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  • : ,. i Operations are proceeding well. i j. ! ! Reports on the .scene are better than press reports at home. There is i .. reason to expect significant military losses by Viet Cong in coming months. ~e i ,;. ! I l -- "There is not a military
  • . ---·=.....----~~·-,. - ~ ~- ~ i;; ' 'f'! "t:(l l/ !t.,;:... - ~ (~t: ~~ T ......'' .... .f· ­ l .­ GEN G. EAR~E ~~~E~~~, CJCS TO hDX U.S.G. l. C:XC?AC SEA~?, By referenced message I have inforced you of actions to ceet alterr.ative pressed by you in ~urtter ~AC
  • on the press, my talks, and reports. Mr. Katzenbach: There may be a small degree of movement before the conventions that won't mean anything. General Wheeler: We have identified 107, 000 in infiltration groups - half of which are in location. Tonnages in May
  • defections in ARVN and by whole units. He was deceived by the American press into thinking the ARVN were no good. He found they were stronger than expected. Viet Cong infiltrated with the crowd. He did catch South Vietnam off guard in many places
  • the press know about the shape of responses. Bundy: Could tell press to go after the Ambassadors and it would be more persuasive to let them ·say it, not us. President: Alright 0 we wait to see Goldberg • • ..I~ - • -~.-- ...--
  • frank, I would hard pressed to show trucks on the road. Also b ·~ difficult for the jets to hit them. Vietnamese are on alert. Probability is exactly what you have outlined -- we must control ourselves without violating the military requirement. it may
  • forum to explain this, Would be inopportune to hold debate, Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium. President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions. Bundy: One
  • they It If they violate the facts of life, we would be back with "business as usual. " SERVI,. ..: SS'" Sf!!@!f& y• -4­ Secretary Rusk noted that we had just pulled back the NEW JERSEY from around the Vinh area to a point closer to the DMZ. The President pressed
  • . The general feeling is. to press forward with this program. Douglas Dillon and McGeorge Bundy agreed that South Vietnam should and must do more. Walt Ros tow said South Vi~tnam must improve administration, fight corruption and be more aggressive
  • . m. (These are the first units of the 10, 500 authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.) ~:"'\re~-• MEETl~~G ti>~OTliS
  • . Mr. McNamara stressed the need to increase combat intelligence as well (CIA and MACV-J -2 were working on this pro blem) . The President indicated his deep concern about press stories from Saigon that US forces were bombing innocent civilians
  • to this problem. We must keep the British in front on this question, but we should also restate as our mm policy our firm commitment to majority rule. The Africans will press for an early decision on revocation of South Africa's mandate for South West Africa
  • ­ Helms interrupted to say the 100-Day program "is set to go and could be implemented immediately. Walt Rostow said he received a cable toaay with Bunker's recommendation of the main items that they will press on ·the government of Vietnam. Walt Rostow
  • Press relations
  • entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel. In fact, we can take some credit for Eban 1 s acceptance of the resolu­ tion last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying
  • was not the proper moment to indicate any desire to return to conference 7 table. When I pressed him on Thai reaction he said, after con­ siderable pause for reflection, he thought he could bring Thai government to new conference, but only when we had continued
  • stop putting out announcements. Put more sorties into a mission. GENERAL WHEELER: There was a press policy of being completely open on everything. THE PRESIDENT: Let 1 s explore this. Also let's explore the whole area of press relations. Perhaps some
  • suggested that rather than announce the movement of these forces into the area we could informally give the press the list of U.S. forces which have been placed on alert for short notice movement to the Western Pacific. In response to the President's
  • propaganda war. COPY LBJ .. . .... .LIBRARY ~ - 5 ­ SECRETARY KATZENBACH: There will be further efforts in South to strengthen their position in the South. Exposure of North Vietnamese delegation to Western press. The.y have been exposed for what
  • during lunch on the status of the Paris talks today. The President: Fine, let's go on. Walt Rostow: Ambassador Bunker has a good report on Vietnam. shows action in land reform and other areas. The President: Huong has a good image with our press. before
  • . They said they are not authorized to speak for the NLF. They would not agree to seating the NLF press representatives who are in Paris because 11 We do not speak for the NLF." Vance and Harriman say the announcement should state that talks should begin
