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  • Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the back ­ ground, consequently, he will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is solid but the members of the new government are not yet well - known to us
  • the Post Presidential documents are in this section . Contains WWR's summary memo (5/14/73) and two copies of the full chronology . most of the news clippings are in this section 3. Documents fastened to the right side (#64-114) . These documents date
  • - ~-rep~~Y." They were she had played · a role in the I Godfrey Hodgson ;; s C -i ..; The Washington Post Wednesday, July 23, 1969 _L etters' t 'tl ., The E'ditor:i:. ~!. .. ,~ Black Mark for Teddy White Being personally acquaint ed with "Mrs
  • L I N E . PAGE 2. mo RF3 W IL L CO^JDUCT AR.'IED RECCE SOUTH ALONG C0NI3UCT POST S T R IK E RECOMNAISANCE. R'JMGZK 2 45 T 0 P J E C H E- f ------- 6 F S 'S and 1 RFB W ILL 3E LAUNCHED 0 4 25 - 043 3Z AND DEPART IMMEDIATELY FOR QUANG KHE
  • , ----------------------- Vietnam------------------------------------- memo, 13 morale evaluation 12 -- Aide Memoire, policies S to Westmoreland--------------------- post-TET msg, 12 -- Wheeler Vietnam questions 11 12 -- State Khe Sanh
  • Vietnam time (about 0100 EST, 7 February) . Because 0£ cloud cover in the target areas , only the strike against the Dong Hoi target was completed. The other missions aborted before reaching their targets. 3. Initial post-strike photography
  • STATES:MIGHT BE MADE'. •-:°'.'-'. .. , .... ' ,,r 1 1I~' • •· . IT WAS LEVISON'S SUGGESTION THAT.':.PEOPLE LIKE-:JQHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,,' . ,_..:;·;-· :: ' KING, JAMES WECHSLER, ·THE EDITOR ·or THE' "NEW ·YORK POST~, DR.,'.JOHN .. BENNETT, PRESI DENT OF UNION
  • ""ietnam, not only for the value of ~ss i s t an c e, but a l so because of its jmport::m ce to Victnarnese rno r ale. Sf.RVlCE _7 : .. .. _..,_ -. _ _ ,,::~~ . .. .. . • i;. I - l ­ (3) The Vietname s e ncc
  • --:as the committee on post-Vietnam adjustment I announced in my Economic Report last year· has been doing-and act boldly, we will have that 3 percent of output to add­ over a year or two-to our normal 4 percent a year of economic growth. If we preserve a healthy
  • February, reports for 24 February indicate sporadic fire at Khe Sanh. 2. Vietnamese forces have captured the Palace inside the Citadel and the VC flag that was flying over the Palace is now in the First ARVNDivision Command Post. Friendly forces hold all
  • DETAILEDTHE MISSION OF CAPTURING GENERAL THANHANDHIS HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SAMEPURPOSEAS DESCRIBED ABOVEIN THE CASEOF GENERAL TRI. 5. THE SIGNIFICANTFEATUREI~ ALL OF THE ABOVEINCIDENTSIS THATTHE PRINCIPALS WE~E AT THEIR POSTS OF DUTY WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE
  • served as Secretary General of the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, and in 1945 was reported as President of the Privy Council of the Kingdom, ··with some indication that he. may have held the post since 1930.. He became Crown Prince of Luang Prabang sometime
  • TO THE COililAND POST AMD. AP P R O P R I AT E ACTI ON A G E N C I E S . PART SEVEN: ( A) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: 1 5 AF WI LL PROVI DE THE TASK FORCE CO-'IMANDER AND '-IINI^JUM NECESSARY STAF F TO PROVI DE FOLLOWING L E G , FOR EMROUTE '’1 I S S I 0 N PLANNING
  • SEACOORD posts informed. Embassy Bangkok should be given necessary resources_ to do the job. Saigon will ccntinue to have primary responsibility for reporting and policy recommendations relating to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, keeping other SEACOORD
  • /CINCAFSTRIKE HJEADXP/CINCAFSTRIKE COMMAND POST LANGLEY AFB VA RUEADX/2D WEATHER GP LANGLEY AFB VA INFO RUEKDA/JCS ,, ^ECEASSIFIED RUEKC/ANMCC Authori^ E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (B) RUERC/NECPA RUEKMJ/NEACP r ------RUEAHQ/CSAF RUEPDA/CSA RUECW/CNO RUECEM/CMC
  • , post- war life, and government of the nation . An amnesty offer and proposals for national reconciliation would be steps in the right dir ecti on and should be parts of the plan. It is important that this plan be one which will appear reasonable
  • . FONECON MACV301723 EST. Elements of a US rifle platoon have landad on the US Embassy roof. The situation in the embassy area is slackening. 13. PONECON MACV301730 EST. hRs been evacuated, except have moved to bunkers. for Tan Son Nhut command post
  • directed at US positions the northern provinces including the posts at Khe Sar.h, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, and Chu Lai. The US/ South Vietnamese 36-hour cease-fire began at 5: 00 AM EST this morning. Some 45 minutes before it· began, Saigon announced
  • this duty. At least half of the RD cadres have been with- 9Xawn to assist ;!.n tp.e 9-efepse of towns or cities·. RF and PF posts outside ominous ract .units in itself~- withdrawing In short, of cities are many scattere~ to towns or cities 9ut
  • O STS (Additional addresses^) iJ A A P IE R C E ARROW In lie u of not yet available detailed wrap-up of P IE R C E ARROW re ly . operation, posts shouldKai§r on following ite m s contained w ire le ss file »» * '■* •., fo r inform ation
  • theater in World War II — it was in our deepest national interest to provide that help. Three events in the immediate post-war period set the stage for the type of problems we have been wrestling with in Asia, in a steady ssd COPY LBJ LIBRARY -3and
  • ) TO WHICH GVN HAS D IR EC T ACCESS, E IT H E R THROUGH OG LIA IS O N OFFICER POSTED IN SAIGON, GVN LIA ISO N O FFICER ATTACHED TO OG HQ, OR D IR EC T COMMUNICATIONS L IN K W ITH OG. B E LrE V E WE MUST RECOGNIZE TH A T OG WHICH ANSWERS ABOVE D ESC RIPTIO N W
  • and broad papers on the key problem appr~isal of Section G is a discussion of possible options in the area of our negotiating post~~e> discussing possible actions that might be taken in co~~unc~ion with the at~our.cement of whatever actions may
  • DISSOLUTION THAT GOVERNMENT. HOLDOVERS; AM VAN do who held IN FOREIGN a f f a i r s POST, KY CHOSE TO RETAIN TP 4 »\ riU Same p o r t f o l io i n . f i r s t diem government and, in QUAT GOVERNMENT DO should f u r n i s h u s e f u l c o n t i n u i t y , e x
  • of the negotiations and/or a means of solving the problem of GVNintran­ sigence. The United States would have agreed to continue foreign aid .to South Vietnam as long as desired by a post settlement government. The USSRhad no objections to outside countries furnishing