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14 results

  • but that certainly has no objection was rather if the u.s. more milj,. time for U.S. weapons, the Joint Committee to the PAL System for U.S. weapons. mentioned also that the destruct had been weapons at the bases visited, and he assumed on other weapons 1n
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • for your information. A 26 minute summary is also available on 16 mmfilm and we would be happy to show it at a time and place convenient to yourself and interested members of your staff. 2. (U) The participants in EPSILON I-65 and those of us in the Joint
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • for are not in our favor submarine force, German aspirations -SECR:E'f (UK - ..SECRET - 8 aspirations for of Indian nuclear lost equality continuing to mount, program with backlash on Europe), time may equal lost On balance, seems in the US
  • not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • judgment on the following: a. The technical, economic, quality, and timing importance of the item to the national weapons program. b. The use actually intended for the item. c. The alternative sources outside the u.s. for the item or a comparable
  • of payments costs for our troops in NATO are temporary . They buy time but they don't cure the problem . Ovet· the Longer term we look for the British to do mo re in Europe which could enable us to do less . We can also anticipate the UK working towa r d some
  • , the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomal play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting
  • wou lc~ }:;e possible e::ce!_Jt after c. cec l c. r ~tion oi \·;c:r by Frc.nce . No Fre r.cil co:,1mitr.'.ent c c.n be given regc:rd ing such re - entry in time of N.=,To a l ert or crisis . Th e y a r e , howev er , ·w illing to perr.,.:..t c