Discover Our Collections


  • Series > Transcripts of LBJ Library Oral Histories (remove)
  • Time Period > Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-) (remove)

186 results

  • , 1981 INTERVIEWEE: WALT W. ROSTOW INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: Professor Rostow's office, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas Tape 1 of 1 R: --study the problem of guerrilla warfare. I get into that in The Diffusion of Power. I forget what page
  • See all online interviews with Walt W. Rostow
  • between China and Russia and how that affected relations with Southeast Asia and the U.S.; LBJ's instructions to Rostow on how to do his job; the role of national security advisor under JFK and LBJ; Rostow's staff; the size of the White House staff
  • Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003
  • Oral history transcript, Walt W. Rostow, interview 2 (II), 1/9/1981, by Ted Gittinger
  • Walt W. Rostow
  • . My boss was Walt Rostow, period. G: Do you know anything about how you were selected? 1 LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library
  • How Ginsburgh joined the Policy Planning Council at the State Department and his duties under the Policy Planning; Ginsburgh’s work on the Vietnam negotiating group; how Policy Plannine made their recommendations; Walt Rostow; bombing campaigns
  • INTERVIEWEE: WALT ROSTOW INTERVIEWER: PAIGE E. MULHOLLAN PLACE: Mr. Rostow's office, Federal Building, Austin, Texas Tape 1 of 3 R: I think it might be useful if I were briefly to start with the first impressions-- M: Let me move this microphone so
  • See all online interviews with Walt W. Rostow
  • Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003
  • Oral history transcript, Walt W. Rostow, interview 1 (I), 3/21/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
  • Walt W. Rostow
  • members, although they were paid by the NSC and their line to the President was usually through McGeorge Bundy. This didn't happen all at once. In the early days there was some confusion. Walt Rostow, a deputy special assistant, had direct access
  • of special assistant; Walt Rostow; personal staff and foreign policy.
  • . But in that case, there were these six or seven people at the party. The repeated suggestion was made to us that Walt Rostow might be available for this deanship. The committee considered that very carefully. M: This is coming down [from the top]? L: Yes, I don
  • or public experience, show evidence of good administration skills, and gain LBJ’s acceptance; how names were submitted to the White House; how Huitt was treated as a candidate; the dean’s salary; why Rusk and Walt Rostow were not chosen; working with Joe
  • : http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 5 M: Where did you see these drafts? C: I saw these drafts at the State Department. And my own feeling is that what happened was that perhaps Rostow, with Rusk's okay and McNamara's okay, or perhaps one
  • years before going to the White House. M: I guess that's really what I was driving toward. In none of that time did you have any contact with Senator Johnson or with the Johnson staff in any close way? F: No, I did not. Walt Rostow. M: Walt Rostow
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Saunders -- I -- 7 those meetings. There was a kind of agenda, at least in the form of memos from Walt Rostow to the President, and oftentimes as a staff, we were very conscious of getting things ready for the Tuesday lunch
  • for Tuesday lunches; LBJ’s and Nixon’s preferred use of the NSC; Eugene Rostow and systematic decision-making at the State Department; the oil crisis in the Middle East; McGeorge Bundy’s leadership role; NSC’s involvement in U.S. aid to India to prevent famine
  • because in the inaugural message that same theme was to be found. So mostly through others, through Rostow and Bingham--I suppose chiefly Rostow--I did keep up a peripheral kind of relationship with Senator Kennedy and was persuaded that this was a very
  • for a post-war development plan for South Vietnam; Lilienthal's skepticism on Vietnam quelled; effect of pacification programs; advising JFK on foreign aid; William Fulbright; Walt Rostow; James Rowe; HHH; RFK; Adlai Stevenson; Eleanor Roosevelt; Nguyen Cao
  • oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh THOMSON -- I -- 3 I stayed on his staff and on loan from State till he, in due course, pulled out and I inherited Mr. Rostow. But just about the time, coincidentally, of Mac Bundy's decision
