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  • Series > Transcripts of LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)
  • Type > Text (remove)

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  • of it, the very end of it, or better yet, I think it was when Mr. Nixon came in. I told him that, you know, I took all the flak for a lot of these operations when in LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson
  • -­ 22 or December of 1969, for a month . G: Now, Nixon's Vietnamization was taking hold 0: That's right . And by now, of 1968 from Vietnam to in the fall by this time . of 1968--I came back in April the States, and I covered the political
  • , anyhowo I'm sure the Johnson people feel a certain antipathy toward the Nixon people as usurpers, even though they knew for months it was going to happen. R: Yes. Well, when it comes that suddenly-- F: It's just a surrender. R: You are i.n physical
  • of the Johnson Administration. In fact, I don't think the Nixon people have shipped them very much military aid. It has mostly been only spare parts, etc. I don't recall when that decision was made--rnaybe under Johnson, maybe under Nixon--but all this to-do
  • that in the review of foreign policy which I am sure Mr. Nixon's Administration intends to make that we would look SEATO over and decide whether we need that particular coalition. present form. I doubt it in its Or whether it would be possible and desirable to put
  • effect in Saigon, and I knew that she was representing herself to Bui Diem as speaking for Nixon. In fact I was told that Agnew in some eccentric way or another got into the act, but I was told this in very great confidence and on the basis
  • Harbor after Nixon became President effects of Tet offensive as a public relations defeat; LBJ’s harassment by both the media and Kennedy people in the administration; further results of military restraints from Washington.
  • was quite different from theirs, so I never had any hesitations about staying on. professional. I've always regarded myself as a I would have stayed on for the Nixon Administration if they had chosen to regard me as a professional instead of a Johnson
  • ; problems regarding Komer’s ambassadorship; losing his job when Nixon became President; LBJ’s visit with Indira Ghandi; how Komer met LBJ and discussed the Pakistan-India issue; White House visits from foreign dignitaries; sending wheat to India; comparing
  • with a family--shot to pieces in this war--and that's the way he felt about it. M: I notice that with the new Administration coming in one of the programs that Mr. Nixon talked about, and there are now some Congressmen talking about it, is trying to convert
  • the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Uow this was a practice that was followed also by preceding presidents and also by Mr. Nixon. But, for example, before we put the budget to bed, as always, there was a meeting of the President with the Secretary of Defense
  • in the National Security Council now, which I had the opportunity of attending on many occasions after Mr. Nixon became president. But I think it achieved the same end. Every- body got his oar in, and the President listened to everybody's advice, and notes were