Skip to main content
-
Collection >
National Security Files
(remove)
-
Tag >
Digital item
(remove)
-
Specific Item Type >
Meeting notes
(remove)
Limit your search
Tag
Date
Subject
Type
Collection
Series
Specific Item Type
Time Period
63 results
- proposals when as ked a bout them
-• . !" ...)
some days ag o .
SECRET
J
SERVJCESET
-,
.
I
- 2
Mr . McCone said the photographic intelligence shown the President
was so new that there had been little time to analyze it. He said that
neither
- of the decision to make a
reprisal strike only.
The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's
strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera
tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
- , but it is a day- to
day problem. The Greek Cypriots are trying to delay progress in order to throw
the entire problem into the G eneral Assembly. Turkish military intervention
becomes more difficult with the passage of time .
Secretary Rusk :
Dean Acheson has
- through international or private a gencies,
Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the
other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the UAR,
voluntary a gency programs might have to give for the time being
- assistance to Indonesia is in
the U.S. national interest. In an amendment to the For eign Assistance Act,,
Congress required the President to make such a deter mina tion ( see attached
State Department pape r ) .
Secretary Rusk said it was not a good time
- of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon.
As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20
missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of
the billet.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
- and diplomatic. I see
a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally
I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak
over with.
The President:
I think that public approval is deteriorating , and
that it will continue to go
- in Cuba
would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries
of the methods of dealing with the EC M . In addition , there may
come a time when we have a critical ne ed to look at a SAM - defended
site. If we use the ECM now, we would thr
- Vietnam . W e have asked many times what
the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We
have hea rd nothing to date in reply.
c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in
Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
- of an
Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro
prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else
where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a
growing chance that he will try a shoot-down
- ing for a
long time.
The President:
The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get
partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris.
Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns
- action and a General Assembly at this time is undesirable.
Rusk said that while the present trouble is tribal unrest and rebel
bands moving freely in the absence of effective police, we must assume that
if disintegration continues the Communists
- , at which time the tempo will s t ep up .
In r e sponse to the President 1 s questions, General Wheeler gave these
answers:
a. Iniiltration from North to South V i etnam is estimated a t about 4, 500
men per month.
b. Air operations in the north have
- the
time he is in New York he will see 70 or 80 Foreign Ministers. This
opportunity provides a useful review of bilate r a l problems in addition to useful
discussions of UN i ssues .
2 . As to African representatives , they are better than they used
- that he too would have
time to visit several Latin American countries to demonstrate our
high-level interest in the area .
The President asked Mr. Ht:_lms for the latest situation report from
Mr. Helms said
the Generals are fed up
with President Thieu
- , it was later decided to
spend the meeting time discussing the President's Asian trip .
Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged
that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior
to the NSC Meeting
- of the large n umber
of North Korean Migs available to attack them .
General Wheeler sai d some p l anes were sent from Okinawa but that in
order to reach Wonsan they needed to refuel on route. From the time that
the commanders received the ship ' s call
- clear the huge amount of time which we spend defending our selves from
our domesti c opponent s . More time should be spent on new initiatives.
Perhaps we should have two Councils - - one defensive and one offensive. New
initiatives are required. We can
- not feel that he should strike north before his
security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No
strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological
requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels
- whoever comes
out on top. It is a messed up situation.
Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassado r Taylor 's planned trip to
Washington. We have a strong t eam in the field and we don 2 t know when would be
a better time for him to come.
r:f'OP
- Minister Gromyko may go.
With respect to the Chinese Communist nuclear test, the short-run effect in
Asia will be intense fear of fallout. A serious, long - run effect will be felt in
Japan and India. Now is no time for a new policy toward Communist China
- . The Kennedy statement at Fort Bragg referring to th e U.S. G over nment's
position at the time of the Geneva Conference.
2 . The Taylor Report, 196 1 -- that part which discussed what might be
necessary if current moves did not work in Vietnam .
3.
The Geneva
- time, we should try to move forward
on the President's proposal of an arms registry . The need
of our friends for limited additional military assistance
and our interest in arms control need not be in conflict.
c. In the emotional atmosphere of poli t
-
and the State Department had handled the situation in Brazil . He said
we would have to provide new economic assistance to Brazil but he
hoped that the time had come when we could get something ior this
new aid .
The President replied that we are hard at work
- approved a program of further pressure
against North Vietnam but did not initiate actions for the time being, in
order to allow Ambassador Taylor a period of time in which we hoped he
would be able to assis t the Vietnamese in creating a stable government
- the
proposal to reduce the 72 - hour notice proposal contained in
Recommendation 12 . He ag r eed that this time should be reduced
if -: i.3 possible to do so without 1·esulting in the maldeployment of our
forces in the Pacific.
The Pres ident asked
- on this problem
wi ll be presented in a paper for circulation to the Council.
......
The President:
On our recent Europ ean trip we spent a great deal of time on
this problem and we wi ll continue to do so. However , it is doubtful that
acceptable solutions
- Venus had been failures. He said the USIB, which was now
meeting, would probably re c ommend to the President that the Board
be authorized to c onduct an investigation to determine how this informa
tion reached the p r ess. The Times story was similar
- in the s ame time period than w ill be lost in the air
s trikes.
The off-loading cap acity of the No rth Vietnames e in the po rt of Haiphong would
be struck. However, the Chiefs 1 view is t hat POL targets should be h it as a
first priority. These att
- be over their targets in North Vietnam
at 3 : 00 P . M . their time.
The President gave the fo llowing figures on the four recommended targets :
Tare: et
Dong Hoi Barracks
Vit Thu Lu Barrac ks
Chap Le Army Barracks
Vu Con Barracks
Troops
6,000
150
1,200
- -~-ol-
SE CRET
--&:EC !tEI
-2
The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he
had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be
in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from
- } \"·l e ·d be ho:-n:).
Ul..
II
Tb~
ulti1-.;ate qt;cstion i3
v:h·~the.-
C:r ~ek.. T >.1 !'k
cecl. as!3umi ng
eviccnca !a ~:u.Ha
lnco ~clu:Jiv~ . ?.fa1:a:rios b~z ot;tmzin9~1;)..--~d tb~ Gr !:;'.l~1 cv-a1-y time ~o
! ar , and n~w h: tbl~kn h3 h e c S
-
going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out
there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a
way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional
support for his actions in Vietnam
- and that the Japanese Gove rn
ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided
were:
(1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and
(2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever
sion.
He thought that action
- information and information given by
Ambassador Dobrynin.
The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter,
The S ecreta ry could say:
(a) Astonished at this news.
(b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow.
Tell allies we
- ) are with us; some countries
(e . g . , France and P akistan) are luke warm; some 11 unaligned1 '
countries are flatly opposed.
The Secretary indicated hi s misg1v1.ngs with W!!EiZ r espect to an
app roach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a d e bate
- ..
The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some
allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop.
A t the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was
unce r tain but their confidence
- time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity
for Western assistance;
b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely
by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area
specialis ts. We must
- there were two interpretations of the Russian demand:
.·' ''\. ....
,'
~.
(
(1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space
agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring
their own initiative at a l ater time
- East supplies. He recalled his long acquaintance
with Foreign Minister Malik. He said military rule continued and was
likel y to for some time. He said that additional resources after
January 1 might have to be drained off from other sources rather than
