Skip to main content

Discover Our Collections

23 results

Memorandum # 335, Preparation of Arms Control Program, 6/8/1965 (Item)

priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n

Folder, "A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation (Rostow)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

. the argument Notably for a reserve after the experience minimal national at a time of isolation and extreme danger, some part persistence as a national in Britain's Aside from nuclear Washington, diplomacy it capabilities the argument did

Memorandum # 351, Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, 6/10/1966 (Item)

to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need

Folder, "NSAM # 335: Preparation of Arms Control Program, 6/28/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

Presidential decision on the substance of a programo I believe this is a realistic schedule which will make possible the timely and orderly considera tion by the President of the subjects covered by NSAM 335. This proposed schedule presents one difficulty

Folder, "Problem of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe (Murray)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface to-air missile

Folder, "JCS -- BETA I & II‑67, Final Report, 4/67," Agency Files, NSF, Box 32 (Item)

, Game Director) . As one of the participanta aaid at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, con people in tributed by so many knowledgeable

Folder, "NSAM # 355: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further to NSAM 351, 8/1/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 9 (Item)

tentatively assigned to these alternatives. Some disagreement does exist concerning the specific circumstances in which given actions might be taken, and it is generally agreed that these uncertainties cannot be resolved at this time. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958

Memorandum # 305, Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1964, 6/16/1964 (Item)

of NSJ:.M 143 and NSJ~M 197. UNCUSSIFIED -3 3. In order to pl

Folder, "NSAM # 305: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1964, 6/16/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 5 (Item)

that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time

Folder, "Background Paper on Factors which Could Influence National Decisions re Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons (Garthoff)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests

Folder, "NUCLEAR - Freeze Strategic Nuclear Vehicles, U.S. Views (Committee of Principals)," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33 (Item)

keep NAC fully and proq,tly informed of developments at Geneva • • You should express readiness consider any points 3. by allies and offer such further clarm.cations raised as may be posoible in next two weeks; at same time you should make

Folder, "NUCLEAR - Non-Proliferation Treaty," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 36 (Item)

and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time

Folder, "JCS -- BETA War Games‑SM Keeny, 1967 [2 of 2]," Agency Files, NSF, Box 32 (Item)

that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi cacy of various

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Draft Treaty on Non/Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3/27/1968, Volume 5, Tab 66," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

-~-ol- SE CRET --&:EC !tEI -2 The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from

Folder, "NSAM # 50: Official Announcement of Launching Into Space of Systems Involving Nuclear Power in any Form [Revised], 4/10/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

a single approval action for a series of similar tests will suffice, the Secretary of State will be consulted with respect to the timing of each test. aunches involving nuclear devices ~ 'a ~ 6a ' ·-- Ji #... 'ifCuv:. J .. t The Executive Secretary

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] The Problem of Indian Nuclear Weapons, 6/9/1966, Volume 3, Tab 40," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity for Western assistance; b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialis ts. We must

Folder, "NSAM # 351: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, 6/10/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8 (Item)

. 'interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be • d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued. The study should balance the price of each

Folder, "Arms Control on The Ocean Bottom Panel I (Nat'l Security)," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 19 (Item)

lnformaUon. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the documenL (C) Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In the donor's deed at gift. ' j P' DD~sn~ I u , , l\Ilt.l lll,} JdU1 USP f • , • I • r ) TH~ NEW YORK TIMES

Folder, "Arms Control on the Seabed," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 19 (Item)

of the existiI!g ~iological, chemical end physica~ processes end ·balances; Each State shall provide timely announcement and c.ny necessary amplifying - ... information of any mt.rine activity or ex.:;ieriment planned by it or its nationals that coul~ harmfully

Folder, "Memo on Security Guarantees and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ACDA)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

the nuclear threat Thirdly, whether it could ally, .!:ln hy nucleE.T been subject£·c by the Soviet Union., On the other hand, agab1::;t India although might be feasible c,£ from t;L~c of the U.So have been targetted 'Weapons for some time now

Folder, "JCS -- BETA War Games‑SM Keeny, 1967 [1 of 2]," Agency Files, NSF, Box 32 (Item)

is threatening time in this century. c. Need to cooperate holocaust. 2. overall rather is FRG nuclear world peace for third than face nuclear Vis a vis Europe: a. Same as a. above. b. Same as b. above. c. Separate US and Europe on high-risk short of all

Folder, "Committee of Principals - General," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

anything to do with the Committee of Principals. It might be possible to find something by talking personally to Bromley, but the time hasn't seemed to arrive; if you want to talk with him, that might help. * Attached. Ina

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Stockpile Criteria, 10/31/1968, Volume 5, Tab 74," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

, with representatives from the Departments and Agencies listed on Attachment A. Since that time the Committee has had under continuing r eview the criteria upon which the stockpile objectives are determined. President Johnson specifically charged the Committee to give