  • might find that he did. Why did Mr. Johnson decide to appoint you when Francis Bator-K: I think you may also find that before Kaysen, Rostow had it. M: You went back that far? K: 1961. M: I thought they used a lower ranking title. K: Negative
  • lay it on the line? T: Yes. Usually the times I talked to him after I returned from [these trips], Walt Rostow sat in on the meetings. F: Did you get a feeling that Johnson was unduly influenced by Rostow? T: I don't think so. I don't think he
  • the ultimate responsibility for it, and I do think that men like Walt Rostow, and Rusk, and several others along with the President have to share the responsibility for having made the decision; whether a different group of men w.ould have made a very
  • work there; Walt Rostow; Dan Rusk; making decisions with out of date information/opinions; expressing disagreement with the President’s choices; U.S. relationship with China; Fullbright hearings; LBJ’s distrust of intellectual Easterners; LBJ’s accent
  • was on the national security staff of Mr. Rostow. Prior to that you had been deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs from 1965 until 1966. Prior to that you had been special assistant to Mr. [Averell] Harriman. been on the Policy Planning Council
  • ever doubt the accuracy of the information he was receiving from his official sources, say Walt Rostow or. . .? Z: Oh, yes. G: Did he really? Z: Yes, I think he'd raise the question. He'd do it in two ways. Half the time when he was talking
  • 1965 meeting with LBJ about press coverage in Vietnam; Frank Stanton; Arthur Sylvester; LBJ and the press; Walt Rostow; different interpretations of the situation in Vietnam; Bill Moyers; government response to press criticism; qualifications
  • subjects such as Vietnam. These notes were made -- to the extent that they were made -- by a member of the President's staff, such as Walt Rostow, Tom Johnson, or someone else.Those notes were not circulated to the other participants for checking before
  • with the Atomic Energy Commission, and I got a message from Walt Rostow saying that the President thought that since this thing was LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID
  • his reaction to that? J: No, I really can't. I was looking at some of those questions. Most of the stuff surrounding Vietnam I don't recall. Things were moving rather fast then. I'd leave that one to [Walt] Rostow and some of those. G: Then it's
  • , at any rate. F: Was there any essential difference between working with Bundy and working with Rostow? K: I didn't work with Rostow as intimately, of course, as I did with Bundy simply because I was Bundy's interim successor as Special Assistant
  • ; differences between Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy; Komer taking charge of Vietnam issues as Special Assistant to the President; the quasi-military character of “the other war” in Vietnam vs. pacification; unifying the management of the war; using the term
  • the secretary He and the Secretary of State and Walt Rostow, who was special assistant to the President for defense and international matters, met regularly at luncheon once a \'Jeek, where they had lengthy discussions of this kind of problem. George Christian
  • to a waiting room there outside the President's study, where I talked for a little while with vlalt Rostow. [He] gave me somewhat further background on what was being done with regard to the Pueblo and tried to reassure me that everything that was possible
  • : Yes. Well, I'm just saying that that's how I got in and that was the outcome. G: Yes. Was Walt Rostow the head of the Policy Planning Council then? J: He was not. G: And Rostow took over, I guess, shortly thereafter? J: And Walt replaced
  • and took part in, I believed, most of the discussions after that. But I was not in the critical meetings with Wheeler, Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, and the President at which the level of troop reinforcement was discussed, and in which the figure of two hundred
  • force, with Walt Rostow and Gene Rostow and Harriman and Rusk and what have you, the ten or twelve that were involved. At any rate I had another meeting that next morning with Rusk and McNamara, and except for maybe one or two editorial changes
  • Walter Jenkins , William Bundy, Robert McNamara, Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, Gene Rostow. Washington meetings about bombing Hanoi in December 1966, cessation of bombing in Hanoi, Poland backing out of discussions, Gronouski’s interpretation of Polish
