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  • problem than they themselves realized. The second "fifth column" in Thailand was the North Vietnamese. Those Viet Minh who had fled Laos in 1946 with the return of the French and had settled in Northeast Thailand were partisans of Ho Chi Minh to begin
  • •' '-"'la -A...,_\_,4\.4:.£J. 1,.,L.! 1. - 4,... I U.°1tle~~stan1, ho•.vcver, th".t Stat~ 1.-Ioncfo.y. C:ctobcr 21. r.;1.::iy now y,rish to Tcco~.uizc a::; e::i.rly as ... The l.Hlitary Govei·nm.:.::nt is i!l !u!l co:1trol, a nc1 no dzniflc:~mi oppo
  • an emissary to make a peace proposal to Ho Chi Minh. Ho turned him down flatly . This reveals the present attitude of Hanoi very clearly-- directly from the rankin g Hanoi leader . Secretary Clifford: For some weeks we have had reports that Hanoi
  • important t!iat we maintain ·· & certain flexibility in our public poelilona because we •imply do not bow ·:~ the ezact form negotiations will aaaume. But ho can be confident that we do not intend to n.aotiate without the GVN laaua which are it• vital
  • POLI'rtCAl PAiHTIES, CvM~UlSYS AND GAULLISTS, NOT ONLY SPEClFlCALLV OPPOSEDTO OUR vn:THAt'r f'FPRTS SUT Al.SO DEOICAU.:o TO LIMITATIOH OF TIIE PO'tER AOOINFLUENCE OF THE U.S. IN ~LO AF'F'AIRS. 3. F~E CU OFFICIAL INTERF"ER}:NCE- HO\J MUCHOE GAULLE WILL VISH
  • with. And trana.for of ma.tedalo and atomic weapon& pa.rt.• to, die Unked ~ pursrw:4 to tho /\gno• m.mt bet.w04D &ho Cio\fCJtmllem oi Che UnUcd State• of ,;\.meftca And the Oowrnmam of tbo UDUed Klagdom of ONot Britda and Norehorn lrelaod tor Cooperation OD tho Use
  • BREZHNEVGOES• KOS~GI~ WILL: NOT• BREZHNEV's· SUCCESSOR IS UNKNOWN,BUT GRECHKOWILL BE REPLACED BY GSF'G·CINC YAt
  • , EXCEPT HIMSELF, KNEW ABOUT~ r i :. 3. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN WAR AS A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, HE SAID. HE HAD CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A COURSE . OF MODER AT ION O_N-THE WHOLE QUEST ION OF PALEST I NE IN THE HO PE THAT REASONABLE MEN COULD ONE
  • FR0~l 1ATIJN OF THE ALLIA~·JCE FO~ ?ZACE AND 3AIGON TELLS O? .TH~ FOR[ DEt•108R::\CYCLIE:t'l MINH CAC LU LUONG DA~-JTOC V.~ HJ.~ BIUH). GP- 1 • 900 1 1 .-:_~y:f' ··t:::z r, 2 a -,tottrt·· ., w · ...... ----~---~---··· ·•••·-;-4~7
  • . There would be no particular problem in his waltlng 30 to 60 days, although it might be helpful polltlcally and psychologically if the announcement were made earlier. in Guatemala W. W. Rostow DECLASSIFIED Whtto Ho By4 WWRostow:rln ~ GONFID!:MTIA.L
  • . A -Pix Photo Ho Chi Minh and his people feel the strain of war, "have as many problems as we-probably more" smaller number of the raids against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos come from Thailand. Without the backup bases in Thailand, we wouldn't be able
  • to g iv e e ffe c t iv e a id to Vietnam b ut th a t t h e ir a s sis ta n c e w i l l be lim it e d by t h e ir c a p a b ilit ie s and t h e i r r e a liz a t io n o f t h e ir own needs at home. - GDGRET/HO F eaf ilCM P1S3BM — COPY LBJ LIBRARY
  • SLXJGEStlON AND I!S I'.1.EL,I~:cATIONS CLEARLY., .THAT LAU'S RESPONSE W.AS NEGAT1:VE--BIJT-THAT ...~HE: SAID Hi WOULD~!HINK ABOUT: IT. I TOLD ZORIN I ASSUMED NOR7H · i•VI£T:~h~1!::S_i:: WQULD-DIS.CUSS THIS MAT-TER1.HTH ·HIM. AND I HO?EO_~·:_ . :..t•/OULi) SE
  • . OF HO?E" AND ASK£D MCCLOY WHETHL~ · THE US WOULD BE' VILLlNG TO '"SfEP ASIDK" ·AND PERMlt ··· soME GERMAN PURCHASES IN .THE. UK -OF - MILIT ARY EQUIPt1ENT ·WHICH WOULD •. OTHERWISE : BE MADE L~ THE: US. ·THIS REDUCT ION IN OFFSET ~PURCHA$ES BElwEEN - :I
  • , consideration might be given to ho,lding regular· Natio·n al Security Council meetings limited to examination of crises which can be expected in the months ahead. Such a meet• ing would give the intelligonce community the ~p­ portunity to ensure
  • UNIQUE STATES USSR gUP- , Jt01'1iS'RGA IN ITS EFFORTS AMONG·ASIAN, NON.ALIGNED COUNTRIES "AGAINST COLONIALISM, OLD AND,;NEW." ,BOTH POWERSEXPRESSED HO E UN TJltADE AND .?>EVELORfENTCONFERENCEOBJECTIVES "WILL IE YET MORE FULLY REALIZEB" BEFOftE NEXT
  • Vietnamese guerrillas up the Ho Chi Minh Trail-in reverse and taking over North Vietnam supply • po~s~~ey~. ·0 Hi13 general evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam is very·reasonable encouraging·. He has asked for an appointment through his· embassy
