Discover Our Collections
Limit your search
Tag- Digital item (543)
- new2024-June (117)
- new2024-Dec (35)
- new2024-Mar (33)
- new2023-Oct (30)
- Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003 (228)
- Bundy, McGeorge, 1919-1996 (41)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (11)
- Hilsman, Roger, 1919-2014 (2)
- Rostow, Eugene V. (Eugene Victor), 1913- (1)
- State Department (1)
- 1965-xx-xx (19)
- 1966-xx-xx (19)
- 1965-07-xx (15)
- 1967-11-xx (12)
- 1968-05-xx (12)
- 1964-08-xx (11)
- 1964-xx-xx (11)
- 1967-09-xx (11)
- 1967-10-xx (11)
- 1967-xx-xx (11)
- 1968-06-xx (11)
- 1968-10-xx (11)
- 1968-03-xx (10)
- 1967-08-xx (9)
- 1968-02-xx (9)
- Vietnam (59)
- India (36)
- Nuclear weapons (28)
- Arms control and disarmament (15)
- Greece (14)
- Major force deployment (14)
- Vietnam War, 1961-1975 (14)
- War games (12)
- Tet Offensive, 1968 (11)
- Tonkin Gulf Incidents, 1964 (9)
- Japan (8)
- Middle East (8)
- NATO (8)
- Outer space (8)
- USSR and Eastern Europe (8)
- Text (543)
- National Security Files (543)
- Memos to the President (268)
- Country Files (51)
- National Security Action Memorandums (37)
- National Security Council Histories Files (31)
- National Security Council Meetings Files (29)
- Files of Robert Komer (28)
- Files of Charles E. Johnson (25)
- Country Files, Vietnam (13)
- Agency Files (12)
- Files of Robert W. Komer (12)
- Subject Files (9)
- Files of Edward K. Hamilton (5)
- Committee Files (4)
- Files of Walt W. Rostow (4)
- National Intelligence Estimates (4)
- Folder (543)
- Meeting notes (29)
- Folder listed on subject guide (14)
- Histories (11)
543 results
- of these exports go to Western Europe and Japan; • this Soviet Union has been a major importer of American wheat. The balance of U.S. farm exports, ·valued at Rs. 800 crores, supplied to a large number of developing countries under the Food for Peace Programme
- ,Sec. 3.5 NU/~ ll·t.6. NARA, Date C9-ll-l'J. ·gglJii'lPENTIOI BETA I ANDII-67 ISSUES The United States should deploy an ABMsystem. NO YES The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABMsystem in the defense of metropolitan Moscow. In addition
- are: 1. Getting Ky aboard before we act. 2. See if the Swedish government really would accept the responsibility, if asked by Hanoi and Washington -- and announce it at the time we made the offer. In fact, we might want some Ethiopian, Danish, etc
- at the time of the Pop• la ■o her• a■klna that yo'll cowd attend the f'llneral of Senator Robert Kennedy •onal repre ■ eatatiY• Warm of Hi ■ Halble••• r•1ard■• Lyndon B. Jobn•on Hi ■ Eminence The Moat Rneread Aqelo Cardinal Vicar General I
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 47, October 21-24, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 24
(Item)
- and internal security of Cameroon. Most African leaders spend half their time trying to hold together a flimsy patchwork of regions and tribes divided along arbitrary colonial boundaries. Cameroon is a classic case. It was a merger of French and British
- a full opportunity to make alternative suggestions of a positive character. He doesn't have a leg to stand on 1f the situation at that time is clearly presented. W. WWRostow:rln w. Rostow .... h dt s
- be the hot issu.es next month, but I think that in principle one should always be able to stonewall on the tough ones and use the rest of the time to convey a picture of the President at work for peace. ~--!. ~. McG. B. Please do Please don't - - -- Speak
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 73: Apr. 24‑30, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 33
(Item)
- for the time betn,. W.W. Approve Call me Ro■tew ECLAS.II U'D E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 LJ ~7-;i_~7 By ~ , NARA Datef:K-o~ 1 ----S~CllET/1;,CDIS L/ --Mr. PreaideDt: Attacbed warm farewell for your approval meaaage It would be delivered OD i• a to KiDg
- Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
- delineated in our report to you last January 31 on future cooperation with the Soviet Union. Consistent with that report, the biolo gy and medicine agreement for the first time opens the way to cooperation· in an area related to manned space f li ght
- on December 3, 19620 On September 20, 1963j President Kennedy reaffirmed our intention to keep weapons of mass destruction out of orbito Since that time, we· have met with the representatives of the Soviet Union on this problemo We are glad
- on que•tion of control with " ' the Soviet Union, but there should not be substantial delay. Gromyko r e p l i e d ~ e could agree. It would save time in the Q,... future. But he didn't exclude tabling the draft withAblank Article , ~ W,• The r
- are sounding Phil out on the pos~ibility of urging the " coup government simply to expel Andreas. No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until he is out of the picture, so expulsion would meet our domes tic needs while at the same time being a gain
- ~t poll for negotiations with the Chinese. At an -appropriate time and manner, therefore,· t-1e should vigor ously pursue negotiations on this subject with China. But if we must ultimately have · the cooperation of China, and the Soviet Union
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8
(Item)
- should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
- it is impossible to be certain of what these Soviet tests represent. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union has been testing space vehicles for some re-entry program. But we suspect the Russians are pursuing the research and development of a FOBS. If this turns
- the Soviets have in mind in terms of consulates in the US. However, the rapid implementation of plans to open at least one consulate in the Soviet Union and in the US is an act which can be taken within a very short time once the convention has been ratified
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8
(Item)
- in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