  • reasonably hope for GVN to be recognized by sitting at talks." George Christian: I will send the Press home now. Clark Clifford: If orders go out at 12 noon tomorrow to stop bombing at 12 midnight, what is the possibility of a leak? General Wheeler
  • me to a situation. I don't know what I might do. Rusk and Clifford are in disagreement. Secretary Rusk: What are we in disagreement about? I notice - 3 ­ The President: About the basic Vietnam policy, so the press says. It's imaginary
  • of the first questions of substantive matter will be a more formal agreement on the DMZ, cities and reconnaissance. They will press for a political settlement. of political settlement they can agree to. We cannot agree to type I would lean toward
  • position. I think the cables miss the point-­ .as a committment to do nothing for a month. We can stop bombing, not say anything, and resume · when we choose. Would pressure mount to tell the press? President Yes, it would be brutal. But Christmas
  • show it to gov·ernmenta and not put it out to the .A.meric3.n press. Presid~'.1~: McNamu"': That's good. Let's do it tha.t way. When sho•ild we have this s .. evidence~ -r-~ . . - -­ rt ... \,_ _ ... .a.... LJ.J COPY Lvndon B. John
  • : General Walt got on well with him. keep eye on him. But a conniver. Hard to President: How do we get Lodge and Westmoreland to stop giving out Top Secret information? The press is saying they have to go to Saigon (for) Top Secret information and it's
  • - 100, 000 last 4 months April record month. I will talk to Ball about "Meet the Press". TOP SECRET . . ··., .­ i -­ ~ i '. ... - - - - - - - - ­:-; ,. "' =·-· ; I l - .d•-1/ ~ ~vt~) ~1~ vr/,, ;ti,_,:_ k ~. j j ~ ' j ! l
  • and quarreling of the. type that haa gone on in South Vietnam. I ' I I I The meeting waa followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the e!!ect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President
  • . Secretary McNamara: We would plan this on the basis that it would be brought to the attention of the North Vietnamese and not to the American public. CIA Director Helms: hands of the press. It is a great thing if you can keep it out of the Secretary
  • : If the press asks us why no bombing, we answer we are increasing our effort in Laos and the South. Ball: Only 40 per cent of the missions are going on now. in the South. Concentrate President: Shouldn't we have someone moving throughout the world trying
  • . Everyone present can be trusted but we must be careful about talking to the press or even to staff members who might talk to the press. The highest security must be maintained. Secretary Rusk: We have an elementary obligation to support our combat troops
  • service. but the Australians were pleased he finally decided against it. Siha nouk is pressing Australia for a declaration on his boundaries, which would be difficult to grant. Hasluck then asked President Johnson as to whetBilrB!e prospects were
  • has said it is willing to talk about de-escalation in South Victnara rather than rr..:iintc:.ining this was a matter only for discussion with the NLF. He pressed the U.S. to take the first step of stopping the bombing, a step of limited risk in his
  • like a leader. The Vietnamese forces did better than the press indicated. None of the things the enemy expected to happen happened. President Thieu has moved ahead on a great many fronts - - mobilization, upped it from 65, 000 ; civil side, 14 new
  • . · The Secretary pointed out there may be some press speculation on this figure, particularly after testimony he has made on the Hill to the Congressional committees. The Secretary said that the field commanders would be supplied with the men required. I
  • "stalemate.'' The Secretary said that the press corps in Viet Nam are more antagonistic now than they ever have been. He said there is no evidence of a stalemate. He said that military commanders in Viet Nam told him that they believe they have made
  • of the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese Army does not receive good attention. The press does not like to travel with the South Vietnamese troops because their accommodations are not nearly as good as with U. S. troops. 17. Most of the senior reporters with whom
  • press tone because of General Sidle 1 s approach General Abrams ;doesn 1t "sell" it. Facts are on our side. Secretary Rusk: Bunker would try to go along with anything, but he puts priority on GVN presence at table. Secretary Rusk: To replace Ball
  • need to get this thing ironed out before all of them a re called together. The President: I agree. The Press would have a field day otherwise. What is our situation in Paris? Secretarv Rusk: There is not much they can say until Thieu
  • Press relations
  • . The President: Would General Taylor give me his views. General Taylor: I am optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts -- economic, political, military and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way. We should be escalating