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  • ,Sec. 3.5 NU/~ ll·t.6. NARA, Date C9-ll-l'J. ·gglJii'lPENTIOI BETA I ANDII-67 ISSUES The United States should deploy an ABMsystem. NO YES The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABMsystem in the defense of metropolitan Moscow. In addition
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • , and less that would weaken them. our fortunes inconsistent Union. place area they the Chinese strengthens public At some time we might wish to the Indians no objection with would desire which they would find with nonalignment. Our actions
  • . should decide to offer a.private security assurance, an effort might be made to encourage the Soviet Union to follow a similar course. We are not at this time recommending approval of the type of private assurance discussed here. A decision need
  • . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
  • If this to Indian will probably side nuclear the Soviet in Union its is to be have to leaders in some· weighs quite do so. heavily of the calculus. have been brooding the Soviet of in the face of conflicting as systematically for some time
  • talking in terms of March. Experience on other weapon systems indicates that there is usually some time lag between an initial operational capability and a dependable capability. Nevertheless, this interim detection system should be fully operational
  • informed the Soviet Union that any further attackS on the Federal Republic of Germany would be casas belli. At the· same time, however, ---SECRET- NOFORN - Page.! ot 6 Pages ✓ -J;" SECRET- NOFORH it became clear to Moscow that the US was attempting
  • . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
  • of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-swmnary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon and other interested on 24 March, for senior participants officials. Individual film showings were
  • separation plants for this purpose., preferring to have the 'WOrk done by the U:3, uc, France or the Soviet Union under bilateral agreements. In fact, Indtl.a is the onq non-veaponG power with such a :facility, if' one ex~tJSthe multilatera.J..·European
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • keep NAC fully and proq,tly informed of developments at Geneva • • You should express readiness consider any points 3. by allies and offer such further clarm.cations raised as may be posoible in next two weeks; at same time you should make
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • to their is favorable no doubt attempt the unpopular cause. to bring who are likely nuclear ownership greatness "merchants have to be discreet, officers since pressure de Gaulle's connnitted than de Gaulle. these also time they on the general's
  • the Soviet Union. A single Control Group represented all other nations, fate, nature, and infl~encing factors. Senior participants for BETA I and II included representa­ tives of interested departments, agencies- and commands and recognized authorities from
  • threat to the United States and the free world comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In order proper!y to understand the scope and magnitude of this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive hearin~ at which nuclear
  • the nuclear threat Thirdly, whether it could ally, .!:ln hy nucleE.T been subject£·c by the Soviet Union., On the other hand, agab1::;t India although might be feasible c,£ from t;L~c of the U.So have been targetted 'Weapons for some time now
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • the foreseeable future (say 15-20 years), and even within the range of present technology, the number will grow substantially. The Union of South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico may be included. Why has it become so easy to build a bomb
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • the possibility of our denial being effective, at least to hinder the timing of the French nuclear effort. Therefore I would withhold approval until the British had been approached and given a brief period to respond. The IBM computer is in a much different
  • of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Sovi et Union has conducted three undergr ound tests which we have detected. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (1) Is a more than 50 per cent increase in the number of tests justified? The pertinent considerations bearing
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • purposes will not be adopted at this time. · I 2. Limited war stockpile objectives will be based upon: a. estimated essential shortages during a two-year emergency period {as opposed to the present three-year planning period), and b. the assumption
  • for CoopcrAtion eration in 1956 of our comprehensive Agreement in the Civil between the Commission and its French counterpart, missariat al' Eneriie Atomique (CEA) hu now encompasses almost the total Thi& program is the largest Union. short Uses of Atomic