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Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 113: Jan. 1‑15, 1969 [1 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 44 (Item)
Folder, "JCS -- War Games, Vol. 3, 1/65 ‑ 11/65 [1 of 2]," Agency Files, NSF, Box 31 (Item)
  • ) MGENJames C. Sherrill, J-4 USAF------------------- Mr. Abbott Smith------------------------------- CIA Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, State Jr. -------------------- Honorable Llewellyn E. Thompson---------------- State GENERAL Earle G. Wheeler, USAF
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 92: Aug. 22‑31, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 39 (Item)
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] U. S., Europe and the Czech Crisis, 9/4/1968, Volume 5, Tab 72," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)
  • itself. We do not know what triggered the Soviet action. 1. East Ge rman Chairman Ulbricht reported to the Soviets following his August visit to Prague. He may have expressed his deep concern over developments in Czechoslovakia and their harmful effect
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 90: Aug. 1‑10, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 38 (Item)
  • Congress. This was clearly an effort to put the be st face on thin.gs. Ulbricht' s departure by plane for Brai:islava has already been reported. Speculation has it that Tito's visit is now scheduled for Monday. Our Intelligence People believe there may
Folder, "INDIA - December 1963-1964 [3 of 4]," Files of Robert W. Komer, NSF, Box 23 (Item)
  • during Ulbricht s visit t the USSR last month for reduci g West Germanyts armed force and for establishing in- ternatioy✓i control militay over its productiona The Soviet premier may the time is ripe to restate modify Soviet positions on European
Folder, "FRANCE - 1964-1966 (March)," Files of Robert W. Komer, NSF, Box 20 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 15, November 1 - 30, 1966 [2 of 3]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 11 [1 of 2] (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 81: June 7‑12, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 35 (Item)
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 3, May 16 - 26, 1966 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 7 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 92: Aug. 22‑31, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 39 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 93: Sept. 1-11, 1968 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 39 (Item)
  • , :_~ :· 2. The Soviets now clearly that they wer'~ ·misled in their estimate ot .the internal situation. The prime instigator or the aggression was Ulbricht, . ·. l ' i \ : ;'. ;. who is .f'rAlightened by the spread of the .liberal tendencies :111 the East
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 97: Oct. 1‑4, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 40 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 105: Nov. 9‑14, 1968 [1 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 42 (Item)
Folder, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 25, April 1-15, 1967 [2 of 2]," Memos to the President, NSF, Box 15 (Item)
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8 (Item)
  • cutting the ground from under Ulbricht. If the Russians don't play, he is more likely to opt for a diluted NATO and against a neutralist position. What is clear, irrespective of what happens in Moscow, is that as a negotiator he will go to great lengths