- , and less that would weaken them. our fortunes inconsistent Union. place area they the Chinese strengthens public At some time we might wish to the Indians no objection with would desire which they would find with nonalignment. Our actions
Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem [1 of 2]," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33
(Item)
- . should decide to offer a.private security assurance, an effort might be made to encourage the Soviet Union to follow a similar course. We are not at this time recommending approval of the type of private assurance discussed here. A decision need
Folder, "NSAM # 352: Bridge Building, 7/8/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8
(Item)
- with our Allies we actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He has asked the Secretary of State to examine and propose to him specific actions the Government might take. These actions
Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem [2 of 2]," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33
(Item)
- . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
- , there is some evidence of admix ture with Malayan and Caucasoid strains. The only important minority group at the present time is the approximately 600,000 Koreans. There are also much smaller groups of Chinese and Caucasian residents. Religion Buddhism
- ~~~~~~-J {)fe,, (\ #§. report #6 report: 7) \~/02 \\ L-~ {X;HO \ :r:e HSA:M 364 Tab B "Relations with the Soviet Union and Eas't Ettropean Bloc Countr i es IR the Industr ial and Copyright Fields" Secret 7 pp rJ.;
- tentatively assigned to these alternatives. Some disagreement does exist concerning the specific circumstances in which given actions might be taken, and it is generally agreed that these uncertainties cannot be resolved at this time. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958
- with the Soviet Union a desire to convey the feeling that the present draft was the te.>...-1: of the NPT and not simply a proposal sub ject to general amend.n1ents. At the same time, however, we did not wish to join the Soviet Union in an attempt to railroad
Folder, "A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation (Rostow)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- If this to Indian will probably side nuclear the Soviet in Union its is to be have to leaders in some· weighs quite do so. heavily of the calculus. have been brooding the Soviet of in the face of conflicting as systematically for some time
- of our effort in the south. (This last sounds like an effort to have it both ways.) 2. I continue to be a strong believer in a December pause, and of course the time is getting shorter every minute. Rusk and McNamara and I plan to review this matter
- their economic dependence upon the Soviet Union. Application of the GATT rules, whether modified or not, should influence the East European countries toward adopting more multilateral methods in their trade with the CP 1 s. By freeing them from the neces sity
- of Egyptian a.i.rcraft and troops, who at one time numbered over 60,000. The republican position began to deteriorate as the evacuation which be an in Se tember roceeded. The only significan ~------------~ response to the republican predicament, however, has
- are still basically the same as·those developed in 1952, at a time when substantial U. S. a.nd Allied forces and resources were engaged in Korea and therefore not available in Europe. Because of this history ·and-the size of the nuclear shield provided
- ·, · •-~·· • • in do it in· one Vietnam. realistic, own problems we can so interested they supplies if by going people were settlement arms has Union the shall a number a peaceful government or, insure, bombing and that time-wasting
- and cool-headed set ·of proposals for this meeting. We can also fend off Soviet propaganda against the MLF as long as we are smart about it. It is true that it would be good to have more time, but this kind of last-minute Soviet acceptance is a standard
- talking in terms of March. Experience on other weapon systems indicates that there is usually some time lag between an initial operational capability and a dependable capability. Nevertheless, this interim detection system should be fully operational
- time ago you asked me to send you information relating to the canplaint a friend or yours has concerning the closing of an Air Postal otfice (APO) in Asia. Military post offices are established to provide service for u.s. military personnel, U.S
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 67: Mar. 14‑18, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 31
(Item)
- the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze; -- the Strategic Rese rve call-up (par a. 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand deployment, but it would
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 54: Dec. 11‑19, 1967 [4 of 4]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 26
(Item)
- and to provide the items and dollar amounts of thle asehtance. The Department ha• concluded that release at thh time of certain of the information of the kind reque ■ted would be prejudicial to the defen ■ e lntere ■h of the United States and that the non-dleclo
- . They are particularly insistent in light of the fact that the President transmitted the prior authorization bill in 1965. If you approve, I will have the writers attached). and have the material ready shortly after the State of the Union. Approve ----- 1 • II
- IHSS"E:M course. component, Improvement of aaREt/NO relations with the United States excluded, virtually continued policy A mo e lausi with the Soviet. Union. wolds e pos em to be i it The success w of this d policy e some wou d
- be cove:re-d at some other time. If you want a full day 1a rest along the route, this could be easily arranged at the half-way point - - Lima·, Peru. The tentative program contains a good mix of popular receptions in big cities with ·v isits to Alliance fo1