had gone to London before this. At any rate, judging from what's in the file, including a chronology, this was not my action so I can't add anything to it. M: That's a good enough reason not to go into too much detail. Does
  • that it was a very unuise decision--one that I didn't think should be made. I \Vas concel'ned abou t '·iho could be, and Hould be the Pres iden t beginning in January '69. I thir,k one of my first thought;: '\vas that there was no Democrat that '-las capable
  • oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh ROBERTS -- I -- 6 bus, somebody had taken a shot at the President, but we had no reason to believe he had been hit. F: They had just an evasive action in a sense. R: For all we knew
  • days of the New Deal and the National Youth Administration; that he was very cool, if not opposed, to some of the more way-out activities that had characterized OEO. G: Would this have been in Community Action? H: Primarily, yes. G: Let me just
  • First acquaintance with LBJ; appointment as Deputy Director to Shriver; reasons Boutin left; management survey; meeting with President; Community Action; criticism of 1967 bill; Shriver’s perception of role of OEO; opposition to Dominick amendment
  • opinion; and [I felt] that--although I am not positive of this and can't document it so to speak--frequently his basic horse sense told him that the best course of action was perhaps not that reco~nended by the majority of his advisors. Mc
  • overseas ought to portray America in proper perspective. By that I mean specifically that it seems eminently [un] fair to refer and to mention only things that [are] really short-comings and failures and mention nothing at all of our successes
  • does he give it his stamp? G: That depends on how interested he is in doing that. I think he can make a very real impression on the agency if he wants. decide, He can for example, the priorities between Latin America, Asia, LBJ Presidential
  • Republic. In your judgment was our action and the size of our commitment justified with the information that was available at that time? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories
  • started recommendations to resume consideration of this course of action, which had been considered and rejected in the past. It was only after three terrorist attacks on American installations--one, the Bien Hoa Air Base just before the election; one
  • a general concept in Latin America that the U.S. should not intervene. F: How much notice did you have of our action? B: None. F: You mean that you found out from what you learned in the papers It had already happened when I found out. to a certain
  • Foreign service career assignments: 1936 in the Pacific and later in Latin America; effect of Alliance for Progress in Ecuador; effect of Kennedy assassination on the Alliance; assignment as Ambassador to Venezuela; fishing agreement (12 mile limit
  • in the defensive capabilities of the country. Now the parts of our program that receive major criticism at the present time involve military aid to such countries as Ethiopia and to countries in Latin America. I think I've explained earlier that our military
  • , the Brinks incident occurred--a clear case of terrorist action against an American officers' billet. was very fortunate that the damage was light. It But I recommended retaliation again despite the nearness of Christmas. I was much less sympathetic
  • a policy but to explore various alternative courses of action that could be undertaken. I think the general conclusion was that at least for the time being we ought to do more of the same, which was basically putting Americans in an advisory role
  • approach of some kind, how do you get it into the action channel? 0: Send it as a memo to the secretary . M: Is there anyway you can then lobby it forward? 0 : Oh sure . I can go and talk to him about it, or I can ask for a meeting in which other
  • work I respect, and I think that very often in their reporting one got an insight into a situation or a mood or an action that one didn't get in the action reports that were coming through official channels, often through eight filters and so on and so
  • had to take the positions and information that came to me from those sources as the benchmark for my own actions. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781
  • been horrified if he knew how little I knew when I started. Mc: Did you continue in this area? P: Yes--and all the way through, although we did a good deal more in 1967 in thinking through farm programs, programs for rural America up
  • was the National Advisory Council? P: The National Advisory Council also was created by the act to bring together, at a high level, citizens simply to serve as an advisory group for the director of OEO. It subsequently, through Congressional action
  • is probably too strong a word, but a program of actions designed to warn the North Vietnamese that something forceful might be in store for them if they didn't lay off supporting operations in the South? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org