  • complexltieG aa4 posaible pktalla tn tbl# uercl::Ht. We also ,:i..itae tiat 1n the lut analysts lt 1- the KoHtms ¥atber tb.aa the Japallese '-•ho will have to walk ·the &1al mil•• Tlwl f4 ~-elJ' wby the J?~eoideot tallted with B~ovm. A• l'0\1 kl.1ow. the Pre
  • . For Hanoi dld not observe the splrit or the letter of the agreement from. the day it went lnt:o effect. thelr military forces out of Laos. They dld not, as they had promlsed. pull And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Mlnh trail through Laos
  • of the agreement from. the day it went lnt:o effect. thelr military forces out of Laos. They dld not, as they had promlsed. pull And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Mlnh trail through Laos to send their men and war m.a.terlal into South Vietnam
  • in London wh.en he arrived to see Wilson and that Wilson and Koaygln were annoyed by the letter to Ho Chi Minh and the Moscow contact. I told hlm that there w·e re exceedingly good reasons which could bear on the future prospects fol' peacemaking, why we did
  • South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows: 1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area
  • to spend instead for bread. We would even be willing to help Ho Chi Minh. I He stressed, ho.vever, that out of Vietnam, saying that if were no good anywhere~ He said OUr answer is Yes. Hanoi Is is we were not going to surrender or pull agreements :ho
  • and he might be an effective President. But I have come to believe that the healthiest thing that could happen in Viet-Nam right now would be the election of a civilian. The best government I can think of would be: Huong as President., Big Minh as Vice
  • • the future of South Vl·e •aam and &ho hope• of it• owa poo}lle. Ou Jtegloual Devolopm.~uit Plan l• aimed at lte attractloo.• I.or Ham>l; 1 think we ued to •1'ai.-p•u tb.e Idea that &he people who nall1 ueed Tender LoviDg Care are the ricdm• of tbe •tn.aste
  • ·; s ·milffo·n· i -s eligible...1orJna.t chi~­ XD,~0_!_: -than.·=-=._noug h-,_!O r one·-nii1_l;_i~!!.E2.~}. 7. T.~lsTng__the-·second_m.~ur.e·_ ·ot:lnatcli~f!g~ ~th¢l'o.:i·~=al~(Q;~:~-*-~ough: pro~v t~tCn:ew··~aia: that_· ls~t:7.easGear
  • that the National Liberation Front wished to send representatives to the U. N. During my meeting with President Thieu December 6, I reviewed with him the status of his proposed letter to Ho Chi Minh suggesting direct talks betweenNorth and South Vietnam. He has
  • Committee. 4. Algerian Message to Ho Chi Minh - Algeriahas released a message trom Boumedienne to Ho Chi Minh which, inter alia, condemns our air strik es on North Viet Nam, suggests Viet Nam is under colonial occupation, characterizes the NLF as the sole
  • . n., tvan 1f you cmm.>t ..JDCO tilt ~D~ tlv~ Qmtl Ds.322A Dt>W accept our p ~ , I uxgo you tu .1ct at tfio 82 smviv~ ~ of 'tiie Pueblo's crew amd iho b""Y of lldX·.- \.ho died wilo in your cust«.y. Jloldia3 tho crau as h~u:es mad
  • the Bo Cbl Minh trail in Laos; doing.more al>out the fiow of supplies £rom Cambodia; improving. if possible. the-naval blockade; -- Preaatns l(y to seek to defect high-level Vi et Cong ft.g ui-es, and to consider more explicit ofter& about future
  • to be criteria. · spelled out by Mr. matched by a similar toler­ .Acheson twenty years ago,· arice for other totalitarian re­ ; that ·a id program has ·been a"· gimes such as that of Ho Chi dismal failure. Minh in North Vietnam: It Testifying before the Senate
  • regime aids the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam with large numbers of m ilitary specialists, vital supplies and equipment, and key commu ­ nications facilities. Much of the personnel and materiel moves into South Viet-Nam over the so-called “ Ho Chi Minh T
  • ' WWRostow:rln DECLi. ~s·r:rn E.O . 12)5 ~ ~ 'hire Ho, " C t ,· ', fA.f-, 1 .-(.l •• . t,, , .i(b) ~ .'.J. 1--t, t9,:;,3 . ~ -?-?t:Z- -~ ' - . - - SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASH I NG T ON PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD June 7, 1968
  • and on the Conimtmists and the Outc~~es of Present activity there weakened. ftu·ther 13. l'le believe of rnili tary into the poll tical e::1erge from the present the GVU/ARVN will Alternative occu.r, to be contained,; manifest being ho:·rever, hand, US
  • kno'Wil for several months, now, that the Communists ·planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh's order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. • We know the object was to overthrow