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  • was very light. Attached are articles appearing April 19 in the Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, and also the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune. 7 The Guardian carried a press wire service dispatch :f'romParis stating that the French confirmed
  • . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • . the argument Notably for a reserve after the experience minimal national at a time of isolation and extreme danger, some part persistence as a national in Britain's Aside from nuclear Washington, diplomacy it capabilities the argument did
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • talking in terms of March. Experience on other weapon systems indicates that there is usually some time lag between an initial operational capability and a dependable capability. Nevertheless, this interim detection system should be fully operational
  • use of of nucloar weapons. I confim that the Memorandum Understanding -enclosed viith your letter correctly reJresent,s the position of my Government. J"t the s~~a time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the underta.'d.ngs g1van
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /s/ DeanRusk Dean Rusk •• ·CEIVED ~-os I 0\1'S
  • of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-swmnary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon and other interested on 24 March, for senior participants officials. Individual film showings were
  • . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
  • at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon­ ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface­ to-air missile
  • , Game Director) . As one of the participanta aaid at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, con­ people in tributed by so many knowledgeable
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • of NSJ:.M 143 and NSJ~M 197. UNCUSSIFIED -3­ 3. In order to pl
  • . foregoing 'tak:i.nc,; into· bei~ to that tiMe • .3.3 Departril~nt }1iniste:tr with other am;enc~os -~oncerried • EIID~· ~-3 Lb)(>)(t,}('1)" i 't A~~
  • that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time
  • India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests
  • that the I:ldians have yet decided to begin weapons development. At the same time, evcrythiJ:1« the Indians have done so far would be compatible "1th a wce.J?.Onsproe;ram 11' at sane future date it appeared desirable to start one. 'lbis is probably no accident. One
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • keep NAC fully and proq,tly informed of developments at Geneva • • You should express readiness consider any points 3. by allies and offer such further clarm.cations raised as may be posoible in next two weeks; at same time you should make
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa­ bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex­ trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi­ cacy of various
  • On the orders of the da7: .(Tn1naration] Mr. Real Caouette
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • relatively long-range mis­ siles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program. 4 IMPAt:l' OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR W!.APONB S. FrfflCI. N'tldmr Te,t Pror,,am Turning to the French nuclear .test J>?OP.1
  • . -Fnacla coepentioa la botb tbe ''ceautructlft and •11U11Ctlw" aapecta of wclau Wrff. Ha look• ~ to aDOtber vlalt to tile UaltiN State• Dest ,-a.r wbea Ile wUa the AEC mlpt, ban more time to ..... atalf _. Yl•Hiac AEC flldllU.a. r f.raia &om •Jial that I f
  • to their is favorable no doubt attempt the unpopular cause. to bring who are likely nuclear ownership greatness "merchants have to be discreet, officers since pressure de Gaulle's connnitted than de Gaulle. these also time they on the general's
  • purposes will not be adopted at this time. · I 2. Limited war stockpile objectives will be based upon: a. estimated essential shortages during a two-year emergency period {as opposed to the present three-year planning period), and b. the assumption
  • this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion. l. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our
  • the possibility of our denial being effective, at least to hinder the timing of the French nuclear effort. Therefore I would withhold approval until the British had been approached and given a brief period to respond. The IBM computer is in a much different
  • , the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomal play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting
  • the nuclear threat Thirdly, whether it could ally, .!:ln hy nucleE.T been subject£·c by the Soviet Union., On the other hand, agab1::;t India although might be feasible c,£ from t;L~c of the U.So have been targetted 'Weapons for some time now
  • the time period we had foreseen. We see no reason to alter our estimate of when they might have an operational ca pa bili ty. Since Communist China has refused to sign the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it can be expected that there will be further
  • is threatening time in this century. c. Need to cooperate holocaust. 2. overall rather is FRG nuclear world peace for third than face nuclear Vis a vis Europe: a. Same as a. above. b. Same as b. above. c. Separate US and Europe on high-risk short of all