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11 results

  • rity in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline rather than numerical superiority. The President then went on to read a statement later released to the press (attached) , establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council to deal
  • APPROACH ~AST EUROPEANS RE I NTERCESSIO N, GI VZN LACK OF RESULTS TO DATE FROM OUR EFFORTS WITH YUGO SLAVS, IiJD IANS, ALG ER IANS, IRAQ IS AND TUR XS. 2 . HOPE D E PART M E~T WILL GIVE ERIC PACE TR E AT.E NT I N -RESPONSE PRESS. I NQUIRIES. STORY LO W KEY
  • and launched int o a discussion of whether or not we should press for Security Council action on Vietnam, but then returned to explain the devel opment s on the Middle Eas t in New York since July. He concluded by indicating that the non-permanent
  • discussions on the ABM with the Soviet Union. He felt that Kosygin had agreed at Glassboro to have such discussions . A brief exchange followed on exactly what Kosygin had a g reed to at Gla ssboro . The President felt that he had pressed over and over
  • reactions to Syrian and Egyptian provocations, pressed the United States for a public state_ment on the extent of the American com­ mitment to Israel's security. But in lieu of ma.king a public commitment to Israel President Johnson wrote to President Nasser
  • of these states 'Will press for US support in their endeavors. We are skeptical of their ability to cooperate effective4' - - either with each other oz: jointly with local rulers along the Gulf. C. Nevertheless, for the next couple of years the chances are against
  • baa fel~ for 1SG to be helpf•lo tbroughcut tiuat vidiout • - dear• of c®®p®rati@n ancl reapoulveaeea frcm both •diatioll efforto partie•~ tbe~e WOQild be p©>i111t in pressing We have no deaf.re elbow our•elvea into attattica in absence deaire
  • in Libya until 1959, at which time he was appointed Ambassador to India. According to the Indian press, Fikki was very effective as UAR Ambassador; he was given substantial credit for improving Indo-UAR relations. In about March 1964, Fikki was named
  • is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968. SECRET s:se~T -2King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence
  • the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and the n decide to give the supers onic s . Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the r oad, he should refer back to Washington
  • to expand the growth in the level of economic act_ivity -- to continue pressing the absorptive capacity of the areaTs resources and productive facilities. Over time, this is the best and perhaps the only way to absorb labor in the area