  • exposure, although I was probably involved in a background sort of a way with his Southeast Asia trip. I expect Walt Rostow was closer to that, because Walt had the Far Eastern account. M: That was before he went back to the State Department? B: Before
  • LBJ's knowledge of, and experience with, foreign affairs; LBJ's decision-making process; LBJ's vice presidential trip to Berlin; Walt Rostow and Bundy supporting LBJ as vice president; how Bundy was able to meet influential people through LBJ; LBJ's
  • , and the President didn't lose respect for him at all. Another was Walt Rostow, you know. No, no, I don't think the President felt that they had diddled him, nor did I. He had given them a clear green light. I think that simply was a case where in giving than
  • House Conference on Civil Rights; Cliff Alexander; National Science Foundation Board; Jim Webb's acceptance of Administrator of NASA; campus unrest; Vietnam; Perkins Commission; Walt Rostow's Policy Planning Commission; Wise Men; role as Vatican
  • and I remember General [Maxwell] Taylor telling him so in rather brutal terms. G: Do you recall the occasion for that? N: Yes, it was at the time of the Taylor-Rostow mission. -~ 2 LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
  • Situation on arrival in Vietnam as Ambassador; Chief of MAAG; General McGarr; Taylor-Rostow mission; Ed Lansdale; task force chaired by Roswell Gilpatric; impressions after traveling in the provinces; Viet Cong tenacity; Colonel John Paul Vann
  • vaguely that we had some of these high-level meetings with [Walt] Rostow and [Dean] Rusk, and CIA and Defense, et cetera. I don't think that that group ever--I don't think it lasted long, and I don't think it did very much. I think it pretty much fell
  • . But to my knowledge, no one called [Walt] Rostow or any of the political people. G: Was there a reason for that? LG: I just have no idea. I kept on asking, because I wanted the doors open, I wanted to get the damn thing done. G: Some people have said
  • , and this time I was flown on a helicopter to Philadelphia, waited there until a helicopter with Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow and some of the others came in, and I got on that one, and we landed at Glassboro, in the ball park. And this time Okolovsky was with me. I
  • of the unit in the State Depart­ ment . With people like Walt Rostow and his immediate associates close to the President, there was less immediate need for the President to rely on the Policy Planning Council . Secondly, the Secretary of State himself
  • . There was a theoretical idea. It may have been just a little more than the traffic bore at the time. G: This is jumping ahead a little bit but it I think is a good follow-up to that. You mentioned Ataturk and several other models. Other commentators--I think Walt Rostow
  • ; the role of the media; CORDS; Taylor-Rostow mission
  • defensive Rostow But I think anybody looking at the results would have to say either they refused to believe the intelligence or they took damned poor action on some of it. But I think there was no LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org
  • : I have no knowledge of that ·one way or the other. G: Now later in 1961 there was another famous mission to Vietnam, the Maxwell Taylor-Walt Rostow mission. Did CIA have any input into that? H: I think that CIA had an input into everything
  • Biographical information; CIA in Vietnam and Indochina; structure of the CIA; Bay of Pigs; the “secret war” in Laos; disputes on the role of the CIA; Edward Lansdale; Taylor-Rostow mission to Vietnam; “How to Lose a War;” debate over Diem; Diem’s
  • to say that during both Mac Bundy's and Walt Rostow's time the White House staff, or the National Security Council staff as run by these two White House men, aimed at facilitating the job of the President, while not seizing the initiative or alienating
  • channels to put things into the White House? Did you normally go through Harry McPherson or did you normally go through Rostow or Bundy? S: No, normally, the recormlendations would go from Secretary Rusk to the President. We would do the staff work. M
  • Symington--whoever was chief of protocol; Walt Rostow; Mac Bundy; and Moyers; Secret Service; the Signal Corps and myself and the advance captain in each country. And we discussed everything from Bess Abell and the Protocol Chief's point of view